In 1903-1905, Hans Von Arnim (1859–1931) published Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, the
Fragments of the Ancient Stoics. This work is a collection of Greek and Latin fragments that pertain to the early Stoic philosophers, ranging from Zeno of Citium through Boethus Sidonus. A fragment in this work is often cited with the abbreviation SVF in other sources, so that either
SVF 3.4 or
S.V.F. iii, frag. 4 refers to the fourth fragment in the third volume.
This webpage began as a copy of the work by Dr. Jan Garrett from an older website entitled
The Stoic Place at Western Kentucky University, which does not appear to have been updated over a decade. Garrett translated some of the material from Volume 1 and Volume 3 into English, and often included
Loeb to refer to the translation in the Loeb Classical Library (LCL) by Harvard University Press.
Translators include JG as Jan Garrett and LS as Long and Sedley.
The presentation, here, is part of a project to continue translating the work by Hans Von Arnim. Contributions are welcome.
1. Diogenes Laërtius 7.1.
2. Diogenes Laërtius 7.2.
3. Diogenes Laërtius 7.3.
4. Diogenes Laërtius 7.4.
5. Diogenes Laërtius 7.5.
6. Diogenes Laërtius 7.6.
7-8. Diogenes Laërtius 7.10. “In the archonship of Arrhenides, in the fifth prytany of the tribe Acamantis on the twenty-first day of Maemacterion, at the twenty-third plenary assembly of the prytany, one of the presidents, Hippo, the son of Cratistoteles, of the deme Xypetaeon, and his co-presidents put the question to the vote; Thraso, the son of Thraso of the deme Anacaea, moved:
Whereas Zeno of Citium, son of Mnaseas, has for many years been devoted to philosophy in the city and has continued to be a man of worth in all other respects, exhorting to virtue and temperance those of the youth who come to him to be taught, directing them to what is best, affording to all in his own conduct a pattern for imitation in perfect consistency with his teaching, it has seemed good to the people — and may it turn out well — to bestow praise upon Zeno of Citium, the son of Mnaseas, and to crown him with a golden crown according to the law, for his goodness and temperance, and to build him a tomb in the Ceramicus at the public cost. And that for the making of the crown and the building of the tomb, the people shall now elect five commissioners from all Athenians, and the Secretary of State shall inscribe this decree on two stone pillars and it shall be lawful for him to set up one in the Academy and the other in the Lyceum. And that the magistrate presiding over the administration shall apportion the expense incurred upon the pillars, that all may know that the Athenian people honor the good both in their life and after their death. Thraso of the deme Anacaea, Philocles of Peiraeus, Phaedrus of Anaphlystus, Medon of Acharnae, Micythus of Sypalettus, and Dion of Paeania have been elected commissioners for the making of the crown and the building.
9. Themistius Or. XXIII 295 D. Hard.
10. Strabo XIII p. 614.
11. Numenius Eusebii praep. evang. XIV 5, 11 (p. 729b).
12. Numenius Eusebii praep. evang. XIV 6, 9 (p. 732b).
13. Cicero Acad. Post 1.34. Finally, Polemo had diligent pupils in Zeno and Archesilas, but Zeno, who was Arcesilas’s senior in age and an extremely subtle dialectician and very actue thinker, instituted a reform of the system. Cicero De Finibus 4.3.
14. Quintilian Inst. Orst. 12 7, 9.
15. Seneca ad Helviam 12, 4. It is well-known that Homer had one slave, Plato three, that Zeno, the founder of the strict and virile school of Stoic philosophy, had none.
16. Seneca De Benef. 4.39,1.
Why then, you say,
did your master Zeno when he had promised a loan of five hundred denarii to a man, and had himself discovered that he was an altogether unsuitable person, persist in making the loan because he promised it, although his friends advised him not to give it?
17. Themistius orst. 21 252B.
18. Sopater phlyacographus apud Athen. IV 160e.
19. Aelianus Var. Hist. 9.33
20. Diogenes Laërtius 7.22. He was a man of a very investigating spirit, and one who inquired very minutely into everything; in reference to which, Timon, in his Silli, speaks thus: —
[I saw an aged woman of Phoenicia,
Hungry and covetous, in a proud obscurity,
Longing for everything. She had a basket
So full of holes that it retained nothing.
Likewise her mind was less than] a simdapsus [W sort of guitar or violin.]”
Note: Is Garrett citing instead the end of Diogenes Laërtius 7.15?
21. Timon Phliasius Sill. fr. XX W. Diogenes Laërtius 7.16.
22. Timon Phliasius Sill. fr. VIII W. Diogenes Laërtius 7.15.
23. Athenaeus XIII 603d.
24. Ind. Stoic. Herc. col. IX.
25. Ind. Stoic. Herc. col. VIII.
26. Plutarch De Stoic. Rep. 4.1034a.
27. Plutarch De Stoic. Rep. 2.1033b.
28. Dio Chrysostom or. XLVII § 2.
Cf. Seneca De Tranq. An. 1, 10.
29. Arrian, Epictetus discourses 3.21, 19
30. Ind. Stoic. Herc. col. I.
31. Ind. Stoic. Herc. col. III.
32. Ind. Stoic. Herc. col. VI.
32a. Athenaeus IX 370c.
33. Galen De differentia pulsuum iii 1, vol viii p. 642 K.
34. Cicero De Finibus 3.5. Cicero De Finibus 3.15.
35. Cicero Tusc. Disp. 5.34.
36. Lucianus Macrob. 19.
36b. Pausanias 1.29, 15
37. Strabo XVI p. 757.
38. Diogenes Laërtius 7.36.
39. Ind. Stoic. Herc. col. X 2.
40. Origen Contra Celsum 3.54 Vol. I p.250,3.
40a. Plutarch vita Cleom. 2.
41. Diogenes Laërtius 7.4.
42. Ind. Stoic. Herc. col. IV.
43. Clemens Alex. Strom. V 9 p. 680 Pott.
44. Quintilian Inst. Orat. XII 1,18.
45. Diogenes Laërtius 7.39
Cicero De Finibus 4.4
46. Diogenes Laërtius 7.40. The Stoics divide reason according to philosophy, into three parts; and say that one part relates to natural philosophy, one to ethics, and one to logic. And Zeno, the Cittiaean, was the first who made this division, in his treatise on Reason …
47. Cicero De Finibus 4.9.
48. Arrian Epictetus Disc. 1.17, 10, 11.
49. Stobaeus Ecl. II 2. 12 p. 22,12 W.
50. Plutarch De Stoic. Rep. 8, 1034f.
51. Arrian Epictetus Disc. 4.8, 12.
52. Cicero Acad. Prior 2.66.
53. Cicero Acad. Post. 1.42.
54. Cicero pro Mur. § 61.
55. Cicero Acad. Post. 1.40.
56. Numenius apud. Euseb. praep. evang. XIV 6,13.
57. Galen De Optima Doctrina 1 Vol. I p. 41 K.
58. Sextus Empiricus Adv. Math. 7.236. Sextus Empiricus Adv. Math. 6.230.
59. Cicero Acad. Prior 2.18. Cicero Acad. Prior 2.77. Sextus Empiricus Adv. Math. 7.248. Sextus Empiricus Adv. Math. 7.426. Sextus Empiricus Pyrrh. Hypot. 2.4. Diogenes Laërtius 7.50. August. c. Acad. III 9, 18.
