Epitome of Stoic Ethics

Arius Didymus
as reported by Joannes Stobaeus, Anthology, 2.7.5-12.


The beliefs of Zeno and the other Stoics about the ethical part of philosophy.

Next I will offer a summary of their ethics, repeating the essentials of their principal beliefs. I will begin here.

5a. Those things exist, according to Zeno, which participate in substance. Of the things which exist, some are good, some are bad, and some are indifferent.

These are examples of good things: intelligence, self-restraint, justice, bravery, and everything which is a virtue or participates in virtue.

These are examples of bad things: stupidity, lack of self-restraint, injustice, cowardice and everything which is a vice or participates in vice.

These are examples of indifferent things: life, death; reputation, lack of reputation; toil, pleasure; riches, poverty; sickness, health; and things of this sort.

5b. Of good things, some are virtues, others are not.

So intelligence, self-restraint, <justice>, bravery, <great-heartedness, strength of mind, and power of the soul> are virtues; joy, cheerfulness, confidence, wish, and the like are not virtues.

Of the virtues, some are types of knowledge and expertises in certain matters, others are not.

Intelligence, self-restraint, justice, and bravery are types of knowledge and expertises in certain matters; great-heartedness, strength of mind, and power of the soul are neither types of knowledge of particular matters nor expertises.

Analogously, of bad things some are vices, others are not.

So stupidity, <lack of restraint>, injustice, cowardice, small-mindedness, and mental incapacity <and feebleness> are vices;

pain and fear and the like are not vices.

Of the vices, some are failures to understand certain matters and failures in expertise, but others are not.

So stupidity, lack of restraint, injustice, and cowardice are failures to understand certain matters and failures in expertise;

small-mindedness, incapacity, <and feebleness> are neither failures to understand particular things nor failures in expertise.

5b1. Intelligence is a knowledge of what things must be done and what must not be done and of what are neither, or a knowledge of what are good things and what are bad and what are neither for a naturally political creature (and they prescribe that it is to be so understood with regard to the other virtues);

self-restraint is a knowledge of what things are worth choosing and what are worth avoiding and what are neither;

justice is a knowledge of apportioning to each its due;

bravery is a knowledge of what things are terrible and what are not and what are neither;

stupidity is <ignorance of> what things are good and what are bad and what are neither, or ignorance of what things are to be done and what not to be done and what are neither;

lack of restraint is ignorance of what things are worth choosing and what are worth avoiding and what are neither;

<injustice is ignorance not apportioning to each its due;>

cowardice is ignorance of what things are terrible and what are not and what are neither.

They define the other virtues and vices as well in a similar fashion, keeping to what has been stated. More generally, they say that virtue is a disposition of the soul in harmony with itself concerning one’s whole life.

5b2. Of the virtues, some are primary, while others are subordinate to the primary virtues.

There are four which are primary: intelligence, self-restraint, bravery, and justice.

Intelligence deals with appropriate acts;
self-restraint deals with man’s impulses;
bravery deals with acts of endurance;
justice deals with the apportioning of what is due.

Of the Virtues which are subordinate to these, some are subordinate to intelligence, others subordinate to self-restraint, others to bravery, others to justice.

To intelligence are subordinated soundness of judgment, circumspection, shrewdness, sensibleness, <soundness of aim>, and ingenuity;
to self-restraint are subordinated orderliness, propriety, modesty, and self-control;
to bravery are subordinated perseverance, intrepidness, great-heartedness, stout-heartedness, and industriousness;
to justice are subordinated piety, kindness, good fellowship, and fair dealing.

They say, then, that soundness of judgment is a knowledge of what sort of things to do and how to do them so we will act expediently.
Circumspection is a knowledge which marks off and summarizes what is still in process and what is completed.
Shrewdness is a knowledge which is able to discover the appropriate act on the spot.
Sensibleness is a knowledge <of what is worse and what is better.
Soundness of aim is a knowledge> which is able to hit the target in each case.
Ingenuity is a knowledge which is able to discover a way out of difficulties.

Orderliness is a knowledge of when something must be done and in what sequence and, overall, of the order of actions.
Propriety is <a knowledge> of suitable and unsuitable motions.
Modesty is a knowledge which is able to avoid correct reproach.
Self-control is a knowledge that does not overstep the bounds of what has come to light in accord with correct reasoning.

Perseverance is a knowledge ready to persist in what has been correctly decided.
Intrepidness is a knowledge through which we know that we shall not encounter anything terrible.
Great-heartedness is a knowledge acting above what occurs naturally in both worthwhile and worthless matters.
Stout-heartedness is a knowledge belonging to a soul as it shows itself invincible.
Industriousness is a knowledge which is able to accomplish what is proposed, without being prevented by the toil.

Piety is a knowledge of the service of the gods.
Kindness is a knowledge which is disposed to do good.
Good fellowship is a knowledge of equality in partnership.
Fair dealing is a knowledge of how to deal with one’s neighbors without incurring blame.

5b3. The goal of all these virtues is to live consistently with nature. Each virtue through its individual properties enables man to achieve this. For from nature he has initial impulses for the discovery of what is appropriate, for the balancing of his impulses, for acts of endurance, and for acts of apportioning. Each of the virtues, by acting in concert and by its own particular properties, enables man to live consistently with nature.

5b4. So they say that the above-mentioned virtues are complete concerning life and are comprised from rules of behavior. There are other virtues in addition to these, no longer expertises but particular capacities, resulting from practice, such as the health of the soul, its soundness and strength, and its beauty. For just as the health of the body is a correct mixture of the hot, cold, dry, and wet elements in the body, so too the health of the soul is a correct mixture of the beliefs in the soul. And likewise, just as bodily strength is an adequate tension in the sinews, so mental strength is adequate tension when deciding and acting or not. And just as the beauty of the body is a due proportion of the limbs as they stand in relation to each other and in relation to the whole, so too the beauty of the soul is a due proportion in reasoning and in the parts of reasoning in relation to the whole of the soul and in relation to each other.

5b5. All the virtues which are types of knowledge and expertises have rules of behavior in common and the same goal, as has been stated. Because of this they are also inseparable. For he who has one has them all and he who acts in accordance with one acts in accordance with them all. They differ from one another in their main functions. For the main functions of intelligence are primarily to view and do what must be done, but secondarily to view what one needs to apportion, <what one needs to choose, and what one needs to endure>, in order to do unerringly what must be done. Self-restraint’s particular main function is primarily to provide balanced impulses and to view them, but secondarily to view those things which are under the control of the other virtues so that one conducts oneself unerringly in one’s impulses. Likewise bravery is primarily to endure everything that one must, secondarily what is under the control of the other virtues. Justice is primarily to view what is in accord with the merit of each person, but secondarily — et cetera. For all the virtues consider what belongs to them all and those things subordinate to each of the other virtues. Thus Panaetius said what happens in the case of the virtues is just as if there were one target set up for many archers and this had on it markings different in their colors. Then each archer would aim at hitting the target, one, however, by striking the white marking if he could make a hit, another by striking the black, and another by striking yet another colour marking. Just as these above all make it their goal to hit the target, but then each proposes its attainment in a different way, so in the same way all the virtues make it their goal to be happy, which depends on living in agreement with nature, but each attains this in its own way.

5b6. Diogenes says that the things which are worth choosing for themselves are spoken about in two senses: those which are completely worth choosing, as are those things classified in the above-mentioned division; and all those which have in themselves a cause for being chosen, which exists in every good thing.

5b7. They say the virtues are both plural and inseparable from one another, and are the same as the controlling part of the soul in substance; accordingly, then, every virtue is a body and is spoken of as such, since the mind and soul are body. For they think that the inborn breath in us, as it is warm, is our soul.

They also want the soul in us to be a living creature, since it lives and has awareness. This is particularly true of the controlling part of it, which is called mind. Hence also every virtue is a living creature since it is the same as mind in essence. In accordance with this, they also say that intelligence is intelligent; for it is consistent with these things to speak in this way.

5b8. There is nothing in between virtue and vice. All men have from nature initial impulses for virtue and they have, as it were, the logic of iambic haif-lines according to Cleanthes: while they are incomplete they are worthless, but once complete they are worthwhile.

They also say that the wise man does everything in accord with all the virtues. For every action of his is complete; hence he also lacks none of the virtues.

5b9. So, consistent with this, they hold the belief that he also acts sensibly and dialectically, and convivially and erotically.

For the erotic man is also spoken of in two senses: in one sense with regard to virtue as a type of worthwhile person, in the other with regard to vice as a reproach, as in the case of a person mad with erotic love. <Worthwhile> erotic love is <for friendship>. The man worthy of erotic love is spoken of in the same way as the man worthy of friendship and not as the man worth erotically loving. So this is the man worth loving erotically: the man who is worthy of worthwhile erotic love.

As with the erotic virtue, they also accept the convivial virtue among the virtues. First, dealing with what is appropriate at a drinking party, it is a knowledge of how one needs to carry out drinking parties and how one needs to drink in company. Then it is the knowledge of the hunt for young men of natural ability, encouraging them toward the things which are in accord with virtue, and, overall, a knowledge of nobly loving. Hence they also say that the person who has good sense will fall in love. To love by itself is merely indifferent, since it sometimes occurs in the case of the worthless as well. But erotic love is not an appetite nor is it directed at any worthless thing; rather it is an inclination to forming an attachment arising from the impression of beauty.

5b10. They say that the wise man also does everything he does well. This is obvious: in the way that we say that the flute-player or the lyre-player does everything well (it being understood by this, in the first case, what is concerned with flute-piaying and, in the second, what is concerned with lyre-playing), so in the same way the sensible person does everything well with respect to whatever he does, and not, by Zeus, with respect to what he does not do. For they have thought that the belief that the wise man does everything well is consistent with his completing everything in accord with correct reasoning and in a fashion which is in accord with virtue, which is the expertise which deals with life as a whole. Analogously, the worthless man does everything he does badly and in accord with all the vices.

5b11. They call fondness of music, fondness of literature, fondness of horse-riding, fondness of hunting with dogs, and, overall, what are called the everyday expertises, pursuits, but not types of knowledge, and they admit these among the worthwhile conditions. Consistent with this they say that only the wise man is fond of music, fond of literature, and analogously with regard to the other pursuits. They describe a pursuit this way: it is a path through expertise (or through a part of an expertise) which leads to what is in accord with virtue.

5b12. They say that only the wise man is a good prophet, poet, and orator, and capable of dialectic and literary criticism, although not in all respects, since each of the above also needs in addition the acquisition of particular rules. They say that the prophetic art is a rule-based knowledge of signs from the gods or spirits which apply to human life. They say the same about the species of the prophetic art.

They also say that only the wise man can be a priest, while no worthless person can be one. For the priest needs to be experienced in the laws concerning sacrifices, prayers, purifications, foundations, and the like. In addition to this, he needs ritual, piety, and experience in the service of the gods, and to be inside the divine nature. Not one of these things belongs to the worthless; hence, also all the stupid are impious. For impiety as a vice is ignorance of the service of the gods, while piety, as we said, is knowledge of the service of the gods.

Likewise they say that the worthless are not holy. For holiness is described as justice with respect to the gods. The worthless transgress many of the just customs pertaining to the gods, on account of which they are unholy, impure, unclean, defiled, and barred from festive rites.

For carrying out festive rites is, they say, the mark of a civilized man, since a festival is a time when one ought to be concerned with the divine for the sake of honor and appropriate celebration. So the person who carries out festive rites needs to have humbly entered with piety into this post.

5b13. Furthermore they say that every worthless person is mad, as he is in a state of ignorance about himself and his affairs, which is madness. But ignorance is the opposite vice to self-restraint. And this, when providing unstable and agitated impulses in relation to something else, is madness. Hence they also describe madness in this manner: as agitated ignorance.

5c. Furthermore of good things, some belong to all the intelligent at all times, others do not. Every virtue, intelligent perception, intelligent impulse, and the like belongs to all the intelligent and on every occasion. Joy, cheerfulness, and intelligent walking do not belong to all the intelligent, nor at all times. Likewise some bad things belong to all the stupid and at all times, others not. So every vice, stupid perception, stupid impulse, and the like belongs to all the stupid at all times. But pain, fear, and stupid answering do not belong to all the stupid, nor on every occasion.

5d. All good things are beneficial, useful, advantageous, profitable, worthwhile, suitable, fine, and fitting. Conversely all bad things are harmful, useless, disadvantageous, unprofitable, worthless, unsuitable, shameful, and unfitting.

They say that the good is spoken of in various ways. First as having the role of a source, which is interpreted as follows that from which or by whose agency being benefited occurs (in this first sense it is causative). Second, it is that in respect of which being benefited occurs. More generally, extending to the above explanations as well, whatever benefits. Likewise the bad too is described analogously with the good. It is that from which or by whose agency being harmed occurs. Then, that in respect of which being harmed occurs. More generally than this, whatever harms.

5e. Of good things, some concern the soul, others concern externals, while others concern neither the soul not externals. Concerned with the soul are the virtues, the worthwhile conditions, and, overall, the praiseworthy activities. Externals are friends, acquaintances, and the like. Neither concerned with the soul not externals are the worthwhile and, overall, those who have the virtues. Likewise of bad things too, some are concerned with the soul, others externals, and others neither concerned With the soul nor externals. Concerned with the soul are the vices together with base dispositions and, overall, the blameworthy activities. Externals are enemies along with their manifestations. Neither concerned with the soul nor externals are the worthless and all those who possess vices.

5f. Of the good things to do with the soul, some are dispositions, some are conditions but not dispositions, and others are neither conditions nor dispositions. All the virtues are dispositions. but the pursuits, such as expertise in prophecy and the like, are only conditions and not dispositions. Neither conditions nor dispositions are the activities in respect of the virtues, such as exercise of intelligence and the use of self-restraint and the like. Likewise with regard to the bad things to do with the soul, some are dispositions, others are conditions but not dispositions, and others are neither conditions nor dispositions. All the vices are dispositions, but propensities, such as enviousness, taking offense, and the like, and in addition the illnesses and frailties, such as fondness for money, drunkenness and the like, are only conditions. Neither conditions nor dispositions are the activities in respect of the vices, such as acting with stupidity and acting with injustice, and things like these.

5g. Of good things, some are final, others are productive, while others are both. Thus the intelligent man and the friend are only productive goods; but joy, cheerfulness, confidence, and intelligent walking are only final goods. All the virtues are both productive and final goods, for they both help to create happiness and make it complete, being parts of it. Analogously, of bad things, some are productive of unhappiness, others are final, while others are both. Thus the stupid man and the enemy are only productive evils. But pain, fear, theft, stupid questioning, and the like <are only> final <evils>. The vices are both productive and final evils, for they help to create unhappiness and make it complete, being parts of it.

5h. In addition, some of the good things are worth choosing for themselves, others are productive. So whatever things result in a reasonable choice for the sake of nothing else are worth choosing for themselves; but those which are preparative of something else are spoken of in respect of their productivity.

5i. Also, everything good is worth choosing, as it is satisfying, is prized, and is praiseworthy. But everything bad is worth avoiding. For the good, inasmuch as it sets moving a reasonable choice, is worth choosing. Inasmuch as it unhesitatingly results in a choice, it is satisfying. Again, inasmuch as one would reasonably surmise with regard to it that it is one of the things that derive from virtue, <it is praiseworthy>.

5k. Furthermore, of good things some are in motion, while others are in a state. In motion are things like these: joy, cheerfulness, and intelligent association. In a state are things like these: orderly rest, calm persistence, manly attention. Of things in a state, some are also in a condition, such as the virtues, while some are only in a state, such as the things named above. Not only are the virtues in a condition but also the other expertises in a worthwhile man which have been altered by virtue and have become unchangeable, for they become like virtues. They say that among the good things which are in a condition are also what are called the pursuits, such as fondness for music, fondness for literature, fondness for geometry, and the suchlike. For there is a selective path of the things in these expertises which have an affinity with virtue, referring them to the goal of life.

5l. Furthermore, of good things, some are good in themselves, while others are good being related in a certain way to something. Good in themselves are knowledge, acting justly, and the like. Good in relation to something are honor, good-will, friendship, <and harmony>.

Knowledge is an apprehension which is secure and irreversible by reason. In a different sense knowledge is a composite of such kinds of knowledge, such as the knowledge of particulars, which is rational in a worthwhile person. In another sense it is a composite of expert types of knowledge, possessing a solidness out of itself as do the virtues. In another sense, knowledge is a condition which is receptive of impressions and irreversible by reason — this, they say, is something which consists in tension and capacity.

Friendship is a partnership in life. Harmony is an agreement in beliefs concerning matters in life. Of friendships, acquaintance is friendship of those known to one another; intimacy is the friendship of people grown accustomed to one another; comradeship is friendship by choice, as, for example, with those of the same age group; hospitality is friendship with strangers. There is also a kin friendship of kinsmen, and an erotic friendship from erotic love.

Not feeling distress and orderliness are the same as self-restraint, good sense and brains are the same as intelligence, the skill of sharing and the skill of giving are the same as kindness — however, they have been named by being in a certain condition with respect to something. It is appropriate to observe carefully this distinction with regard to the other virtues as well.

5m. Furthermore, of good things, some are unmixed, such as knowledge, while others are mixed, such as being fortunate with children, a fortunate old age, and a fortunate life. Being fortunate with children is a worthwhile usage in the case of children in accord with nature, being fortunate in old age is a worthwhile usage in the case of old age in accord with nature, and being fortunate in life is defined similarly.

5n. It is always clear with regard to these goods that there will be the same divisions of bad things as well.

5o. They also say there is a difference between what is worth choosing and what is worth acquiring. What is worth choosing is stimulative of an impulse which is complete in itself, <while what is worth acquiring is what we select circumspectly>. In the same degree as what is worth choosing differs from what is worth acquiring, so what is worth choosing for itself differs from what is worth acquiring for itself, and, overall, the good differs from what has value.

6. As man is a rational mortal creature, political by nature, they also say that every virtue which is associated with man and the happy life is consistent with and in agreement with nature.

6a. Zeno interpreted the goal thus: To live in agreement — that is to live according to a single line of reason and in harmony, as those who live in conflict are unhappy. Those after him, adding further detail, expressed it thus: To live in agreement with nature, assuming that Zeno’s statement was insufficient as a predicate. So Cleanthes, the first to take over the sect after him, added with nature and interpreted it thus: The goal is living in agreement with nature. Chrysippus, wanting to make this clearer, expressed it in this way: To live in accord with experience of what happens naturally. Diogenes offered this: To be circumspect in the selection and rejection of things in accord with nature. Archedemus: To live completing everything appropriate. But Antipater interpreted it as: To live continually selecting what is in accordance with nature and rejecting what is contrary to nature. And on many occasions he also used to interpret it thus: To do everything in one’s power continually and unerringly with regard to obtaining the things which are preferentially in accord with nature.

6b. The goal is spoken of in three ways by the members of this sect. The final good is spoken of as the goal in scholarly usage, when they say agreement is the goal. They also say that the target is the goal, such as speaking of the life which is in agreement with reference to the associated predicate. In relation to the third meaning they say that the last of the desired objects, to which all the others are referred, is the goal.

6c. They think that the goal and the target are different things. For the target is the body set forth, which they set their sights on hitting; [but] those aiming at happiness [have as their goal the striking of this target] because every worthwhile person is happy and every worthless person conversely is unhappy.

6d. Of good things, some are necessary for happiness, others are not. Necessary are all the virtues and the activities making use of them. Not necessary are joy, cheerfulness, and the pursuits. In a similar fashion, some bad things are necessary, as much as bad things can be necessary, for unhappiness, others are not necessary. Necessary are all the vices and the activities in respect of them. Not necessary are all passions, frailties, and things similar to these.

6e. They say that happiness is the goal: everything is produced for its sake, while it is not produced for the sake of anything else. It consists in living according to virtue, in living in agreement, and in addition, this being the same thing, in living in accordance with nature. Zeno defined happiness in this way: happiness is a smooth flow of life. Cleanthes also used this definition in his treatises, as did Chrysippus and all their followers, saying that happiness was nothing other than the happy life, but saying that happiness was set up as the target, while the goal was to achieve happiness, which is the same as being happy.

So it is clear from this that living in accord with nature, living the good life, living well are equivalent, as are also the fine and good and virtue and what participates in virtue. And that every good thing is fine, and likewise every shameful thing is bad. Because of this the Stoic goal is equivalent to life in accord with virtue.

6f. They say that what is worth choosing and what must be chosen are different. Thus worth-choosing is every <good>, but must-be-chosen is every benefit: this is viewed in relation to possessing the good. Hence we choose what must be chosen, such as being intelligent, which is considered in relation to possessing intelligence. However, we do not choose what is worth choosing, but rather we choose to possess it.

Likewise all good things are worth maintaining and persisting in, and the case is analogous for the other virtues, even if they have not been given names. But all benefits must be maintained and persisted in. The same reasoning applies to the other things which are in accord with vice.

7. Having given an adequate account of the good and the bad, and what is worth choosing and what is to be avoided, and about the goal and happiness, we have thought it necessary also to give an account of what they say about indifferents in suitable order. They say that the things between good and bad are indifferents, saying that the indifferent is thought of in two ways: in one way as the neither good nor bad, and as what is neither worth choosing nor to be avoided; in the other, as stimulative of neither impulse nor repulsion. In accord with the latter some things are said to be utterly indifferent, such as <having an even or odd number of hairs on one’s head, or> pointing a finger in this direction or that, or picking up something in the way, such as a twig or leaf. It is according to the first sense that the things in between virtue and vice are called indifferent by the adherents of this sect, not in view of selection and rejection. Hence as well some things have a selective value, but others have a rejective lack of value, as contributing nothing to the happy life.

7a. Of indifferent things, some are in accord with nature, others contrary to nature, while others are neither contrary to nor in accord with nature. In accord with nature then are things like these: health, strength, soundness of the organs of sensation, and those things similar to these. But contrary to nature are such: sickness, feebleness, disability and the like. Neither contrary to nor in accord with nature are: the state of the soul and the state of the body, in accord with which the soul is receptive of false impressions, while the body is receptive of wounds and disabilities, and things like these. They say that they reason about these things from the first things in accord with and contrary to nature. For the differing and the indifferent are among the things spoken of as being in relation to something. Hence, they say, even if we say that bodily things and externals are indifferent, we are saying that they are indifferent in relation to living with dignity (in which living happily consists), but not, by Zeus, in relation to being in accord with nature nor in relation to impulse and repulsion.

7b. Furthermore, of indifferent things, some have more value, others have less. Some have their value in themselves, others as productive. And some are preferred, others dispreferred, while others are neither. Preferred are whatever indifferent things have much value — to the extent this exists among indifferent things. Likewise dispreferred are whatever have much lack of value. Neither preferred nor dispreferred are whatever have neither much <value nor> much lack of value.

Of the preferred, some concern the soul, others the body, others externals. Concerning the soul are such things: natural ability, progress, memory, quickness of the mind, a condition in accord with which people are steadfast in the case of the appropriate acts, and all expertises that are able, for the most part, to work in partnership for the life in accord with nature. Concerning the body, the preferred are health, keen perception, and things like these. Of externals, the preferred are parents, children, moderate possessions, and acceptance by one’s fellow men.