60. Cicero Acad. Post. 1.41.
61. Cicero Acad. Post. 1.40.
62. Cicero Acad. Post. 1.41.
63. Sextus Empiricus Adv. Math. 8.355. Cicero De Nat. Deorum 1.70.
64. Chrysippus apud Sextus Empiricus Adv. Math. 7.373.
65. Stobaeus Ecl. I p. 136, 21 W.
66. Cicero Acad. Prior 2.144.
67. Sextus Empiricus Adv. Math. 7.151.
68. Cicero Acad. Post. 1.41.
69. Cicero Acad. 1.42. Sextus Empiricus Adv. Math. 7.151.
71. Diogenes Laërtius 7.23.
72. Schol. ad. Dionys. Thracis Gramm. ap. Bekk. Anecd. p. 663, 16.
73. Olympiodorus in Plat. Gorg. p. 53, 54.
74. Eustath. in II. Diogenes Laërtius 7.55.
75. Sextus Empiricus Adv. Math. 2.7. Cicero De Finibus 2.17.
76. Cicero De Finibus 4.7.
77. Cicero Ad. Famil. IX 22, 1.
78. Plutarch De Stoic. Rep. 8, 1 p. 1034e.
79. Quintilian Inst. Orat. IV 2. 117.
80. Plutarch vita Phoc. 5.
81. Diogenes Laërtius 7.18.
85. Diogenes Laërtius 7.134.
Philo. De Provid. I 22.
86. Chalcidius in Tim. c.290.
87. Stobaeus Ecl. I 11.5a, p. 132, 26 W.
88. Chalcidius in Tim. c.292.
89. Stobaeus Ecl. I p. 138, 14 W.
90. Cicero Acad. Post. 1.39.
91. Aëtius I 15, 6 (DDG p. 313).
92. Galen comment. in Hippocr. de humoribus I (SVI 32 K.).
93. Stobaeus Ecl. I 8. 40e p. 1047, 7 W. (Arius Didymus Fr. 26 Diels).
94. Themistius in Phys. 40b Speng. II 284, 10.
95. Aëtius I 18, 5 et 20, 1 (DDG p. 316b 11, 317b 31).
96. Philoponus in Aristotle Phys. p. 613, 23.
97. Diogenes Laërtius 7.143.
99. Stobaeus Ecl. I 19, 4 p. 166, 4 W.
100. Schol. Hes. Theog. 134 Gaisf. Gr. Poet. Min. II 482.
152. Sextus Empiricus Adv. Math. 9.133
153. Hippolytus Philosoph. 21, 1 (DDG p. 571)
154. Cicero De Nat. Deorum 1.36. Here Zeno says god is another name for the aither. Tertullian adv. Marcion I 13. They describe the gods as air or aether, as Zeno does. Minuc. Felix 19, 10. aer is the principle of all things. Cicero Acad. Prior 2.126. For Zeno and the rest of the Stoics the highest god seems to be aether, endowed with mind, by which all things are ruled.
155. Tertullian ad nat. ii 4
156. Tertullian De praes. cup. 7
157. Aëtius I 7, 23
Aug. adv. academicos iii 17, 38
159. Tatian ad Graec. 3, p. 143 c
160. Lactantius De vera sap. c. 9.
Tertull. Apol. 21
Minuc. Felix 19, 10
161. Cicero De Nat. Deorum 1.36. … he holds the view that a ‘reason’ which pervades all nature is possessed of divine power. (LCL)
cf. Epiphan adv. Haeres. iii 36.
162. Cicero De Nat. Deorum 1.36. Zeno believes that the law of nature is divine, and that its function is to command what is right and forbid the opposite. — Lactant inst. div. I 5. Zeno (regards god) as divine and natural law. — Minucius Felix Fe. Octav. 19, 10. Zeno [holds that] natural or divine law is the cause of all things.
Cf. Diogenes Laërtius 7.88. … the common law of mankind is in the habit of forbidding, and that common law is identical with that right reason which pervades everything, being the same with Jupiter, who is the regulator and chief manager of all existing things. [This may not be testified for Zeno but only for the Stoics in general.-JG]
Schol. Lucan. II 9
163. Diogenes Laërtius 7.148. The substance of God is asserted by Zeno to be the universal world, and the heaven.
164. Lact De ira dei ch. 11.
165. Cicero De Nat. Deorum 1.36 (LCL). He likewise attributes the same [divine] powers to the stars, or … to the years, months and the seasons.
166. ibid 2.63. Another theory also, and that a scientific one, has been the source of a number of deities, who clad in human form have furnished the poets with legends and have filled man’s life with superstitions of all sorts. This subject was handled by Zeno and was later explained more fully by Cleanthes and Chrysippus.
167. ibid 1.36. Again, in his interpretation of Hesiod’s Theogony, he does away with the customary and received ideas of the gods altogether, for he does not reckon either Jupiter, Juno or Vesta as gods, or any being that bears a personal name, but teaches that these names have been assigned allegorically to dumb and lifeless things. [cocksure Epicurean speaker Velleius.]
168. Philodemus peri eusebias cp. 8
169. Minucius Felix
170. Philodemus peri euseb col 8
171. Cicero De Nat. Deorum 2.57. Now Zeno gives this definition of nature:
nature (he says) is a craftsmanlike fire, proceeding methodically to the work of generation. For he holds that the special function of an art or craft is to create or generate, and that what in the processes of our arts is done by the hand is done with far more skillful craftsmanship by nature, that is, as I said, by that
craftsmanlike fire which is the teacher of the other arts.
Diogenes Laërtius 7.156. Another of their doctrines is that nature is an artificial fire tending by a regular road to production, which is a fiery kind of breath proceeding according to art.
172. Cicero De Nat. Deorum 2.58 (LCL). And on this theory, while each department of nature is craftsmanlike, in the sense of having a method or path marked out for it to follow, the nature of the world itself, which encloses and contains all things in its embrace, is styled by Zeno no merely ‘craftsmanlike’ but actually ‘a craftsman,’ whose foresight plans out the work to serve its use and purpose in every detail. And as the other natural substances are generated, reared and sustained each by its own seeds, so the world-nature experiences all those motions of the will, those impulses of conation and desire, that the Greeks call hormae, and follows these up with the appropriate actions in the same way as we do ourselves, who experience emotions and sensations. Such being the nature of the world-mind, it can therefore correctly be designated as prudence or providence (for in Greek it is term pronoia) and this providence is chiefly directed and concentrated upon three objects, namely, to secure for the world, first, the structure best fitted for survival; next, absolute completeness; but chiefly, consummate beauty and embellishment of every kind.
173. Cicero De Div. 1.6.
174. Diogenes Laërtius 7.149. They also say that divination has a universal existence, since Providence has; and they define it as an act on account of certain results, as Zeno
175. Diogenes Laërtius 7.149. But Chrysippus, in his treatise on Fate, and Posidonius, in the second book of his work on Fate, and Zeno, and Boethus, in the eleventh book of his treatise on Fate, say, that all things are produced by fate. And fate is a connected cause of existing things, or the reason according to which the world is regulated.