Of the dispreferred, those concerning the soul are the opposite to the those which have been stated. Concerning the body and externals, they are similarly opposed to those stated concerning the body and the preferred externals.

Neither preferred nor dispreferred concerning the soul are impression and assent and the like. And concerning the body, neither preferred nor dispreferred are pale or dark skin, the brightness of the eyes, every pleasure and toil, and anything else of this type. Of externals, neither preferred nor dispreferred are all things for which, being cheap and bringing nothing useful, there is overall little need deriving from themselves.

Since the soul is more in control than the body, they say that, with respect to living in accord with nature, things concerning the soul which are in accord with nature and preferable also have more value than things concerning the body and externals. Thus, in relation to virtue, natural ability of the mind surpasses the natural ability of the body and they say that the same holds for the other things.

7c. Furthermore, they say that some of the indifferents are stimulative of impulse, others of repulsion, others of neither impulse nor repulsion. So whatever things we have said to be in accord with nature are stimulative of impulse; and whatever we have said to be contrary to nature are stimulative of repulsion. Things which are neither are not stimulative of either impulse or repulsion, such as having an odd or even number of hairs on the head.

7d. Of the indifferent things which are in accord with nature, some are first things in accord with nature, others are so by participation. First things in accord with nature are a motion or a state in accord with generative principles, such as <soundness and> health and perception (I’m referring to apprehension) and strength. In accord with nature through participation are what participate in motion and state in accordance with generative principles, such as a sound hand and a healthy body and senses which have not been injured. The argument follows likewise by analogy with regard to the things which are contrary to nature.

7e. All that is in accord with nature is worth acquiring and all which is contrary to nature is worth shunning. Some of the things in accord with nature are worth acquiring for their own sake, others for the sake of other things. For their own sake are those things which in a self-referential fashion are stimulative of an impulse toward themselves or toward the laying hold of themselves, such as health, good perception, lack of pain, and the beauty of the body. Worth acquring as productive are those things which by reference to something else are stimulative of an impulse toward other things rather than in self-referential fashion <toward themselves>, such as wealth, reputation, and things like these. Similarly of those things contrary to nature some are worth shunning for their own sake, others by being productive of other things which are worth shunning for their own sake.

7f. All the things which are in accord with nature have value and all the things contrary to nature have lack-of-value. Value is spoken of in three ways: its contribution and esteem in itself; the price set by the appraiser; and the third type, which Antipater calls selective, through which, when things allow, we rather choose these particular things instead of those, such as health instead of sickness, life instead of death, and riches instead of poverty. Similarly, they say that lack of value is also spoken of in three ways, such that the meanings are opposed to those previously stated with respect to the three types of value.

Diogenes says contribution is a judgment of the extent to which something is in accord with nature or the extent to which it provides a need to nature. The prized is not spoken of as things priced to be used, but in the way we say the man appraising things is an appraiser. So he says such a man is the appraiser of the price. These are the two values according to which we say that particular things are preferred in value; they say the third is the value according to which we say particular things have dignity and value, which does not occur in the case of indifferents, but only in the case of things which are worthwhile. They say that we sometimes use the term value instead of the befitting, as is employed in the definition of justice, whenever it is said to be a condition apportioning to each according to its value. For it is the same as the befitting for each.

7g. Of things which have value, some have much value, others little. Likewise of those things having lack-of-value, some have much lack-of-value, others little. So those things which have much value are called preferred, those which have much lack-of-value are called dispreferred — Zeno was the first to give these nomenclatures to things. They say that the preferred is an indifferent thing which we select in accord with preferential reasoning. There is the same reasoning about the dispreferred and the examples are correspondingly similar. No good thing is a preferred, because they have the greatest value in themselves. But the preferred, having the second rank and value, to some extent come close to the nature of the good. The king is not in the court of the preferred, but rather those ranked after him. The preferred are so called, not because they contribute some things to happiness and work in partnership toward it, but because it is necessary to make the selection from these things instead of the dispreferred.

8. Consistent with the account of the preferred is the topic of the appropriate. The appropriate is defined as what is consistent in life, which, when carried out, has a reasonable defense. The inappropriate is defined oppositely. This extends even to the irrational among creatures, for they also act in a particular respect consistently with their nature. But with regard to rational creatures, it is interpreted thus: what is consistent in life. Of appropriate acts, they say that some are complete — these are also spoken of as right acts. Right acts are activations in accord with virtue, such as being intelligent and acting justly. Acts which are not such are not right acts and they do not call them complete appropriate acts either, but intermediates: for example, marrying, serving as an ambassador, discussing matters, and the like.

8a. Of right acts, some are obligatory, others are not. Obligatory are the predicative benefits, such as being intelligent and showing self-restraint. Whatever is not such is not obligatory. Likewise there is also the same prescription of rules regarding the inappropriate.

Every inappropriate act occurring in a rational <creature> is a wrong act, while an appropriate act that has been made complete is a right act. The intermediate appropriate is measured by certain indifferent things, selected in accord with or contrary to nature, which bring such a smooth flow that if we did not acquire them or reject them, except in special circumstances, we would not be happy.

9. They say that what sets impulse moving is nothing other than a spontaneously impulsive impression of what is appropriate, while in genus impulse is a motion of the soul toward something. The impulse which occurs in rational creatures is viewed as a species of this, as well as that which occurs in irrational creatures (although the impulses have not been given corresponding names). Thus desire is not the same as rational impulse, but a species of rational impulse. You would rightly define rational impulse, if you said it was a motion of the mind toward something in the field of action. Opposed to this is repulsion, a motion <of the mind away from something in the field of action>. In a special sense they also call impulsion an impulse as a species of practical impulse. Impulsion is a motion of the mind toward what is going to occur. As a result, up till here, impulse is spoken of in four ways, repulsion in two ways. When we add on the condition which is able to impel, which they also in a particular sense call a impulse (that from which impelling occurs), impulse is defined in five ways.

9a. There are numerous species of practical impulse, including these: proposal, inclination, preparation, undertaking, <choice>, policy, wish, and willingness. They say that proposal is an indication of completion; inclination is an impulse before an impulse; preparation is an action before an action; undertaking is an impulse toward something that is now in hand; choice is a wish from comparison; policy is a choice before a choice; wish is I reasonable desire; willingness is a voluntary wish.

9b. All impulses are assents and practical impulses also include that which is stimulative. At the same time there are assents for things and impulses toward something else: assents are for certain propositions, while impulses are toward predicates, included somehow in the propositions for which there is assent. Since in species passion is an impulse, let’s speak next about passions.

10. They say a passion is an impulse which is excessive, disobedient to the choosing reason or an <irrational> motion of the soul contrary to nature (all passions belong to the controlling part of the soul). Hence also every agitation is a passion, <and> again <every> passion is an agitation. As passion is like this, it must be assumed that some passions are primary and fundamental, while others have reference to these. First in genus are these four: appetite, fear, pain, and pleasure. Appetite and fear lead the way, the former toward the apparently good, the other toward the apparently evil. Pleasure and pain come after them: pleasure whenever we obtain that for which we had an appetite or escape from that which we feared; pain whenever we fail to get that for which we had an appetite or encounter that which we feared. With regard to all the passions of the soul, when they say they are opinions, opinion is employed for feeble assumption and fresh for that which is stimulative of an irrational contraction <or> elation.

10a. The terms irrational and contrary to nature are not used in the usual sense, but irrational as equivalent of disobedient to reason. For every passion is overpowering, just as when those in the grips of passion often see that it would be useful not to do this, but carried away by its violence, as if by some disobedient horse, are led to doing this. As a result, often people even confess to this, uttering this commonly repeated line:

Although I have (better) judgment, nature forces me to do this.

Here judgment means the awareness and recognition of right things. Contrary to nature in the description of passion is taken as something which occurs contrary to correct and natural reasoning. All those in the grips of passion turn their backs on reason, not in the same way as those who have been thoroughly deceived in any matter, but in a special way. For those who have been fooled, for example, that there are indivisible first elements, when taught that they do not exist, abandon this judgment. But those in the grips of passion, even if they know or have been taught that they need not feel pain or be afraid or be involved at all in the passions of the soul, nevertheless do not abandon them, but are led by their passions to being governed by their tyranny.

10b. They say that appetite is a desire which is disobedient to reason. The cause of this is forming an opinion that something good is approaching and if that were present we would be getting away fine, when the opinion itself has the unruly, <fresh> stimulation <that it is really something worth desiring>. Fear is an avoidance which is disobedient to reason, its cause being forming an opinion that something bad is approaching, when the belief has the fresh stimulation that it is really something worth avoiding. Pain is a contraction of the soul which is disobedient to reason. The cause of it is forming a fresh opinion that an evil is present, in the face of which it is appropriate <to contract. Pleasure is an elation of the soul disobedient to reason. The cause of it is forming a fresh opinion that a good is present, in the face of which it is appropriate> to be elated.

Under appetite are subsumed things like these: anger and its species (temper, rage, wrath, rancor, cases of ire, and such), violent cases of erotic love, cravings, yearnings, cases of fondness for pleasure, cases of fondness for wealth, cases of fondness for esteem, and the like. Under pleasure are subsumed cases of joy at others’ misfortunes, cases of self-gratification, cases of charlatanry, and the like. Under fear are subsumed cases of hesitancy, cases of anguish, astonishment, feelings of shame, commotions, superstitions, dread, and terrors. Under pain are subsumed distress, envy, jealousy, pity, grief, worry, sorrow, annoyance, mental pain, and vexation.

10c. Anger is an appetite to take vengeance on a person who seems to have acted unjustly contrary to what is fitting. Temper is anger starting up; rage is anger boiling over; wrath is anger set aside or stored up to mature; rancor is anger keeping watch for an opportunity for revenge; ire is anger breaking out on the spot. Erotic love is an inclination for forming an attachment arising from the display of beauty; craving is an appetite in accord with erotic love for one who is absent; yearning is an appetite for the company of an absent friend; fondness for pleasure is an appetite for pleasures; fondness for wealth is an appetite for wealth; fondness for esteem is an appetite for opinion.

Joy at others’ misfortunes is pleasure at the evils suffered by others. Self-gratification is taking pleasure in the unexpected. Charlatanry is taking pleasure in visual deception.

Hesitancy is fear about a future activity. Anguish is fear of failure and, in another sense, fear of defeat. Astonishment is fear arising from an unaccustomed impression. Shame is fear of loss of reputation. Commotion is fear together with noise urging us on. Superstition is fear of the gods or spirits. Dread is fear of the terrible. Terror is fear from reasoning.

Distress is pain at good occurring to others. Envy is pain at another getting what you yourself have an appetite for, but you do not yourself get. Envy is spoken of in another sense as well, as a benediction of what is lacking, and, in another sense as well, as the imitation of another as being superior to oneself. Jealousy is pain at another also getting what you yourself had an appetite for. Pity is pain at someone appearing to suffer harm undeservedly. Grief is pain at a premature death. Worry is pain becoming burdensome. Sorrow is pain which produces speechlessness. Annoyance is pain in accordance with calculation. Mental pain is pain which burrows into a person and takes up home there. Vexation is pain with thrashing around.

10d. Of these passions, some display the occcasion which prompts them, such as pity, distress, joy at others’ misfortunes, and shame. Others show the specific type of motion, such as mental pain and terror.

10e. A proclivity is a propensity to a passion, as a particular deed contrary to nature, such as taking offense, irascibility, enviousness, outbursts of rage, and the like. There are also proclivities to other deeds contrary to nature, such as acts of theft, acts of adultery, and acts of violence, through which they are called thieves, adulterers, and hooligans. An illness is an opinion about an appetite which has inclined into a condition and become ingrained, through which they assume that things that are not worth choosing are especially worth choosing, such as fondness for women, fondness for wine, and fondness for money. There are also some things opposite to these illnesses which occur by aversion, such as the hatred of women, the hatred of wine, and the hatred of mankind. Those illnesses which occur together with weakness are called frailties.