176. Aëtius I 27, 5
177. Epiphanius adv. haeres. iii 2, 9
178. Diogenes Laërtius 7.84
230. Diogenes Laërtius 7.107. Again, they say that that is duty, which is preferred, and which contains in itself reasonable arguments why we should prefer it; as for instance, its corresponding to the nature of life itself; and this argument extends to plants and animals, for even their nature is subject to the obligation of certain duties. And duty had this name given to it by Zeno, in the first instance, its appellation being derived from its coming to; and its effect is something kindred to the preparations made by nature.
cf. ibid. 25 They say too, that he was the first who ever employed the word duty, and who wrote a treatise on the subject.
Stobaeus Ecl II 7.8 p. 85, 13 W. The appropriate [action] is defined as
what is consistent in life, which, when carried out, has a reasonable defense. The inappropriate is defined oppositely. This extends even to the irrational among creatures, for they also act in a particular respect consistently with their nature. But with regard to rational creatures, it is interpreted thus:
what is consistent in life. (Arius Didymus, Pomeroy trans.)
Cicero De Finibus 3.58.
231. Cicero Acad. Post 1.37. And just as with these he had made an alteration of terminology rather than of substance (see Zeno on goods and preferreds), so between right action and a sin he placed appropriate action and action violating propriety as things intermediate, classing only actions rightly done as goods, and actions wrongly done, that is, sins, as evils, whereas the observance or neglect of appropriate acts he deemed intermediate.
232. Cicero De Finibus 4.56
Various precepts (233-246)
On the love of young people (247-249)
248. Diogenes Laërtius 7.129. Further, they say that the wise man will feel affection for the youths who by their countenance show a natural endowment for virtue. So Zeno [says] in his Republic (LCL)
On Matters related to Cynicism (250-257)
252. Plutarch quaest. conviv III 6,1
257. Diogenes Laërtius 7.33. Further, he bids men and women wear the same dress and keep no part of the body entirely covered. (LCL)
On rational departure
258. Seneca Epist. 104, 21. if you enjoy living with Greeks also, spend your time with Socrates and with Zeno: the former will show you how to die if it be necessary; the latter how to die before it is necessary. (LCL)
References to Zeno’s Politeia (259-271)
259. Diogenes Laërtius 7.32. Some there are, among them Cassius the sceptic and his disciples, who accuse Zeno at length. Their first count is that in the beginning of his Republic he pronounced the ordinary (enkuklian: general?) education useless.
260. Plutarch De Stoic. Rep. cp. 8 p. 1034f. Having propounded this argument, he continued to write against Plato’s Republic.
261. Plutarch vita Lycurg. 31. … all those who have written well on politics, as Plato, Diogenes, and Zeno, have taken Lycurgus for their model, leaving behind them, however, mere projects and words (for source of trans. see Fragment 263 below).
262. Plutarch De Alex. virt. I 6 p.329a. (1) The much-admired Republic of Zeno … is aimed at this one main point, that our household arrangements should not be based on cities or parishes, each one marked out by its own legal system, but we should regard all men as our fellow-citizens and local residents, and there should be one way of life and order, like that of a herd grazing together and nurtured by a common law. (2) Zeno wrote this, picturing as it were a dream or image of a philosopher’s well-regulated society. (Long and Sedley, p. 429).
Plutarch De Stoic. Rep. cp. 2, 1 p. 1033b. Well, it happens that Zeno … wrote … about the polity, and ruling and being ruled, and judging and pleading cases (cf. LCL 13, pt. 2, p. 415).
John Chrys. Homily on Matt. 4. Not like Plato, who composed that ridiculous Republic,36 or Zeno, or if there be any one else that hath written a polity, or hath framed laws. (Trans. from
Early Church Fathers, Series I, Vol. X, www.ccel.org).
263. Athenaeus XIII 561C. Pontianus said that Zeno of Citium regarded Eros as god of friendship and freedom, and the provider in addition of concord, but of nothing else. Hence in the Republic Zeno said: ‘Eros is a god which contributes to the city’s security.’ (Long and Sedley, p. 430)
Plutarch vita. Lyc. 31. However, it was not the design of Lycurgus that his city should govern a great many others; he thought rather that the happiness of a state, as of a private man, consisted chiefly in the exercise of virtue, and in the concord of the inhabitants; his aim, therefore, in all his arrangements, was to make and keep them free-minded, self-dependent, and temperate. And therefore all those who have written well on politics, as Plato, Diogenes, and Zeno, have taken Lycurgus for their model (Trans. from the
Dryden Plutarch online at bostonleadershipbuilders.com.)
264. Clemens Alex. Strom V 12, 76 p. 691 P Plutarch De Stoic. Rep. 6,1, p. 1034b. Moreover, it is a doctrine of Zeno’s not to build temples of the gods, because a temple not worth much is also not sacred and no work of builders or mechanics is worth much. (LCL)
Theodoretus Aff. Cur. III 74 p. 89.7 Ra.
Epiphanius adv. haeris. III 36. Zeno of Citium says that it is not appropriate to build temples for the gods.
265. Origen Contra Celsum I 5 vol. I p. 59, 3 Ko (p. 324 Del.) We also can add to these Zeno of Citium, who in his Polity, says:
And there will be no need to build temples, for nothing ought to be regarded as sacred, or of much value, or holy, which is the work of builders and of mean men. (Roberts-Donaldson English trans. from
Early Christian Writings, www.earlychristianwritings.com. The text by Origen continues:
It is evident, then, with respect to this opinion (as well as others), that there has been en-graven upon the hearts of men by the finger of God a sense of the duty that is required.)
266. Stobaeus Floril. 43, 88 Mein.
267. Cassius scepticus acc to Diogenes Laërtius 7.33. and at [line] 200 [he] prohibits the building of temples, lawcourts, and gymnasia in cities (LCL)
268. Diogenes Laërtius 7.33. as concerning currency he writes thus,
currency need not be introduced for exchange or for traveling abroad.
269. Diogenes Laërtius 7.131. It is also their doctrine that among the wise there should be a community of wives with free choice of partners, as Zeno says in his Republic. (LCL) 7.33. Again, he lays down community of wives [like Plato] in the Republic.
270. Diogenes Laërtius 7.121. And he [the sage] will marry, as Zeno says in the Republic, and will produce children.
271. Seneca De Otio cp. 3,2. Zeno says: [the wise man] will engage in public affairs unless something prevents him. (LCL, ME II, p. 185).
Seneca De Tranq. An. I 10 (Von Arnim has I 7). Ready and determined I follow Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus, of whom none the less not one entered upon public life, and not one failed to urge others to do so. (LCL)
277. Plutarch … ibid … Diogenes Laërtius 7.5 (LCL). A different version of the story is that he was staying at Athens when he heard his ship was wrecked and said,
It is well done of you, Fortune, thus to drive me to philosophy. — Seneca De Tranq. An. 14,2.
278. Diogenes Laërtius 7.24 (LCL). Apollonius of Tyre tells us how, when Crates laid hold on him by the cloak to drag him from Stilpo, Zeno said,
The right way to seize a philosopher, Crates, is by the ears: persuade me then and drag me off by them; but, if you use violence, my body will be with you, but my mind with Stilpo.
279. Diogenes Laërtius 7.25 (LCL). A dialectician once showed him seven logical forms concerned with the sophism known as ‘The Reaper,’ and Zeno asked him how much he wanted for them. Being told a hundred drachmas, he promptly paid two hundred.