11a. They say that a right act is an appropriate act having in full all its features, or as we said earlier, a complete appropriate act. A wrong act is something done contrary to correct reason or where some appropriate act has been omitted by a rational creature.

11b. They say that all good things are common to the worthwhile — hence, in addition, the man who benefits any of his neighbors also benefits himself. Concord is a knowledge of common goods. Hence also all the worthwhile are in concord with one another, because they are in harmony in the affairs of life. But the worthless, being in disharmony with one another, are enemies of one another, are ready to do harm to each other, and are at war with one another.

They say justice is by nature and not by convention. Following on from this, it is the case that the wise man takes part in politics, especially in such political systems as display some progress toward being complete political systems. It is also the case that he makes laws and educates his fellow men; furthermore, it is fitting for the worthwhile to write down what is able to benefit those who happen upon their writings, as is also to stoop to marriage and the raising of children, both for his own and his country’s sake, and also to endure for its sake, if it is moderate, toils and death. Opposed to these are worthless things: courting the mob, being a sophist, and writing works which are harmful to those who happen upon them, things which would not befall the worthwhile.

11c. Friendship is spoken of in three ways: in one way, for the sake of common benefit, according to which people are called friends — but they say that this is not one of the good things, since according to them nothing which is made up of separate parts is a good. What is called friendship according to the second definition, a friendly relationship with one’s neighbors, they say is one of the external goods. But the friendship which pertains to oneself, in accord with which one is a friend of one’s neighbors, they declare to be one of the good things of the soul.

11d. Goods are common in another way. For they believe that everyone who benefits anyone else gains an equal advantage by the act itself, while no worthless man can either benefit someone else or receive a benefit. For to confer a benefit is to be in accord with virtue and to be benefited is to be moved in accord with virtue.

They say that only the worthwhile man is skilled in household management and a good manager of his household, and, in addition, skilled at making money. For the skill of managing a household is a rule-based and practical condition with regard to what is useful for the household; household management is the organization of expenses and deeds, and the care of acquisitions and the produce from the fields. The money-making skill is experience in the acquisition of money from appropriate sources and a condition which creates conduct in agreement (with nature) in the collecting, preservation, and expenditure of money to produce affluence. Some say that making money is an intermediate, others that it is something civilized. But no worthless man can be a good head of his household, nor is he able to provide for a well-managed house. Only the worthwhile man is skilled at making money, knowing from what sources money must be gained, and when, how, and for how long.

They also say that <the man with good sense does not forgive anyone. For it is characteristic of the same person both to forgive> someone and to believe that he did not do wrong through his own fault, when all do wrong through their own evil. Accordingly it is rightly said that he does not forgive those who are doing wrong. They say that the good man is not tolerant, since the tolerant can be begged off the punishment in accord with what is due, and that it is the mark of the same man to be tolerant and to assume that the punishments set out by law for the unjust are too harsh and to consider that the lawmaker apportions punishments contrary to what is due.

They say that the law is worthwhile, since it is correct reasoning, ordering what must be done, but forbidding what must not be done. And as the law is civilized, the law-abiding citizen <would be> civilized too. For the man is law-abiding who is able both to follow the law and to carry out the things ordered by it, while the man is learned in the law who is able to interpret the law. But no worthless man is either law-abiding or learned in the law.

11e. In addition, they say that some activations are right acts, while others are wrong acts, while others are neither. Right acts are such as these: to be intelligent, to show self-restraint, to act justly, to be joyful, to be benevolent, to be cheerful, to walk around intelligently, and everything else which is done in accord with correct reasoning. Wrong acts include to act stupidly, to show lack of restraint, to act unjustly, to feel pain, to be afraid, to steal, and, overall, whatever is done contrary to correct reasoning. Neither right nor wrong acts are such: to talk, to pose a question, to answer, to walk around, to live abroad, and things like these. All right acts are justly performed acts, lawfully performed acts, orderly acts, properly pursued acts, prosperous acts, successful acts, opportune acts, and dignified acts. However, they are not intelligent acts, but only those which derive from intelligence are such — and the same is true in relation to the other virtues (even if they have not been named), such as restrained acts derived from self-restraint and just acts from justice. Wrong acts derived from the opposing vices are unjust acts, lawless acts, and unruly acts.

11f. They say that just as what is worth choosing and what must be chosen differ, so too do what is worth desiring and what must be desired, what is worth wanting and what must be wanted, and what is worth accepting and what must be accepted. For good things are worth choosing, being wanted, desired, <and accepted, while benefits must be chosen, wanted, desired,> and accepted, as they are predicates, associated with good things. They say that we choose what must be chosen, wish for what must be wanted, and desire what must be desired. For choices, desires, and wishes are for predicates, as with the impulses. However, we choose, want, and likewise desire to have good things. Hence good things are worth choosing, worth wanting, and worth desiring. We choose to have intelligence and self-restraint, not, by Zeus, to have being sensible and being self-restrained, which are incorporeals and predicates.

Likewise they say that all goods are worth maintaining and worth persisting in and that the case is analogous for the other virtues, even if they have not been given names. All benefits must be maintained and persisted in and so forth. Similarly they assume that there is a difference between what is worth avoiding and what must be avoided and what is not worth sustaining and what must be sustained. There is the same account of other matters which are associated with vices.

11g. They say that every fine and good man is complete because he is lacking in no virtue. Conversely, every worthless man is incomplete because he participates in no virtue. Hence also the good among men always live an absolutely happy life, while the worthless are unhappy, and the happiness <of the former> is in no way different from the happiness of the gods. Chrysippus says that their momentary happiness is no different from the happiness of Zeus <and> that the happiness of Zeus is in no respect more worth choosing, nor finer, nor more majestic than that of wise men.

It is the view of Zeno and his Stoic followers that there are two races of men, that of the worthwhile, and that of the worthless. The race of the worthwhile employ the virtues through all their lives, while the race of the worthless employ the vices. Hence the worthwhile always do right in everything on which they embark, while the worthless do wrong. The worthwhile man, using his practical experiences with regard to life in the things done by him, does all things well, just as he does them sensibly, with self-restraint, and in accord with the other virtues. The worthless man, conversely, does badly. The worthwhile man is also great, powerful, eminent, and strong. Great because he is able to accomplish the things which accord with his policy and are proposed. Powerful, because he is extolled on all sides. Eminent, because he has gained a share in the eminence which befalls a noble and wise man. And strong, because he has possession of the strength which befalls such a man, being invincible and unconquerable. Consequently, he is neither compelled by anyone nor does he compel another, neither prevented by nor preventing anyone else, neither forced by another nor forcing anyone else, neither lording it over others nor being lorded over, neither doing harm to another nor suffering harm from anyone else, neither encountering evils <nor causing anyone else to encounter evil>, neither deceived nor deceiving another, neither subjected to falsehood nor failing to understand nor unaware of what he is doing nor, overall, does he assume a falsehood. He is particularly happy, prosperous, blessed, fortunate, pious, dear to the gods, meritorious, kingly, fit for command, political, good at managing the household and at making money. The worthless have everything opposite to this.

Overall, all good things belong to the worthwhile, all evils to the worthless. It should not be thought that they are saying this: that if particular good things exist, these belong to the worthwhile, and that it is also the same case regarding evils. But rather they have so many good things that there is nothing lacking for their life to be complete <and happy>, while the other group has so many evils that their life is incomplete and unhappy.

11h. They describe virtue by numerous terms. They say it is good, because it leads us to the correct life; pleasing, because it is prized unhesitatingly; highly valued, because it has unsurpassable value; worthwhile, as being deserving of the utmost regard; praiseworthy, because someone would reasonably praise it; beautiful, because it naturally calls to itself those desiring it; advantageous, because it produces the sort of things that contribute to the good life; useful, because it is beneficial in use; worth choosing, because what can reasonably be chosen occur as a result of it; necessary, because when it is present it benefits and, if it is not present, it is not possible to be benefited; profitable, for its benefits are greater than the effort which contributes to them; self-sufficient, as it suffices for the person who has it; free from want, because it removes any want; and enough, because it is adequate for our usage and extends to every need in life.

11i. The worthless participate in none of the good things, since the good is a virtue or something which participates in virtue. The things associated with the goods — whatever things exist which are needed, that is, benefits — occur only to the worthwhile, just as the things associated with the evils — that is, whatever things exist which are not needed — occur only to the bad, as they are harmful things. Because of this the good are all free from harm in both respects, neither being able to harm nor to be harmed; while the worthless are in the opposite position.

They say that true riches are a good and true poverty an evil. True freedom is a good, true slavery an evil. Because of this they also say that the worthwhile man is the only rich and free man, and, conversely, the worthless man is poor, deprived of the impulses toward being rich, and a slave because of his submissive disposition.

All goods are common to the worthwhile, all evils to the worthless. Because of this, whoever benefits someone also is himself benefited, and the person who harms another also harms himself. All the worthwhile benefit one another. They are not totally friends of one another, nor well-disposed to each other, <nor> highly prized nor accepted by each other because they are not aware of each other and do not live together in the same place. However, they are in attitude well-disposed and friendly to each other, and prized and accepted by one another. The stupid are the opposite of this.

As the law is worthwhile, as we have said (since it is correct reason ordering what must be done and forbidding what must not be done), they say that only the wise man is law-abiding, as he is able to do what is ordered by the law, and that he alone is able to interpret it — hence, he is also learned in the law. The silly are the opposite of this.

Furthermore they assign to the civilized the governing superintendence and its species: kingship, generalship, admiralship, and the like. In accord with this also only the worthwhile man governs and, if he does not do this totally with respect to activity, he governs totally with respect to his disposition. And only the worthwhile man is obedient to command, being ready to follow the man who governs. None of the stupid is such. For the stupid person is neither able to govern nor to be governed, being headstrong and unmanageable.

The person with good sense does everything well, and so intelligently, temperately, modestly, and in orderly fashion continually using his practical experiences with regard to life. The worthless man, however, having no experience of the correct use, does everything badly, acting in accord with his disposition, easily changing his mind and in the grip of regret over every matter. Regret is pain at things that have been done, as having been done wrongly by oneself, a passion of the soul which creates unhappiness and is quarrelsome. To the extent that the person in a state of regret feels some sorrow at the occurrences, he is annoyed with himself as having been responsible for them. Hence, every worthless person is dishonored, neither being worthy of honor nor being held in honor. For honor is an evaluation (as deserving) of privilege, and privilege is the prize for benevolent virtue. So what is without any participation in virtue is rightly spoken of as dishonored.

They also say that every worthless person is also an exile, to the extent that he is deprived of law and befitting government in accord with nature. For the law, as we have stated, is worthwhile, and, likewise, so too is the city. With regard to the city being a worthwhile thing, Cleanthes adequately posed the question in this fashion, If the city is an arrangement for dwelling in a place and it is possible for people who have taken refuge in this to get and suffer judgment, then isn’t the city civilized? But it is in fact such a dwelling place. So the city is civilized. The city is spoken of in three ways: with regard to the dwelling place, with regard to the composite made of men, and thirdly with regard to both of these. The city is spoken of as civilized in respect of two definitions, in regard to the definition the composite made of men, and, because of the reference to the inhabitants, in regard to the definition in both respects.

11k. They also say that every worthless person is rustic. For rusticity is a lack of experience of the customs and laws of the city to which every worthless person is subject. He is also wild, being hostile to the lifestyle which is in accord with the law, bestial, and a harmful person. This same fellow is savage and despotic, inclined to do tyrannical acts, and furthermore to do cruel, violent, and lawless acts when he gets opportunities. He is also ungrateful, neither having an affinity to the return of a favor nor to the bestowal of one because he does not do anything cooperatively nor amicably nor spontaneously.

The worthless person is neither fond of discussion nor of listening, because he has not been prepared for the reception of correct reasoning because of his stupidity which fails from its distortion, and because none of the worthless is inclined toward nor can incline others to virtue. For the person who is inclined or can incline others needs to be ready for philosophizing, and the person who is ready is without impediment, and none of the stupid are such. For it is not the person who eagerly listens to and makes notes of what is spoken by the philosophers who is ready for philosophizing, but the person who is ready to transfer the prescriptions of philosophy to his deeds and to live in accord with them. None of the worthless are such, being already prejudiced by the teachings of vice. For if any of the worthless had been so inclined, he would also have turned from vice. But no one who possesses vice is turned toward virtue, just as no one who is sick is turned toward health. Only the wise man is inclined to virtue and only he is able to incline others, while none of the stupid can. For none of the stupid are able to live according to the prescriptions <of virtue>. Nor can they be fond of discussion, but are instead fond of talking, advancing as far as superficial chatter, but not, in addition, strengthening the reasoning of virtue by deeds as well.

None of the worthless are industrious. For industriousness is a disposition able to accomplish unhesitatingly what is befitting through toil, and none of the worthless are unhesitating with regard to toil.

Nor do any of the worthless gain virtue’s contribution in accord with their merits, for contribution is something worthwhile, being knowledge in accord with which we think we are acquiring something worthwhile. None of the worthwhile things befall the worthless, so none of the stupid gain virtue’s contribution in accord with their merits. If any of the stupid gained virtue’s contribution in accord with his merits, to the extent that he honored it, he would be getting rid of vice. But every stupid person gladly lives with his vice. It is necessary to examine, not the published accounts of these men, which are worthless, but rather the accounts of their deeds. From these they are convicted of being eager, not for the good and worthwhile, but for slavish, immoderate pleasures.

It is their view that every wrong act is an impious act. For to do something against the wish of the god is proof of impiety. As the gods have an affinity with virtue and its deeds, but are alienated from vice and those things which are produced by it, and as a wrong act is an activation in accord with vice, every wrong act is revealed as displeasing to the gods (that is, an impious act): for with every wrong act the worthless man does something displeasing to the gods.

Furthermore, since every worthless man does whatever he does in accord with vice, just as the worthwhile man acts in accord with virtue, the person who has one vice has them all. Among them can also be seen impiety, not the type of impiety which is classified in accord with its activity, but the condition which is opposed to piety. But what is achieved in accord with impiety is an impious act. So every wrong act is an impious act.

Furthermore, it is their view that every stupid person is an enemy of the gods. For enmity is disharmony and discord in matters of life, just as friendship is harmony and concord. But the worthless are in disharmony with the gods in matters of life. Hence, every stupid person is an enemy of the gods. Furthermore if all believe that those opposed to them are their enemies, and the worthless person is hostile to the worthwhile, and god is worthwhile, then the worthless person is an enemy of the gods.

11l. They say that all wrong acts are equal, but are not now the same. Inasmuch as they naturally come from, as it were, one source, that of vice, the judgment is the same in the case of every wrong act. But, in relation to the external cause, since the intermediates vary with regard to which the judgments are completed, wrong acts are different in quality. You would get a clear image of what is being explained by considering it is this way: every falsehood is equally a falsehood, for none are more falsified than the others. So that it is <always> night is a falsehood, just as is saying that centaurs live — to say one is no more a falsehood than the other. (But the false is not equally false, and also those who have been subjected to a falsehood are not equally subjected to a falsehood.) Also to do wrong to a greater or lesser extent is impossible, as every wrong is produced through falsehood. Furthermore, it can’t be that a right act cannot occur to a greater or lesser degree, but a wrong act can occur to a greater or lesser degree: all of them are complete things. Hence, they could not lack or have anything more than one another. So, then, all mistaken acts are equal.

11m. Concerning natural ability and being well-bred, some of the members of this school have been led to say that every wise man has such qualities, while others do not. For the latter think that people naturally suitable for virtue occur not only by nature, but also as a result of training, and they have agreed with this proverbial saying:

Practice over a long time turns into second nature.

They have come to the same supposition about good breeding as well: so while natural ability is, in normal usage, a condition from nature, or a condition from training which has an affinity with virtue, or a condition in accordance with which people are easily able to gain virtue, good breeding is a condition, inherited or as the result of training, which has an affinity with virtue.

The worthwhile man, being affable, clever, encouraging, and able to hunt for goodwill and friendship through association, is as accommodating as possible to the mass of men, through which he is also charming, gracious, and trustworthy, and, in addition, soothing, keen in aim, opportune, shrewd, guileless, simple, straightforward, and unaffected, while the worthless person is subject to all the opposites. They say to dissemble is a mark of the worthless, since no one who is a free man and worthwhile dissembles. Likewise with sarcasm, which is to dissemble with a type of mockery. They accept friendship only among the wise, since among them alone is there concord regarding the matters of life, as concord is a knowledge of common goods. For true friendship, not that falsely so-named, cannot exist without trust and firmness. In the case of the worthless, as they are unreliable and unstable and in possession of contradictory beliefs, it is not friendship, but different ties and attachments held together externally by their needs and opinions. They also say that being affectionate, embracing, and loving belong to the worthwhile alone.

Only the wise man can be a king and kingly, while none of the worthless can be such, since kingship is an office answerable to none, both being the office above all others and controlling all other offices.

They also say that the worthwhile man is the best doctor of himself. For, being careful about his personal nature, he is a close observer of and knowledgeable about what is useful for his health.

It is not possible for a person with intelligence to get drunk. For drunkenness encompasses the wrongful, since it is raving caused by wine, and the worthwhile man does wrong in nothing. Hence, he does everything in accord with virtue and the correct reasoning derived from it.

There are three preferential types of life, the kingly, the political, and thirdly the intellectual. Likewise there are three preferential types of making money: the one derived from kingship, through which either one will be king oneself or be rich with money from a monarch; the second derived from political life, for he will take part in politics according to preferential reasoning; and indeed he will marry and father children, as these are consistent with his <nature> as a rational creature who is communal and fond of fellowship. So he will make money both from public office and from those of his friends who are in positions of authority. But as to whether he will be a sophist and will be rich in money through sophistry, the members of this sect disagreed with respect to what is meant. For they agreed that they will make money from educational activities and from time to time accept payments from those who are fond of learning. But there was some disagreement among them concerning what is meant, some saying that to be a sophist is the same thing as to share the beliefs of philosophy for payment, while others suspect that there is something worthless in sophistry, like trading in words, and they say that one need not make money from education from whoever happens along, as this way of making money falls short of the dignity of philosophy. They sometimes say that the way out from life can be appropriate for the worthwhile in numerous ways, while for the worthless and for those who are not going to become wise only persistence in life is appropriate. For virtue does not constrain the worthwhile to live nor does vice force them out, but life and death is measured by what is appropriate and what is inappropriate.

They also say that the wise man is free from outrage. For he is neither treated outrageously nor does he act outrageously toward another, because outrage is injustice which makes one ashamed and a harm. But the worthwhile man neither suffers injustice nor is harmed (although some may deal with him unjustly and outrageously and in this respect act unjustly). In addition, a chance injustice is not an outrage, but only one which makes one ashamed and is outrageous. But the person with good sense does not get involved in these things and is in no way made ashamed, for he has the good and the divine virtue in himself, and as a consequence he is removed from all vice and harm.

The man with good sense will sometimes be king and associate with a king who shows natural ability and the love of learning. For we said it is possible to take part in government in accord with preferential reasoning, but also not to take part if something <prevented him> and especially if he was not going to benefit his country, but assumed that great and difficult dangers would follow directly from political life.

It is said that the wise man does not lie, but tells the truth in all cases. For lying does not occur in telling a falsehood, but in telling the falsehood in a false way and for the deception of one’s neighbors. However they believe that he will sometimes avail himself of the falsehood in numerous ways without assent: in accord with generalship against the opponents, and in accord with his foresight of what is useful, and in accord with many other types of management of life. They say that the wise man never assumes what is false nor does he assent at all to what cannot be apprehended, since he neither forms an opinion nor is ignorant in any matter. For ignorance is changeable and feeble assent. But he assumes nothing in feeble fashion, but instead securely and firmly. Hence, the wise man also does not form an opinion either. There are two types of opinion: assent to what cannot be apprehended and weak assumption. These are alien to the disposition of the wise man. Hence, acting rashly and giving assent before apprehension is the mark of a rash, worthless man, and does not befall the naturally suitable and complete man, the worthwhile person. For nothing escapes his notice, since obliviousness is a declarative assumption of a falsehood. Consistent with this, he does not mistrust, since mistrust is an assumption of a falsehood. But trust is civilized, since it is a strong apprehension, confirming what is assumed. Likewise knowledge is an apprehension irreversible by reason. Because of this they say that the worthless man neither knows anything nor trusts in anything. In line with this, the wise man is not defrauded, cheated, criticized, nor does he swindle nor is he swindled by another. For deception encompasses all these things as well as assent to what are falsehoods in the context. None of the civilized make a mistake about the way, or their home, or about the target — nor do they believe that the wise man fails to see or mishears, nor, overall, that he strikes a false note with respect to any of the organs of sensation, and they believe that each of these (mistakes) belong to false assents. They say that the wise man does not surmise, since surmise is assent to what cannot be comprehended in species. Nor do they assume that a man with good sense changes his mind, for changing one’s mind belongs to false assent, on the grounds of erring through haste. Nor does he change his mind in any way, nor alter his opinion, nor is he confused. For all these things are marks of those who waver in their beliefs, which is alien to the person with good sense. They also say that nothing seems to be to him, in line with what has been stated.

11n. They also believe that a person is wise without having been aware of it at first, since he is neither desiring anything nor has he completely arrived at any of the specific forms of wishing, because he does not judge that what is needed is present for him. There will be similar types of apprehension not only with respect to intelligence, but also regarding the other expertises.

11o. As all wrong acts are equal and all right acts equal too, so the stupid are all equally stupid, having the same, equal disposition? But while wrong acts are equal, there are certain differences among them, to the extent that some of them occur from a harsh and difficult to cure disposition, while others do not.

11p. Of the worthwhile, some are more able to encourage and more persuasive than others; furthermore, some are shrewder about intermediates which involve changes in intensities.

11q. Only the civilized man is fortunate in his children — certainly not everyone — for the man who is fortunate in his children, having civilized children, needs to experience them as such! Only the worthwhile man has a fortunate old age and a fortunate death, for a fortunate old age is living out one’s life in accord with virtue whatever the type of old age, and to have a fortunate death is to end one’s life in accord with virtue whatever the type of death.

11r. Things which are healthy and things which make a person ill are spoken of in relation to man, as are things of the nurturing type, and the laxatives and astringents, and the like. For things which are healthy are those which are naturally suitable for producing or preserving health, while things which make a person ill are the opposite to these. There is a similar reasoning about other matters.

11s. Only the worthwhile man is able to prophesy, having a knowledge that is able to distinguish the signs from the gods or spirits which touch on human life. As a result, the species of prophetic art are associated with him: the skill of dream interpretation, the skill of observing the flight of birds, the skill of making sacrifices, and any things which may be similar to these.

They say that the worthwhile man is stern to the extent that he neither addresses to anyone nor admits to himself speech for the purpose of ingratiation. They say that the wise man will live like a Cynic, which is equivalent to sticking with the Cynic lifestyle; but certainly he will not start out on the Cynic lifestyle when he is a wise man.