280. Plutarch De prof. in virt 6.78e.
281. Gnomologion Monac. 196 … Cf. Cleanthes n. 619.
282. Chrys. apud Galen de H. et P. plac. III 5.
283. Diogenes Laërtius 7.24 (LCL) On being asked how he felt about abuse, he replied,
As an envoy feels who is dismissed without an answer.
284. Diogenes Laërtius 7.24 (LCL). One day at a banquet he was reclining in silence and was asked the reason: whereupon he bade his critic carry word to the king that there was one present who knew how to hold his tongue. Now those who inquired of him were ambassadors from King Ptolemy, and they wanted to know what message they should take back from him to the king.
285. Athenaeus II 55 F … Galen de anim. mor. 3 (vol. iv p. 777 K) etc.
286. Diogenes Laërtius 7.17 (LCL) Being enamored of Chremonides, as he and Cleanthes were sitting beside the youth, he got up, and upon Cleanthes expressing surprise,
Good physicians tell us, said he,
that the best cure for inflammation is repose.
287. Musonius peri trophes ap Stob. Floril 17, 42.
288. Diogenes Laërtius 7.28,29 (LCL) The manner of his death was as follows. As he was leaving the school he tripped and fell, breaking a toe. Striking the ground with his fist, he quoted the line from the Niobe [of Timotheus]: I come, I come, why does thou call for me? and died on the spot through holding his breath. — Stob. Floril 7.44 - Lucianus Macrob. 19.
289. Aelianus Var. Hist.
290. Athenaeus viii 345c … Diogenes Laërtius 7.19 tells the same story less elegantly.
291. Athenaeusv 186 d.
292. Diogenes Laërtius 7.17 (LCL) When of two reclining next to each other over the wine, the one who was neighbor to Zeno kicked the guest below him, Zeno himself nudged the man with his knee, and upon the man turning round, inquired,
How do you think your neighbor liked what you did to him?
293. Diogenes Laërtius 7.16, 17 (LCL) … his remark about the fop showing himself off,
With good reason, said Zeno,
he looks askance at the mud for he can’t see his face in it.
6. Diogenes Laërtius 7.183.
7. Diogenes Laërtius 7.183.
35. Aëtius I, Preface 2. [Translated by LS] The Stoics said that wisdom is scientific knowledge of the divine and the human, and that philosophy is the practice of expertise in utility. Virtue singly and at its highest is utility, and virtues, at their most generic, are triple — the physical one, che ethical one, and the logical one. For this reason philosophy also has three parts — physics, ethics and logic. Physics is practiced whenever we investigate the world and its contents, -thics is our engagement with human life, and logic our engagement with discourse, which they also call dialectic.
42. Plutarch, De Stoic. Rep. 1035A [Translated part by LS] [Chrysippus from his On Lives book 4] ‘First of all, in my opinion, which corresponds to the correct statements by the ancients, there are three kinds of philosopher’s theorems, logical, ethical and physical. Secondly, what should be ranked first of these are the logical, next the ethical, and third the physical; and what should come last in the physical theorems is theology. Hence the transmission of theology has been called
146. Origen, Contra Celsum 1.24. [Translated by LS] The foregoing matter is beset by the profound and mysterious issue of the nature of names. Are names, as Aristotle [De interpretation I] holds, the product of convention? Or, as the Stoics believe, of nature, the primary sounds being imitations of the things of which the names are said? This is the basis on which they introduce some elements of etymology.
4. Diogenes Laërtius 7.87 (LCL). Again, living virtuously is equivalent to living in accordance with the experience of the actual course of nature, as Chrysippus says in the first book of his De Finibus; for our individual natures are parts of the nature of the whole universe. And this is why the end may be defined as life in accordance with nature, or, in other words, in accorance with our own human nature as well as that of the universe, a life in which we refrain from every action forbidden by the law common to all things, that is to say, the right reason which pervades all things, and is identical with Zeus, lord and ruler of all that is. And this very thing constitutes the virtue of the happy man and the smooth current of life, when all actions promote the harmony of the spirit dwelling in the individual man with the will of him who orders the universe.
12. Galen de H. et Plat decr. V 6 (168) p. 450 M.
16. Stobaeus Ecl. II 77, 16 W.
20. Cicero De Finibus 4 11, 28.
23. Plutarch De Stoic. Rep. cp. 15 p. 1040 c. Again in the books concerning Justice after suggesting that for those who regard pleasure as a good but not a goal it is possible to preserve justice as well he has affirmed this position and said in so many words:
For, if it is held to be a good and not a goal and if the fair too is among the things that are of themselves objects of choice, we could perhaps preserve justice by maintaining that the fair and just is a greater good than pleasure.
23. Plutarch De comm. not. 25.1070d. Also in the books concerning Justice he thinks that while justice could not be preserved if one should set up pleasure as the goal, it could be if one should take pleasure to be not a goal but simply a good. I don’t think you need to hear me now recite the passage word for word, for the third book concerning Justice can be had everywhere.
24. Plutarch De Stoic. Rep. 15.1040e-f. In order to leave his self-contradictions not even a plea of defense, when writing against Aristotle concerning Justice he declares him to be wrong in asserting that, if pleasure is a goal, justice is annulled and along with justice each of the other virtues also. This is wrong according to him because, while justice is in truth annulled by them (who so treat pleasure), nothing prevents the other virtues from existing, since they would at any rate be good and approved even though not per se objects of choice; and then he gives each of them by name. It is better, however, to repeat his own words:
For while pleasure is indicated as a goal in such a theory, that does not, I think, have all this kind of implication. That is why it must be stated that neither is any of the virtues an object of choice per se nor any of the vices an object of avoidance but all these must be referred to the aim one has assumed. Nothing in their theory, however, would prevent courage, prudence, continence, endurance and the virtues similar to these from being classified as goods and the contrary from being objects of avoidance.
29. Plutarch De Stoic. Rep. 13.1039c. 3, 30 Diogenes Laërtius 7.101 (LCL). And they say that only the morally beautiful is good. So Hecato in his treatise On Goods, book iii, and Chrysippus in his work On the Morally Beautiful. They hold, that is, that virtue and whatever partakes of virtue consists in this: which is equivalent to saying that all that is good is beautiful, or that the term
good has equal force with the term
beautiful, which comes to the same thing.
Since a thing is good it is beautiful; now it is beautiful, therefore it is good.
157. Plutarch De Stoic. Rep. 15.1040d.
159. Cicero De Finibus 3 17, 57. But in the books [concerning Justice] against Plato he denounces him for appearing to hold that health is good and says that not only justice but magnanimity are annulled if we hold that pleasure or health or anything else that is not fair is good.
178. Diogenes Laërtius 7.85.
288. Plutarch De Stoic. Rep. 16.1041b. Since Plato had said of injustice that, being discord of the soul and intestine strife, it does not lose its force within those who themselves harbor it either but sets the wicked man at variance with himself, Chrysippus objects and says that to speak of doing oneself injustice is absurd, for injustice exists in relation to another and not to oneself.
288. Plutarch De Stoic. Rep. 16.1041c. In the books against Plato this is what he has said concerning injustice as a term used in relation not to oneself but to another:
For isolated individuals [are not unjust nor are] unjust men composites of several such individuals contradicting one another, injustice being understood anyhow as obtaining in the case of several persons so disposed to one another and in no conditions pertaining to the individual save in so far as he stands in such relation to his neighbors.
289. Plutarch De Stoic. Rep. 16.1041c. This he forgot, and later in the Demonstrations concerning Justice he says that the wrong-doer is wronged by himself and does himself injustice whenever he wrongs another, for he has become a cause of transgression for himself and is injuring himself undeservedly.
289. Plutarch De Stoic. Rep. 16.1041d. In the Demonstrations, however, he has propounded arguments like the following concerning the unjust man’s doing injustice to himself as well:
The law prohibits one from becoming accessory to a transgression; and to do injustice is a transgression. Now, he who has become his own accessory in doing injustice transgresses in relation to himself; and he who transgresses in regard to an individual also does that individual injustice. Therefore he who does anyone at all injustice does himself injustice too. Again he argues:
Wrong action is a kind of injury, and everyone in doing wrong does wrong in violation of himself. Therefore, every wrong-doer injures himself undeservedly; and if so, he also does himself injustice. Furthermore he argues as follows:
He who is injured by another injures himself and injures himself undeservedly. This, however, is to do injustice. Therefore, everyone who is done injustice by anyone at all does himself injustice.
297. Plutarch De Stoic. Rep. 15.1041a. Moreover, in the Demonstrations concerning Justice he says expressly:
Every right action is a lawful act and an act of justice; but what is done in accordance with continence or endurance or prudence or courage is right action; consequently it is also an act of justice.
308. (Diogenes Laërtius 7.128; see B. Inwood and L. Gerson, eds., Hellenistic Philosophy, 2nd edition, p. 202, modified) And justice is natural and not conventional, as are the law and right reason, as Chrysippus says in On the Noble (Peri tou kalou).
309. Cicero De Finibus 3, 21, 71. (Loeb trans. modified) Right (ius) moreover, properly so styled and entitled, exists (they aver) by nature; and it is foreign to the nature of the Wise Man (sapiens) not only to wrong but even to hurt anyone. Nor again is it righteous (rectum) to enter into a partnership (consociare) in wrongdoing with one’s friends or benefactors; and it is most truly and cogently maintained that equity should never be disjoined from utility, and that whatever is fair and just is also honorable (honestum), and conversely whatever is honorable will also be just and fair.
310. Proclus in Plat. Alcib. Pr. P. 318 Creuzer. [translated by JG] The whole syllogism proving that what is just is expedient proceeds as follows: all that is just is admirable (kalon), all that is admirable is good; therefore all that is just is good. But also the good is the same as the expedient; therefore all that is just is expedient (another syllogism follows, with an inverse order of terms). For the good of the soul does not subsist in anything other than in virtue, nor does the admirable, but all good is defined by virtue, and the same [holds for] the admirable as for the good, and both things are just. For the moderate and courageous too are just because of the reciprocal implication through virtue: for not to think soberly is to live unjustly, and not to live courageously, and to be deprived of justice at some time, but the same [good] form of life derives from every one of the virtues.
311. Cicero De Legibus 1, 16 44-45 (Loeb trans.). Indeed, it is not merely justice (ius) and injustice (iniuria) which are distinguished by nature, but also and without exception things which are honorable (honesta) and dishonorable (turpia). For since an intelligence (intelligentia) common to us all makes things known to us and formulates them in our minds, honorable actions are ascribed by us to virtue, and dishonorable actions to vice; and only a madman would conclude that these judgments are matters of opinion and not fixed by nature. For even what we, by a misuse of the term, call the virtue of a tree or of a horse, is not a matter of opinion, but is based on nature. And if that is true, honorable and dishonorable actions must also be distinguished by nature. For if virtue in general (universa virtus) is to be tested by opinion, then its several parts must also be so tested; who, therefore, would judge a man of prudence, and if I may say so, hard common sense, not by his own character but by some external circumstance? For virtue is reason completely developed; and this certainly is natural; therefore everything honorable is likewise natural.
312. Cicero De Legibus 1, 17, 45 (Loeb). For just as truth and falsehood, the logical and illogical, are judged by themselves and not by anything else, so the steadfast and continuous use of reason in the conduct of life, which is virtue, and also inconstancy, which is vice, [are judged] by their own nature. Shall we not use the same standard in regard to the characters [ingenia] of young men? Then shall we judge character by nature, and judge virtue and vice, which result from character, by some other standard? But if we adopt the same standard for them, must we not refer the honorable and the base to Nature also? Whatever good thing is praiseworthy must have within itself something which deserves praise, for goodness itself is good by reason not of opinion but of Nature. For, if this were not true, men would also be happy by reason of opinion; and what statement could be more absurd than that? Wherefore since both good and evil and judged by nature and are natural principles, surely honorable and base actions must also be distinguished in a similar way and referred to the standard of nature.
313. Plutarch De Stoic. Rep. 15.1040a. (Loeb). At the very beginning of the books concerning Justice directed against Plato himself, [Chrysippus] pounces upon the argument about the gods and says that Cephalus was wrong in trying to make fear of the gods a deterrent from injustice and that the argument about divine chastisements is easily discredited and, [as it produces] many distractions and conflicting plausibilities, is an inducement in the opposite direction, being in fact no different from the Bogy and Hobgoblin with which women try to keep little children from mischief. Yet, having thus disparaged Plato’s words, in other places he praises and frequently quotes these lines of Euripides: In fact there are, though one deride the words, Zeus and the gods, who mark our mortal woes.
314. Marcian Institutes book 1. Chrysippus, the philosopher of the highest Stoic wisdom, begins thus in his book On Law [translation that follows is from Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers (Cambridge University Press), 1987, p. 432]: Law is king of all things human and divine. Law must preside over what is honorable and base, as ruler and as guide, and thus be the standard of right and wrong, prescribing to animals whose nature is political what they should do, and prohibiting them from what they should not do.
315. Cicero De Legibus 1 6, 18 (Loeb). But the most foolish notion of all is the belief that everything is just which is found in the customs or laws of nations. Would that be true, even if these laws had been enacted by tyrants? … For Justice (ius) is one; it binds all human society, and is based on one Law, which is right reason applied to command and prohibition. Whoever knows not this law, whether it has been recorded in writing anywhere or not, is without Justice.
316. Cicero De Legibus 2, 8 (Loeb). Law is not a product of human thought, nor is it any enactment of peoples, but something eternal which rules the whole universe by its wisdom in command and prohibition. Thus they have been accustomed to say that law is the primal and ultimate mind of God, whose reason directs all things either by compulsion or restraint. Wherefore that Law which the gods have given to the human race has been justly praised; for it is the reason and mind of a wise [lawgiver] applied to command and prohibition. … 9. … This and other commands and prohibitions of nations have the power to summon to righteousness and away from wrong-doing; but this power is not merely older than the existence of nations and states, it is coeval with that God who guards and rules heaven and earth. 10. For the divine mind cannot exist without reason, and divine reason cannot but have this power to establish right and wrong. … Wherefore the true and primal law, applied to command and prohibition, is the right reason of supreme Jupiter.
317. Cicero De Legibus 1, 12, 33 (Loeb). but if the judgments of men were in agreement with nature, so that, as the poet says, they considered
nothing alien to them which concerns mankind, then Justice would be equally observed by all. For those creatures who have received the given of reason from nature have also received right reason, and therefore they have also received the gift of law, which is right reason applied to command and prohibition. But all men have received reason; therefore all men have received justice. Consequently Socrates was right when he cursed, as he often did, the man who first separated utility from justice; for this separation, he complained, is the source of all mischief.