They say that erotic love is an inclination to forming an attachment resulting from the beauty displayed by young men in their prime. As a result the wise man is erotic and falls in love with those worthy of erotic love — the well-bred and naturally suitable.

They also say that nothing contrary to desire, contrary to impulse, nor contrary to his inclination occurs in the case of the worthwhile man, because he does all such things with reservation and nothing adverse befalls him unforeseen!

He is also gentle, gentleness being a condition through which they are gentle about doing what is befitting in every case and not being carried away into anger in any matter. He is also tranquil and proper, propriety being a knowledge of suitable motions, while tranquility is orderliness in relation to the motions in accord with nature and persistences of the soul and body, while the opposite to this occurs in the case of all the worthless.

Everyone who is fine and good is free from slander, being impervious to slander; as a result, he is free from slander both in this way and by not slandering another. For slander is a disagreement between people, who are apparently friends, through false reasoning. But this does not occur in the case of good men, but only the worthless slander and are slandered by one another. Accordingly, those who are truly friends neither slander nor are slandered by one another, but only those who seem to be and appear to be so.

The worthwhile man never delays, as delay is a postponement of activity through hesitancy, and he postpones anything only when the postponement is irreproachable. For Hesiod has stated this about delaying:

Do not delay for the morrow or the day after,


The dilatory man is always wrestling with ruin,

Since delay produces an abandonment of the fitting deeds.

12. So much for these matters: Chrysippus has discussed all their paradoxical beliefs in many different places, both in the book On Beliefs and in the Treatise on Reason and in many other works in particular sections. But now that I have given an adequate account of whatever of the ethical beliefs in accord with the Stoic school of philosophers I intended to go through in survey fashion, I will here bring this summary to an end.


LIB. II CAP. VII. 5-12

Ζήνωνος καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν Στωικῶν δόγματα περὶ τοῦ ἠθικοῦ μέρους τῆς φιλοσοφίας.