318. Cicero De Legibus 2, 5, 11 (Loeb). for every law which truly deserves the name is truly praiseworthy, as they prove by approximately the following arguments. It is agreed, of course, that laws were invented for the safety of citizens, the preservation of States, and the tranquility and happiness of human life, and that those who first put statutes of this kind in force convinced their people that it was their intention to write down and put into effect such rules as, once accepted and adopted, would make possible for them an honorable and happy life; and when such rules were drawn up and put in force, it is clear that men called them
laws. From this point of view it can readily be understood that those who formulated wicked and unjust statues for nations, thereby breaking their promises and agreements, put into effect anything but
laws. 12. It may thus be clear that in the very definition of the term
law there inheres the idea and principle of choosing what is just and true. I ask you then … according to the custom of the philosophers: if there is a certain thing, the lack of which in a state compels us to consider it no state at all, must we consider this thing a good? — One of the greatest goods, certainly. — And if a state lacks Law, must it for that reason be considered no State at all? — It cannot be denied. — Then law must necessarily be considered one of the greatest goods.
319. Cicero De Legibus 1.15, 42 (Loeb). But the most foolish notion of all is the belief that everything is just which is found in the customs or laws of nations. Would that be true, even if these laws had been enacted by tyrants? … For Justice is one; it binds all human society, and is based on one Law, which is right reason applied to command and prohibition. Whoever knows not this Law, whether it has been recorded in writing anywhere or not, is without Justice.
320. Cicero De Legibus 1.15, 42 (Loeb). But if justice is conformity to written laws and national customs, and if, as the same persons claim, everything is to be tested by the standard of utility, then anyone who thinks it will be profitable to him will, if he is able, disregard and violate the laws. It follows that Justice does not exist at all, if it does not exist in Nature, and if that form it which is based on utility can be overthrown by that very utility itself.
321. Cicero De Legibus 1.16, 43-44 (Loeb). But if the principles of justice were founded on the decrees of peoples, the edicts of princes, or the decisions of judges, then Justice would sanction robbery and adultery and forgery of wills, in case these acts were approved by the votesor decrees of the populace. But if so great a power belongs to the decisions and decrees of fools that the laws of Nature can be changed by their votes, then why do they not ordain that what is bad and baneful shall be considered good and salutary? Or, if a law can make justice out of injustice, can it not also make good out of bad? But in fact we can perceive the difference between good laws and bad by referring them to no other standard than Nature.
322. Cicero Tusc. Disp. 1.45, 108 (Loeb, slight mod). But why should I notice the beliefs of individuals, since we may observe the varied deceptions under which the nations [in the sense of peoples] labor? The Egyptians embalm their dead and keep them in the house; the Persians even smear them with wax before burial, that the bodies may last for as long a time as possible; it is the custom of the Magi not to bury the bodies of their dead unless they have first been mangled by beasts; in Hyrcania the populace support dogs for the benefit of the community, while the nobles keep them for family use: it is as we know a famous breed of dogs, but in spite of the cost, each householder procures animals in proportion to his means, to mangle him, and that they consider the best mode of burial. Chrysippus collects a large number of other instances as suits his inquisitive way in making any investigation, but there are details so disgusting that language avoids them with abhorrence.
323. Philo Judaeus, Loeb edition, VI, pp. 155-57 (mod.), p. 161. Polity as seen in the various peoples is an addition to nature which is invested with universal sovereignty. For this world is the
great city (megalopolis) and it has a single polity and a single law, and this is the … reason of nature, commanding what should be done and forbidding what should not be done. But the local cities which we see are unlimited in number and subject to diverse polities and laws by no means identical, for different peoples have different customs and regulations which are extra inventions and additions. The cause of this is the reluctance to combine or have fellowship with each other, shown not only by Greeks to barbarians and barbarians to Greeks but also within each of them separately in dealing with their own kin. And we find them alleging causes for this which are no real causes, such as unfavorable seasons, infertile soil or how the state is situated, whether it is maritime or inland or whether it is on an island or on the mainland and the like. The true cause they never mention, and that is their greed and mutual mistrusts, which keep them from being satisfied with the ordinances of nature and lead them to give the name of laws to whatever approves itself as advantageous to the communities which hold the same views. Thus it stands to reason (eikotos) that particular polities are additions to the single polity of nature, for the laws of different cities are additions to the right reason of nature. … [VIII] For a house is a city compressed into small dimensions, and household management may be called a kind of state management, just as a city too is a great house and statesmanship the household management of the general public. All this shows clearly that the household manager is identical with the statesman, however much what is under the purview of the two may differ in number and size.
324. Diogenianus according to Eusebius Praep. Evang. VI (p. 264b). [translated roughly by JG]. D. attributes to Chrysippus: and you say that all the laws laid down and the regimes [of human cities] are in error.
325. Cicero De Republica 3.33 (Loeb. Trans. slight mod by JG). True law is right reason in agreement with nature; it is of universal application, unchanging and everlasting; it summons to duty by its commands, and averts from wrongdoing by its prohibitions. And it does not lay its commands or prohibitions upon good men in vain, though neither have any effect on the wicked. It is a sin to try to alter this law, nor is it allowable to attempt to repeal any part of it, and it is impossible to abolish it entirely. We cannot be freed from its obligations … and we need not look outside ourselves for an expounder and interpreter of it. And there will not be different laws at Rome and at Athens, or different laws now and in the future, but one eternal and unchangeable law will be valid for all peoples [gentes] and all times, and there will be one master and ruler, that is, God, over us all, for he is the author of this law, its promulgator, and its enforcing judge. Whoever is disobedient is fleeing from himself and denying his human nature, and by reason of this very fact he will suffer the worst penalties, even if he escapes what is commonly considered punishment.
326. Plutarch De Stoic. Rep. 9.1035c (Loeb. Slight mod by JG). Hear what he says about this in the third book [of] On the Gods: ‘It is not possible to discover any other beginning of justice or any source for it other than that from Zeus and from the universal nature (koines phuseos), for thence everything of the kind must have its beginning if we are going to have anything to say about good and evil [things].’
327. Clement of Alexandria. Strom IV 26 p. 642 Pott. (trans. Schofield 1999, 61, mod.). For the Stoics also say that the universe [ouranos] is in the proper sense a city, but that those here on the earth are not — they are called cities, but are not really. For a city or a people is something morally good, an organization or group of human beings administered by law which exhibits refinement (asteion).
328. (Stobaeus anthology; see Inwood and Gerson, 2nd edition, pp. 224-25). And they say that the base person is a fugitive in all things, insofar as he is deprived of law and a polity that corresponds to nature. For the law, as we said, is virtuous (spoudaion), and the city likewise. And concerning what is virtuous, it was enough that Cleanthes posed this argument about the city: if the city is a contrived dwelling-place in which those who take refuge to give and receive justice, then is not the city a good (asteion) place? But the city is such a dwelling-place; thus the city is a good place. And the city is described in three ways, in one way with respect to dwelling place, in another as a complex system of human beings, and thirdly as both of the previous two senses taken together. In two senses, the city is described as good, as a complex system of human beings, and in the sense of both [the place and the system of humans] together, by reference to the [human] inhabitants.