    Περὶ δὲ τῶν ἠθικῶν ἑξῆς ποιήσομαι
τὸν ὑπομνηματισμὸν τὰ κεφάλαια τῶν
ἀναγκαίων δογμάτων ἀναλαβών. Ἄρξομαι
5aδ᾽ ἐντεῦθεν·
    Ταῦτ᾿ εὶναὶ φησιν ὁ Ζήνων, ὅσα οὐσίας5
μετέχει· τῶν δ᾽ ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἀγαθά, τὰ δὲ
κακά, τὰ δὲ ἀδιάφορα. Ἀγαθὰ μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα·
φρόνησιν, σωφροσύνην, δικαιοσύνην, ἀνδρείαν
καὶ πᾶν ὅ ἐστιν ἀρετὴ ἢ μετέχον ἀρετῆς· κακὰ
δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα· ἀφροσύνην, ἀκολασίαν, Ι10
ἀδικίαν, δειλίαν καὶ πᾶν ὅ ἐστι κακία ἢ μετέχον
κακίας· ἀδιάφορα δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα· ζωὴν
θάνατον, δόξαν ἀδοξίαν, πόνον ἡδονὴν,
πλοῦτον πενίαν, νόσον ὑγίειαν, καὶ τὰ τούτοις
5b     Τῶν δὲ ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν εἶναι ἀρετάς, τὰ
δ᾽ οὔ. Φρόνησιν μὲν οὖν καὶ σωφροσύνην <καὶ
δικαιοσύνην> καὶ ἀνδρείαν <καὶ μεγαλοψυχίαν
καὶ ῥώμην καὶ ἰσχὺν ψυχῆς> ἀρετάς· χαρὰν δὲ
καὶ εὐφροσύνην καὶ θάρρος καὶ βούλησιν καὶ20
τὰ παραπλήσια οὐκ εἶναι ἀρετάς. Τῶν δὲ
ἀρετῶν τὰς μὲν ἐπιστήμας τινῶν καὶ τέχνας,
τὰς δ᾽ οὔ. Φρὀνησιν μὲν οὖν καὶ σωφροσύνην
καὶ δικαιοσύνην καὶ ἀνδρείαν ἐπιστήμας εἴναι
τινῶν καὶ τέχνας· μεγαλοψυχίαν δὲ καὶ ῥώμην25
καὶ ἰσχὺν ψυχῆς οὔτ’ ἐπιστήμας τινῶν εἶναι
οὔτε τέχνας. ᾽Ανάλογον δὲ καὶ τῶν κακῶν τὰ
μὲν εἶναι κακίας, τὰ δ᾽ οὔ. ᾽Αφροσὔνην μὲν οὖν
<καὶ ἀκολασίαν> καὶ ἀδικίαν καὶ δειλίαν καὶ
μικροψυχίαν καὶ ἀδυναμίαν <καὶ ἀσθένειαν>30
κακίας εἷναι· λὔπην δὲ καὶ φόβον καὶ τὰ
παραπλήσια οὐκ εἶναι κακίας. Τῶν δὲ κακιῶν
τὰς μὲν εἶναι ἀγνοίας τινῶν καὶ ἀτεχνίας, τὰς
δ᾽ οὔ. Ἀφροσὔνην μὲν οὖν καὶ ἀκολασίαν καὶ
ἀδικίαν καὶ δειλίαν | ἀγνοίας εἷναι τινῶν καὶ35
ἀτεχνίας· μικροψυχίαν δὲ καὶ ἀδυναμίαν <καὶ
ἀσθένειαν> οὔτε ἀγνοίας τινῶν οὔτε ἁτεχνίας.
5b1     Φρόνησιν δ᾽ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην ὧν ποιητέον
καὶ οὔ ποιητέον καὶ οὐδετέρων, ἢ ἐπιστήμην
ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων φύσει40
πολιτικοῦ ζῴου <καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λοιπῶν δὲ
ἀρετῶν οὔτως ἀκούειν παραγγέλλουσι>·
σωφροσύνην δ᾽ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην αἱρετῶν καὶ
φευκτῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων δικαιοσύνην δὲ
ἐπιστήμην ἁπονεμητικὴν τῆς ἀξίας ἑκάστῳ·45
ἀνδρείαν δὲ ἐπιστήμην δεινῶν καὶ οὔ δεινῶν
καὶ οὔδετέρων· ἀφροσύνην δὲ <ἄγνοιαν>
ἀγαθῶν | καὶ κακῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων, ἢ
ἄγνοιαν ὧν ποιητέον καὶ οὔ ποιητέον καὶ
οὐδετέρων ἀκολασίαν δὲ ἄγνοιαν αἱρετῶν καὶ50
φευκτῶν καὶ οὔδετέρων· <ἀδικίαν δὲ ἄγνοιαν
μὴ ἀπονεμητικὴν τῆς ἀξίας ἑκάστῳ>· δειλίαν
δὲ ἄγνοιαν δεινῶν καὶ οὔ δεινῶν καὶ
οὐδετέρων. Παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας
ἀρετὰς καὶ κακίας ὁρίζονται, τῶν εἰρημένων55
ἐχόμενοι. Κοινότερον δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν διάθεσιν
εἶναί φασι ψυχῆς σύμφωνον αὐτῇ περὶ ὅλον
τὸν βίον.
5b2     Τῶν δ᾽ ἀρετῶν τὰς μὲν εἷναι πρώτας, τὰς
δὲ ταῖς πρώταις ὐποτεταγμάνας πρώτας· δὲ60
τέτταρας εἷναι, φρόνησιν, σωφροσύνην,
ἀνδρείαν, δικαιοσύνην. Καὶ τὴν μὲν φρόνησιν
περὶ τὰ καθήκοντα γίνεσθαι· τὴν δὲ
σωφροσύνην περὶ τὰς ὁρμὰς τοῦ ἀνθρώπουτὴν
δὲ ἀνδρείαν περὶ τὰς ὐπομονἀς· τὴν δὲ65
δικαιοσύνην περὶ τὰς ὰπονεμήσεις. Τῶν δὲ
ὑποτεταγμένων ταῖς ἀρεταῖς ταύταις τὰς μὲν
τῇ φρονήσει ὑποτετάχθαι, τὰς δὲ τῇ
σωφροσύνῃ. τὰς δὲ τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ, τὰς δὲ τῇ
δικαιοσύνῃ. Τῇ μὲν οὖν φρονήσει ὐποτάττεσθαι70
εὐβουλίαν, εὐλογιστίαν, ἀγχίνοιαν,
νουνέχειαν, <εὐστοχίαν>, εὐμηχανίαν· τῇ δὲ
σωφροσύνῃ εὐταξίαν, κοσμιότητα,
αὶδημοσὐνην, ἐγκράτειαν· τῇ δὲ ἀνδρείᾳ
καρτερίαν. Θαρραλεὀτητα, μεγαλοψυχίαν,75
εὐψυχίαν, φιλοπονίαντῇ· δὲ δικαιοσύνη
εὐσέβειαν, χρηστότητα, εὐκοινωνησίαν,
εὐσυναλλαξίαν. Εὐβουλίαν μὲν οὖν εἶναι
λέγουσιν ἐπιστήμην τοῦ ποῖα καὶ πῶς
πράττοντες πράξομεν συμφερόντως· Ι80
εὐλογιστίαν δὲ ἐπιστήμην ἁνταναιρετικὴν καὶ
σνγκεφαλαιωτικὴν τῶν γινομένων καὶ
ἀποτελουμένων· ἀγχίνοιαν δὲ ἐπιστήμην
εὐρετικὴν τοῦ καθήκοντος ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα·
νουνέχειαν δὲ ἐπιστήμην <τῶν χειρόνων καὶ85
βελτιόνων εὐστοχίαν δὲ ἐπιστήμην>
ἐπιτευκτικὴν τοῦ ἐν ἑκάστῳ σκοποῦ·
εὐμηχανίαν δὲ ἐπιστήμην εὐρετικὴν διεξόδου
πραγμάτων· εὐταξίαν δὲ ἐπιστήμην τοῦ πότε
πρακτέον, καὶ τί μετὰ τί, καὶ καθόλου τῆς90
τάξεως τῶν πράξεων· κοσμιότητα δὲ
<ἐπιστήμην> πρεπουσὥν καὶ ἀπρεπὥν
κινήσεων· αὶδημοσύνην δὲ ἐπιστήμην
εὐλαβητικὴν ὀρθοῦ ψόγου· ἐγκράτειαν δὲ
ἐπιστήμην ἁνυπέρβατον τῶν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν95
λόγον φανέντων· καρτερίαν δὲ ἐπιστήμην
ἐμμενητικὴν τοῖς ὀρθῶς κριθεῖσι·
θαρραλεότητα δὲ ἐπιστήμην καθ’ ἣν οἴδαμεν
ὅτι οὐδενὶ δεινῷ μὴ περιπέσῶμεν·
μεγαλοψυχίαν δὲ ἐπιστήμην ὑπεράνω100
ποιοῦσαν τῶν πεφυκότων ἐν σπουδαίοις τε
γίνεσθαι καὶ φαύλοις· εὐψυχίαν δὲ ἐπιστήμην
ψυχῆς παρεχομένης ἑαυτὴν ἀήττητον·
φιλοπονίαν | δὲ ἐπιστήμην ἐξεργαστικὴν τοῦ
προκειμένου, οὐ κωλυομένην διὰ πόνον·105
εὐσέβειαν δὲ ἐπιστήμην Θεῶν θεραπείας·
χρηστότητα δὲ ἐπιστήμην εὐποιητικἠν·
εὐκοινωνησίαν δὲ ἐπιστήμην ἰσότητος ἐν
κοινωνίᾳ· εὐσυναλλαξίαν δὲ ἐπιστήμην τοῦ
συναλλἀττειν ἀμέμπτως τοῖς πλησίον.110
5b3     Πασῶν δὲ τούτων τῶν ἀρετῶν τὸ τέλος
εἶναι τὸ ἀκολούθως τῇ φύσει ζῆν᾽ ἑκάστην δὲ
τούτου διὰ τῶν ἰδίων παρέχεσθαι
τυγχάνοντα τὸν ἄνθρωπον. ᾿Ἐχειν γὰρ
ἀφορμὰς παρὰ τῆς φύσεως καὶ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ115
καθήκοντος εὕρεσιν καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὁρμῶν
εὐστάθειαν καὶ πρὸς τὰς ὐπομονὰς καὶ πρὸς
τὰς ἁπονεμήσεις. Καὶ <κατὰ> τὸ σύμφωνον καὶ
τὸ ἑαυτῆς ἑκάστη τῶν ἀρετῶν πράττουσα
παρέχεται τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀκολούθως τῇ φύσει120
5b4     Ταύτας μὲν οὖν τὰς ῥηθείσας ἀρετὰς
τελείας εἶναι λέγουσι περὶ τὸν βίον καὶ
συνεστηκέναι ἐκ θεωρημάτων· ἄλλας δὲ
ἐπιγίνεσθαι ταύταις, οὐκ ἔτι τέχνας οὔσας,125
ἀλλὰ δυνάμεις τινάς, ἐκ τῆς ἀσκήσεως
περιγιγνομένας, οἷον τὴν ὑγίειαν Τῆς ψυχῆς
καὶ τὴν ἀρτιότητα καὶ τὴν ἰσχὺν αὐτῆς καὶ τὸ
κάλλος. Ὥσπερ γὰρ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ὑγίειαν
εὐκρασίαν εἶναι τῶν ὲν τῷ σώματι Θερμὤν καὶ130
ψυχρῶν καὶ ξηρῶν καὶ ὑγρῶν, οὕτω καὶ τὴν
τῆς ψυχῆς ὑγίειαν εὐκρασίαν εἴναι τῶν ἐν τῇ
ψυχῇ δογμάτων. Καὶ ὁμοίως ὥσπερ ἰσχὺς τοῦ
σώματος τόνος ὲοτὶν ὶκανὸς ὲν νεύροις, οὕτω
καὶ ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς ὶοχῦς τόνος | ἐστὶν ἱκανὸς ἐν135
τῷ κρίνειν καὶ πράττειν ἢ μή. Ὥσπερ τε τὸ
κάλλος τοῦ σώματός ὲστι συμμετρία τῶν
μελῶν καθεστώτων αὐτῷ πρὸς ἄλληλά τε καὶ
πρὸς τὸ ὅλον, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κάλλος
ἐστὶ συμμετρία τοῦ λόγου καὶ τῶν μερῶν140
αὐτοῦ πρὸς <τὸ> ὅλον τε αὐτῆς καὶ πρὸς
5b5     Πάσας δὲ τὰς ἀρετάς, ὅσαι ἐπιστῆμαί εἰσι
καὶ τέχναι, κοινά τε θεωρήματα ἔχειν καὶ
τέλος, ὡς εἴρηται, τὸ αὐτό, διὸ καὶ ἁχωρίστους145
εἴναι· τὸν γὰρ μίαν ἔχοντα πάσας ἔχειν, καὶ
τὸν κατὰ μίαν πράττοντα κατὰ πάσας
πράττειν. Διαφέρειν δ’ ἀλλήλων τοῖς
κεφαλαίοις. Φρονήσεως μὲν γὰρ εἶναι
κεφάλαια τὸ μὲν Θεωρεῖν καὶ πράττειν, ὅ150
ποιητέον, προηγουμένως, κατὰ δὲ τὸν
δεύτερον λόγον τὸ θεωρεῖν καὶ ἃ δεῖ ἀπονέμειν
<καὶ ἃ δεῖ αἱρεῖσθαι καὶ ἃ δεῖ ὑπομένειν>, χάριν
τοῦ ἀδιαπτώτως πράττειν ὃ ποιητέον. τῆς
δὲ σωφροσύνης ἴδιον κεφάλαιόν ἐστι τὸ155
παρέχεσθαι τὰς ὁρμὰς εὐσταθεῖς καὶ Θεωρεῖν
αὐτὰς προηγουμένως, κατὰ δὲ τὸν δεύτερον
λόγον τὰ ὑπὸ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς, ἕνεκα τοῦ
ἀδιαπτώτως ἐν ταῖς ὁρμαῖς ἀναστρέφεσθαι·
καὶ ὁμοίως τὴν ἀνδρείαν προηγουμένως μὲν160
πᾶν ὃ δεῖ ὑπομένειν, κατὰ δὲ τὸν δεύτερον
λόγον τὰ ὑπὸ τὰς ἄλλας· καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην
προηγουμένως μὲν τὸ κατ᾿ ἀξίαν ἑκάστῳ
σκοπεῖν, κατὰ δὲ τὸν δεύτερον· λόγον καὶ τὰ165
λοιπά. Πάσας γὰρ τὰς ἀρετὰς τὰ πασῶν
βλέπειν καὶ τὰ ὐποτεταγμένα ἀλλήλαις.
Ὅμοιον γὰρ ἔλεγεν εἷναι ὁ Παναίτιος τὸ
συμβαῖνον ἐπὶ | τῶν ἀρετῶν, ὡς εἰ πολλοῖς
τοξόταις εἴς σκοπὸς εὶη κείμενος, ἔχοι δ’ οὗτος170
ἐν αὐτῷ γραμμὰς διαφόρους τοῖς χρώμασιν·
εἴθ᾿ ἕκαστος μὲν στοχάζοιτο τοῦ τυχεῖν τοῦ
σκοποῦ, ἤδη δ᾽ ὁ μὲν διὰ τοῦ πατάξαι εἰς τὴν
λευκὴν εἰ τύχοι γραμμήν, ὁ δὲ διὰ τοῦ εἰς τὴν
μέλαιναν, ἄλλος <δὲ> διὰ τοῦ εἰς ἄλλο τι χρῶμα175
γραμμῆς. Καθάπερ γὰρ τούτους ὡς μὲν
ἀνωτάτω τέλος ποιεῖσθαι τὸ τυχεῖν τοῦ
σκοποῦ, ἤδη δ’ ἄλλον κατ’ ἄλλον τρόπον
προτίθεσθαι τὴν τεῦξιν, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ
τὰς ἀρετὰς πάσας ποιεῖσθαι μὲν τέλος τὸ180
εὐδαιμονεῖν, ὅ ἐστι κείμενον ἐν τῷ ζῆν
ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει, τούτου δ’ ἄλλην
κατ’ ἄλλον τυγχάνειν.
5b6     Διττὤς δέ φησιν ὁ Διογένης λέγεσθαι τὰ
δι’ αὐτὰ αἱρετά, <τὰ> καὶ τελικὤς αἱρετά, ὡς185
ἔχει τὰ ἐν τῇ προειρημένῃ διαιρέσει