329. Dio Chrysostom or. XXXVI #20 (vol. II p. 6, 13) [translated by JG]. They say that the city is a multitude of humans dwelling together in this [place?] and governed by law. [see Schofield, The Stoic Idea of the City 77-78].
330. Philo de septen. et fest dieb. P. 284 vol. II Mang. [translated by JG]. For in general the regime is virtuous and with laws which only lead into the beautiful and the noble.
331. Dio Chrysostom or. III #43 (cf. Loeb vol. I, p. 125). For government [arche] is said [to be]
lawful administration of human beings and
oversight [pronoia] of human beings in accord with law.
332. Clement of Alexandria Strom II p. 420 Pott.[my translated by JG]. In which some … say the law is right reason, commanding what is to be done, forbidding what should not be done. Regime (politeia) — and it is a fine upbringing of humans with respect to community (sharing a life together). The judicial art (dikastike) — knowledge being correction of moral errors for the sake of justice (the just). Corresponding to it is the art of punishment (kolastike) a sort of knowledge of measure in relation to punishment. And punishment is a correction of the soul — At any rate, the philosophers proclaim that only the sage is king, lawgiver, general, righteous (dikaion), pious, dear to the gods (theophile).
333. Cicero De Finibus 3.19, 64 (Loeb). Again they hold that the universe is governed by divine will; it is a city or state of which both men and gods are members, and each one of us is a part of this universe; from which it is a natural consequence that we should prefer the common advantage to our own. For just as the laws set the safety of all above the safety of individuals, so a good, wise and law-abiding man, conscious of his duty to the state, studies the advantage of all more than that of himself or of any single individual. The traitor to his country does not deserve greater reprobation than the man who betrays the common advantage or security for the sake of his own advantage or security. This explains why praise is owed to one who dies for the commonwealth, because it becomes us to love our country more than ourselves.
334. Dio Chrysostom or. 36, section 23 (vol.II, p. 7, 7 Arnim) [translated by JG]. For we must call one and the same thing a city and a purely happy regime, the community that the gods share with one another, and if someone includes the rational altogether, counting human beings with gods, as children are said to share the city with men (andrasi), being citizens by nature, not in their thinking and doing the business of citizens nor sharing in the law, being alien to it.
335. Dio Chrysostom or. 1, section 42-43 (Loeb, vol. I, trans. by J. W. Cohoon 1932,
First Discourse on Kingship): I might well speak next of the administration of the universe and tell how the world — the very embodiment of bliss and wisdom — ever sweeps along through infinite time in infinite cycles, guided by good fortune and a like power divine, and by a governing purpose most righteous and perfect, and renders us like itself since, in consequence of the mutual kinship of ourselves and it, we are marshaled in order under one ordinance and law and partake of the same polity. He who honors and upholds this polity and does not oppose it in any way is law-abiding, devout, and orderly; he, however, who disturbs it, as far as that is possible to him, and violates it or does not know it, is lawless and disorderly whether he be called a private citizen or ruler.
336. Philo Judaeus,
On the Creation of the World (de mundi opificio), I.3 (Loeb, trans. F. H. Colson and G. H. Whitaker, 1929, rpt. 1962, vol. I, p. 7). The man who observes the law is constituted thereby a loyal citizen of the world, regulating his doings by the purpose and will (boulema) of nature, in accordance with which the entire world itself (sumpan kosmos) is also administered.
337. Philo Judaeus, section 142-43; Loeb op. cit., p. 113 (mod.). If we call that original forefather (archegetes) not only the first man but also the only citizen of the world we shall be speaking with perfect truth. For the world (kosmos) was his city and dwelling place. 143. Now since every well-ordered city has a constitution, the citizen of the world enjoyed of necessity the same constitution as did the whole world: and this constitution is nature’s right reason, more properly called an ordinance (thesmos), … seeing it as a divine law, in accordance with which there was duly apportioned to each entity that which rightly befalls to them. This city and polity must have had citizens prior to the appearance of human beings. These might be justifiably termed people [citizens] of the Great City (megalopolitai) … And who should these be but spiritual and divine natures, some incorporeal and visible to mind only (noetai), some not without bodies, such as are the stars?
338. Cicero De Republica 1.13, 19 (Loeb). Do you not think it important for our homes that we should know what is happening and being done in that home which is not shut in by the walls we build, but is the whole universe, a home and a fatherland which the gods have given us the privilege of sharing with them?
339. Cicero De Legibus 1.7, 22 (Loeb, mod.). That animal which we call human, endowed with foresight and quick intelligence, complex, keen, possessing memory, full of reason and prudence, has been given a certain distinguished status by the supreme god who created him; for he is the only one among so many different kinds and varieties of living beings who has a share in reason and thought, while all the rest are deprived of it. But what is more divine, I will not say in the human being only, but in all heaven and earth, than reason? And reason, when it is full grown and perfected, is rightly called wisdom. Therefore, since there is nothing better than reason, and since it exists both in human beings and gods, the first common possession of humans and gods is reason. But those who have reason in common must also have right reason in common. And since right reason is Law, we must believe that humans have Law also in common with the gods. Further, those who share Law must also share Justice; and those who share these are to be regarded as members of the same commonwealth. If indeed they obey the same authorities and powers, this is true in a far greater degree; but as a matter of fact they do obey this celestial system, the divine mind, and the god of superior power (praepotenti). Hence we must now conceive of this whole universe as one commonwealth of which both gods and humans are members.
340. Cicero De Finibus 3.62 (Loeb). Again, it is held by the Stoics to be important to understand that nature creates in parents an affection for their children; and parental affection is the source to which we trace the origin of the association of the human race in communities. This cannot but be clear in the first place from the conformation of the body and its members, which by themselves are enough to show that nature’s scheme included the procreation of offspring. Yet it could not be consistent that nature should at once intend offspring to be born and make no provision for that offspring when born to be loved and cherished. Even in the lower animals nature’s operation can be clearly discerned; when we observe the labour that they spend on bearing and rearing their young, we seem to be listening to the actual voice of nature. Hence as it is manifest that it is natural for us to shrink from pain, so it is clear that we derive from nature herself the impulse to love those to whom we have given birth. 63. From this impulse is developed the sense of mutual attraction which unites human beings as such; this also is bestowed by nature. The mere fact of their common humanity requires that one man should feel another to be akin to him.
341. Cicero De Finibus 3.64 (Loeb mod.). And as we feel it wicked and inhuman for [people] to declare (the saying is usually expressed in a familiar Greek line) that they care not if when they themselves are dead, the universal conflagration ensues, it is undoubtedly true that we are bound to study the interest of posterity also for its own sake. 65. this is the feeling that has given rise to the practice of making a will and appointing guardians for one’s children when one is dying.
342. Cicero De Finibus 3.65 (Loeb mod.). And the fact that no one would care to pass his life alone in a desert, even though supplied with pleasures in unbounded profusion, readily shows that we are born for society and intercourse, and for a natural partnership with our fellow [human beings]. Moreover, nature inspires us with a desire to benefit as many people as we can, and especially by imparting information and the principles of wisdom. 66. Hence it would be hard to discover anyone who will not impart to another any knowledge that he may himself possess; so strong is our propensity not only to learn but to teach. And just as bulls have a natural instinct to fight with all their strength and force in defending their calves against lions, so those [persons] of exceptional gifts and capacity for service, like Hercules and Liber in the legends, feel a natural impulse to be the protectors of the human race. … Therefore just as we actually use our limbs before we have learnt for what useful purpose they were bestowed upon us, so we are united and allied by nature in the common society of the state. Were this not so, there would be no room either for justice or benevolence.
343. Cicero De Legibus 1.10, 28. (Loeb mod.). Surely there comes nothing more valuable than the full realization that we are born for Justice, and that right is based, not upon [human] opinions, but upon Nature. This fact will be immediately plain if you once get a clear conception of [human beings’s] fellowship and union with [each other]. For no single thing is so like another, so exactly like its counterpart, as all of us are to one another. Nay, if bad habits and flase beliefs did not twist the weaker minds and turn them in whatever direction they are inclined, no one would be so like his own self as all [humans] would be like all others. And so, however we may define the human being, a single definition will apply to all. This is a sufficient proof that there is no difference in kind [between one human being and another]; for if there were one definition could not be applied to all; and indeed reason, which alone raises us above the level of the beasts and enables us to draw inferences, to prove and disprove, to discuss and solve problems, and to come to conclusions, is certainly common to all, and though varying in what it learns, at least in the capacity to learn it is [equal]. For the same things are invariably perceived by the senses, and those things which stimulate the senses, stimulate them in the same way in all [human beings]; and those rudimentary beginnings of intelligence, to which I have referred, which are imprinted on our minds, are imprinted on all minds alike; and speech, the mind’s interpreter, though different in the choice of words, agrees in the sentiments expressed. In fact, there is no human being of any nationality [gens] who, if he finds a guide, cannot attain to virtue.
344. Cicero De Legibus 1.15, 43 (Loeb mod.). And if Nature is not to be considered the very foundation of Justice, that will be mean the destruction [of the virtues on which human society depends]. For where then will there be a place for generosity, or love of country, or loyalty, or the inclination to be of service to others or to show gratitude for favors received? For these virtues originate in our natural inclination to love our fellow [human beings], and this is the foundation of Justice. Otherwise not merely consideration for human beings but also rites and pious observances in honor of the gods are done away with; for I think that these ought to be maintained, not through fear, but on account of the close relationship which exists between [human beings] and [the gods].
345. Lactantius divine institutes V 18 [http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/07015.htm]. For we see that in all animals, because they are destitute of wisdom, nature is the provider of supplies for itself. Therefore they injure others that they may profit themselves, for they do not understand that the committing an injury is evil. But man, who has the knowledge of good and evil, abstains from committing an injury even to his own damage, which an animal without reason is unable to do; and on this account innocence is reckoned among the chief virtues of man. Now by these things it appears that he is the wisest man who prefers to perish rather than to commit an injury, that he may preserve that sense of duty by which he is distinguished from the dumb creation.
346. Origen Contra Celsum VIII 50 (Vol. II, p. 265, 22 Ko (p. 778 Del.) [translated by JG]. For what is social (koinonikon) is not circumscribed as it is with the irrational animals and the most vulgar human beings. But the creator who created us equally in relation to all human beings made us social animals.
347. Proclus in Plat. Alcib. Pr. Vol. III p. 64 ed. Cousin. [translated by JG]. On the one hand those from the Stoa directly represent all such things as wicked. For not to deceive (seduce, beguile?) is rightly not to do violence nor to persist stubbornly but each of these actions spring from wicked habits and is unjust. But the ancients regard all such things as indifferents etc.
367. Diogenes Laërtius 7.129. Further it is their doctrine that there can be no question of right between us and the other animals, because of dissimilarity, as Chrysippus said in the first book concerning Justice
390. Plutarch De virt. mor. ch. 10, p. 450c.
(where it is demonstrated that the pathe are judgments of the hegemonikon)
455. Plutarch CN 25.1070e. Yet Chrysippus does admit that there are certain fears and griefs and deceptions which injure us but do not make us worse. Read the first of his books concerning Justice writing against Plato, for it worth while for other reasons also to observe the man’s verbal ingenuity there sparing absolutely no fact or doctrine at all, either his own or another’s.
462. Galen de H. and Plato decr. IV 2 (136) p. 338 Mu. (only part of the item; this trans. from Long & Sedley 65J) [Chrysippus in On Passions book I] (I) “First of all we should bear in mind that a rational animal follows reason naturally, and acts in accordance with reason as if that were its guide. (2) Often, however, it moves toward and away from certain things in a different way, pushed to excess in disobedience to reason. (3) Both definitions [i.e. the definitions of passions both as ‘irrational’ and as ‘excessive impulses,’ cf. A I (=3, 378, 389 [part] — JG)] refer to this movement: the movement contrary to nature which occurs irrationally in this way, and the excess in impulses … (4) For this irrationality must be taken to mean ‘disobedient to reason’ and “reason turned aside”; with reference to this movement we even speak in ordinary language of people “being pushed” and “moved irrationally, without reason and judgment”. What we mean by these expressions is not as though a person moves in error and overlooking something that accords with reason, but we refer chiefly to the movement of which the expression provide an outline account, since it is not a rational animal’s natue to move in his soul in this way, but in accordance with reason … (5) This also explains the expression “the excess of impulse”, since people overstep the proper and natural proportion of their impulses. (6) My meaning can be made more intelligible in this way. When someone walks in accordance with his impulse, the movement of his legs is not excessive but commensurate with the impulse, so that he can stop or change whenever he wants to. (7) But when people run in accordance with their impulse, this sort of thing no longer happens. The movement of their legs exceeds their impulse, so that they are carried away and unable to change obediently, as soon as they have started to do so. (8) Something similar, I think, takes place with impulses, owing to their going beyond the rational proportion. The result is that when someone has the impulse he is not obedient to reason. (9) The excess in running is called “contrary to the impulse” but the excess in the impulse is called “contrary to reason”. For the proportion of a natural impulse is what accords with reason and goes only so far as reason itself thinks right.
476. Galen de H. and Plato dogm. IV 4 (141) p. 356 Mu.
545. Plutarch De Stoic. Rep. 17.1041f. … he has said in the third book concerning justice:
That is why also because of its exceeding sublimity and beauty what we say seems like fiction and not on the level of man and human nature.
617. Diogenes Laërtius 7.122. Moreover, according to them not only are the wise free, they are also kings; kingship being irresponsible rule, which none but the wise can maintain; so Chrysippus in his treatise vindicating Zeno’s use of terminology. For he holds that knowledge of good and evil is a necessary attribute of the ruler, and that no bad man is acquainted with this science.
662. Plutarch De Stoic. Rep. 31.1048e 3, 668 - Plutarch SR 31. Plutarch CN 10,1062f. Diogenianus acc to Eusebius praep. evang. VI 264b.
705. Plutarch De Stoic. Rep. 32.1049a. Some of the Pythagoreans object to him for writing of cocks in the books concerning Justice that they have come into being for a useful purpose, for they wake us up and pluck out scorpions and arouse us for battle by inducing an eagerness for valor; but all the same they too must be eaten in order that the number of chicks may not exceed what is useful.
709a. Athenaeus Deipn. IV p. 158a.
747. Diogenes Laërtius 7.188. In the third book of his treatise On Justice, at about line 1000, he permits eating of the corpses of the dead
748. Sextus Empiricus Adv. Math. 11.192.
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