κατατεταγμένα, τὰ δὲ ὅσα ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔχει τὴν
αἰτίαν τοῦ αἱρετὰ εἶναι, ὅπερ παντὶ ἀγαθῷ
5b7     Ἀρετὰς δ᾽ εἶναι πλείους φασὶ καὶ190
ἁχωρίστους ἀπ᾽ ἀλλήλων, καὶ τὰς αὐτὰς τῷ
ἡγεμονικῷ μέρει τῆς ψυχῆς καθ᾿ ὑπόστασιν,
καθ᾽ ὃ δὴ καὶ σῶμα πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν εἶναί τε καὶ
λέγεσθαι, τὴν γὰρ διάνοιαν καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν
σῶμα εἷναι· τὸ γὰρ συμφυὲς πνεῦμα ἡμῖν195
ἔνθερμον ὃν ψυχὴν ἡγοῦνται. |
    Βούλονται δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐν ἡμῖν ψυχὴν ζῷον
εἶναι, ζῆν τε γὰρ καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι· καὶ μάλιστα
τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν μέρος αὐτῆς, ὃ δὴ καλεῖται
διάνοια. Διὸ καὶ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ζῷον εἶναι,200
ἐπειδὴ ἡ αὐτὴ <τῇ> διανοίᾳ ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν
οὐσίαν. Κατὰ τοῦτο γάρ φασι καὶ τὴν
φρόνησιν φρονεῖν, ἀκολουθεῖ γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὸ
οὕτως λέγειν.
5b8     Ἀρετῆς δὲ καὶ κακία; οὐδὲν εἷναι μεταξύ.205
Πάντας γὰρ ἀνθρώπους ἀφορμὰς ἔχειν ἰκ
φύσεως πρὸς ἀρετήν, καὶ οὶονεὶ τὸν τῶν
ἡμιαμβεὶων λόγον ἔχειν κατὰ τὸν Κλεάνθην·
ὅθεν ἀτελεῖς μὲν ὄντας εἴναι φαύλους.
τελειωθέντας δὲ σπουδαίους.210
    Φασὶ δὲ καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν τὸν σοφὸν
<κατὰ> πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς. Πᾶσαν γἁρ πρᾶξιν
τελείαν αὐτοῦ εἷναι, διὸ καὶ μηδεμιᾶς
ἀπολελεῖφθαι ἀρετῆς.
5b9     Ἀκολούθως γὰρ τούτοις δογματίζουσι215
καὶ ὅτι καὶ νουνεχόντως καὶ διαλεκτικὤς ποιεῖ
καὶ συμποτικὥς καὶ ἐρωτικῶς. Τὸν δὲ
ἐρωτικὸν καὶ διχῇ λέγεσθαι, τὸν μὲν κατὰ τὴν
ἀρετὴν ποιὸν σπουδαῖον ὄντα, τὸν δὲ κατὰ
τὴν κακίαν ἑν ψόγῳ, ὡς ἂν ἐρωτομανῆ τινα.220
εἶναι δ᾽ ἔρωτα <τὸν σπουδαῖον φιλίας>· τόν τ᾽
ἀξιέραστον ὁμοίως | ῾λέγεσθαι τῷ
ἁξιοφιλήτῳ, καὶ οὐ τῷ ἁξιαπολαύστῳ· τὸν
γὰρ ἄξιον σπουδαίου ἔρωτος, τοῦτον εἴναι
ἁξιέραστον. Ὁμοίως δὲ τῇ ἐρωτικῇ τὴν225
συμποτικὴν παραλαμβάνουσιν εἰς τὰς ἀρετάς,
τὴν μὲν περὶ τὸ ἐν συμποσίῳ καθῆκον
ἀναστρεφομένην ἐπιστήμην οὖσαν τοῦ πῶς δεῖ
ἐξάγεσθαι τὰ συμπόσια καὶ τοῦ πῶς δεῖ
συμπίνειν· τὴν δ᾽ ἐπιστήμην νέων Θήρας230
εὐφυῶν, προτρεπτικὴν οὖσαν ἐπὶ τὰ κατ᾽
ἀρετήν, καὶ καθόλου ἐπιστήμην τοῦ καλῶς
ὲρᾶν· διὸ καί φασιν ὲρασθἠσεσθαι τὸν νοῦν
ἔχοντα. Τὸ δὲ ὲρᾶν αὐτὸ μόνον ἀδιάφορον
εἶναι, ἐπειδὴ γίνεταί ποτε καὶ περὶ φαύλους.235
Τὸν δὲ ἔρωτα οὔτε ἐπιθυμίαν εἶναι οὔτε τινὸς
φαύλου πράγματος, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπιβολὴν φιλοποιίας
διὰ κάλλους ἔμφασιν.
5b10     Λέγουσι δὲ καὶ πάντ᾽ εὖ ποιεῖν τὸν σοφόν,
ἃ ποιεῖ· δῆλον. Ὃν τρόπον γὰρ λέγομεν πάντ᾽240
εὖ ποιεῖν τὸν αὐλητὴν ἢ κιθαρῳδὸν,
συνυπακουομένου τοῦ ὅτι τὰ μὲν κατὰ τὴν
αὔλησιν, τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὴν κιθαρῳδίαν, τὸν
αὐτὸν τρόπον πάντ’ εὖ ποιεῖν τὸν φρόνιμον,
καθ᾽ ὅσα ποιεῖ καὶ οὔ μὰ Δία, καθ᾽ ἃ μὴ ποιεῖ.245
Τῷ γὰρ κατὰ λόγον ὀρθὸν ἐπιτελεῖν πάντα
καὶ οἷον κατ’ ἀρετήν, περὶ | ὅλον οὖσαν τὸν
βίον τέχνην, ἀκόλουθον ᾠήθησαν τὸ περὶ τοῦ
πάντ᾽ εὖ ποιεῖν τὸν σοφὸν δόγμα. Κατὰ τὸ
ἀνάλογον δὲ καὶ τὸν φαῦλον πάντα ὅσα ποιεῖ250
κακῶς ποιεῖν καὶ κατὰ πάσας τὰς κακίας.
5b11     Φιλομουσίαν δὲ καὶ φιλογραμματίαν καὶ
φιλιππίαν καὶ φιλοκυνηγίαν καὶ καθόλου
ἐγκυκλίους λεγομένας τέχνας ἐπιτηδεύματα
μὲν καλοῦσιν, ἐπιστήμας δ᾽ οὔ, ἔν <τε> ταῖς255
σπουδαίαις ἕξεσι ταῦτα καταλείπουσι, καὶ
ἀκολούθως μόνον τὸν σοφὸν φιλόμουσον εἶναι
λέγουσι καὶ φιλογράμματον, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
ἄλλων κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. Τό τε ἐπιτήδευμα
τοῦτον ὐπογράφουσι τὸν τρόπον· ὁδὸν διὰ260
τέχνης ἢ μέρους ἄγουσαν ἐπὶ <τὰ> κατ᾽ ἀρετήν.
5b12     Μόνον δέ φασι τὸν σοφὸν καὶ μάντιν
ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ ποιητὴν καὶ ῥήτορα καὶ
διαλεκτικὸν καὶ κριτικόν, οὐ πάντα δέ, διὰ τὸ
προσδεῖσθαι ἔτι τινὰ τούτων καὶ θεωρημάτων265
τινῶν ἀναλήψεως. Εἶναι δὲ τὴν μαντικήν φασιν
ἐπιστήμην Θεωρητικἡν σημείων τῶν ἀπὸ θεῶν
ἢ δαιμόνων πρὸς ἀνθρώπινον βίον
συντεινόντων. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ εἴδη τῆς
    Λέγουσι δὲ καὶ ὶερέα μόνον εἴναι τὸν
σοφόν, φαῦλον δὲ μηδένα. Τὸν γὰρ ἱερέα εἶναι
δεῖν ἔμπειρον νόμων τῶν περὶ θυσίας καὶ εὐχὰς
καὶ καθαρμοὺς καὶ ὶδρύσεις | καὶ πάντα τὰ
τοιαῦτα, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ ἁγιστείας τε καὶ275
εὐσεβείας δεῖσθαι καὶ ἐμπειρίας τῆς τῶν θεῶν
θεραπείας, καὶ <τοῦ> ἐντὸς εἶναι τῆς φύσεως
τῆς θείας. Μηδ᾽ ἓν <δέ τ>ι τούτων ὑπάρχειν τῷ
φαύλῳ, διὸ καὶ πάντας εἶναι τοὺς ἄφρονας
ἀσεβεῖς. Τὴν γὰρ ἀσέβειαν κακίαν οὖσαν,280
ἄγνοιαν εἷναι Θεῶν Θεραπείας, τὴν δ᾽ εὐσέβειαν,
ὡς εἴπομεν, ἐπιστήμην θεῶν θεραπείας.
    Ὁμοίως δὲ μηδ᾽ ὁσίους εἶναί φασι τοὺς
φαύλους. Τὴν γὰρ ὁσιότητα ὺπογράφεσθαι
δικαιοσύνην πρὸς θεούς· τοὺς δὲ φαύλους285
παρεκβαίνειν πολλὰ τῶν πρὸς θεοὺς δικαίων,
παρ᾽ ὃ καὶ ἀνοσίους εἶναι καὶ ἁκαθάρονς καὶ
ἀνάγνους καὶ μιαροὺς καὶ ἀνεορτάστους.
    Τὸ γὰρ ἑορτάζειν ἁστείου φασὶν εἶναι, τῆς
ἑορτῆς οὔσης χρόνου τινὸς ἐν ᾧ χρὴ περὶ τὸ290
θεῖον γίγνεσθαι τιμῆς χάριν καὶ καθηκούσης
ἐπισημασίας, ὅθεν καὶ τὸν ἑορτάζοντα
συγκαθεικέναι δεῖ μετ᾽ εὐσεβείας εἰς τὴν
τοιαύτην τάξιν.
5b13     Ἔτι δὲ λέγουσι πάντα φαῦλον μαίνεσθαι,295
ἄγνοιαν ἔχοντα αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν καθ᾽ αὑτόν,
ὅπερ ἐστὶ μανία. Τὴν δ᾽ ἄγνοιαν εἴναι ἐναντίαν
κακίαν τῇ σωφροσύνῃταύτην δὲ πρὸς τί πως
ἔχουσαν ἁκαταστάτους καὶ πτοιώδεις
παρεχομένην τὰς ὁρμὰς μανίαν εὶναι· διὸ καὶ300
ὐπογρἀφουσι τὴν μανίαν οὕτως· ἄγνοιαν
5c     Ἔτι δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν πᾶσι τοῖς
φρονίμοις ὑπάρχειν καὶ αἰεί, τὰ δὲ οὔ. Ἀρετὴν
μὲν | πᾶσαν καὶ φρονίμην αἴσθησιν καὶ305
φρονίμην ὁρμὴν καὶ τὰ ὅμοια πᾶσι τοῖς
φρονίμοις ὑπάρχειν καὶ ἐν παντὶ καιρῷ· χαρὰν
δὲ καὶ εὐφροσύνην καὶ φρονίμην περιπάτησιν
οὔτε πᾶσι τοῖς φρονίμοις ὑπάρχειν οὔτε αἰεί.
Ἀνἀλογον δὲ καὶ τῶν κακῶν τὰ μὲν πᾶσι τοῖς310
ἄφροσιν ὑπάρχειν καὶ αἰεί, τὰ δ’ οὔ. Κακίαν
μὲν οὖν πᾶσαν καὶ ἄφρονα αἴσθησιν καὶ
ἄφρονα ὁρμὴν καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια πᾶσι τοῖς
ἄφροσιν ὑπάρχειν <καὶ> αὶεί· λύπην δὲ καὶ
φόβον καὶ ἄφρονα ἀπόκρισιν οὔτε πᾶσι τοῖς315
ἄφροσιν ὑπάρχειν οὔτ᾽ ἐν παντὶ καιρῷ.
5d     Πάντα δὲ τἀγαθὰ ὠφέλιμα εἶναι καὶ
εὔχρηστα καὶ συμφέροντα καὶ λυσιτελῆ καὶ
σπουδαῖα καὶ πρέποντα καὶ καλὰ καὶ οἰκεῖα·
τὰ δὲ κακὰ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων πάντα βλαβερὰ320
καὶ δύσχρηστα καὶ ἀσύμφορα καὶ ἀλυσιτελῆ
καὶ φαῦλα καὶ ἀπρεπῆ καὶ αἰσχρὰ καὶ ἁνοίκεια.
    Τὸ δ’ ἀγαθὸν λέγεσθαί φασι πλεοναχῶς,
τὸ μὲν πρῶτον, οἷον πηγῆς ἔχον χώραν, ὅπερ
οὕτως ἀποδίδοσθαι· ἀφ᾿ οὗ συμβαίνει325
ὠφελεῖσθαι ἢ ὑφ᾽ οὗ <τὸ δὲ | πρώτως εἷναι
αἴτιον>· τὸ <δὲ> δεύτερον, καθ᾽ ὃ συμβαίνει
ὡφελεῖσθαι· κοινότερον δὲ καὶ διατεῖνον καὶ ἐπὶ
τὰ προειρημένα, τὸ οἷον ὠφελεῖν. Ὁμοίως δὲ
καὶ τὸ κακὸν κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀναλογίαν330
ὐπογρἀφεσθαι. Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀφ᾽ οὗ συμβαίνει
βλάπτεσθαι ἢ ὑφ’ οὗ· τὸ δὲ καθ᾽ ὃ συμβαίνει
βλάπτεσθαι· κοινότερον δὲ τούτων τὸ οἷον
5e     Τῶν δ᾽ ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν εἶναι περὶ ψυχήν,335
τὰ δ᾽ ἐκτός, τὰ δ’ οὔτε περὶ ψυχὴν οὔτ’ ἐκτός.
Περὶ ψυχὴν μὲν τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ <τὰς>
σπουδαίας ἕξεις καὶ καθόλου τὰς ἐπαινετὰς
ἐνεργείας· ἐκτὸς δὲ τούς τε φίλους καὶ τοὺς
γνωρίμους καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια· οὔτε δὲ περὶ340
ψυχὴν οὔτ’ ἐκτός, τοὺς σπουδαίους καὶ
καθόλου <τοὺς> τὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχοντας. Ὁμοίως
δὲ καὶ τῶν κακῶν τὰ μὲν περὶ ψυχήν, τὰ δ᾽
ἐκτός, τὰ δ᾽ οὔτε περὶ ψυχὴν οὔτ᾿ ἐκτός· περὶ
ψυχὴν μὲν τάς τε κακίας σὺν ταῖς μοχθηραῖς345
ἕξεσι καὶ καθόλου τὰς ψεκτὰς ἐνεργείας· ἐκτὸς
δὲ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς σὺν τοῖς εἴδεσιν· οὔτε <δὲ> περὶ
ψυχὴν οὔτ᾽ ἐκτὸς τοὺς φαύλους καὶ πάντας
τοὺς τὰς κακίας ἔχοντας.
5f     Τῶν δὲ περὶ ψυχὴν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν εἶναι350
διαθέσεις, τὰ δὲ ἕξεις μὲν διαθέσεις δ᾽ οὔ, τὰ δ᾽
διαθέσεις, τὰ δὲ ἕξεις μὲν διαθέσεις δ᾽ οὔ, τὰ δ᾽
ἀρετὰς πάσας, ἕξεις δὲ μόνον καὶ οὔ διαθέσεις
τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα, ὡς τὴν μαντικὴν καὶ τὰ
παραπλήσια· οὔτε δὲ ἕξεις οὔτε διαθέσεις τὰς355
κατ᾽ ἀρετὰς ἐνεργείας, οἷον φρονίμευμα καὶ τὴν
τῆς σωφροσύνης χρῆσιν καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν περὶ ψυχὴν κακῶν τὰ μὲν
εἶναι διαθέσεις, τὰ δ᾽ ἕξεις μὲν διαθέσεις δ᾽ οὔ,
τὰ δὲ οὔτε ἕξεις οὔτε διαθέσεις. Διαθέσεις μὲν360
τὰς κακίας πάσας, ἕξεις δὲ μόνον τὰς
εὔκαταφορίας, οἷον τὴν φθονερίαν, τὴν
ἐπιλυπίαν καὶ τὰ ὅμοια καὶ ἔτι τὰ νοσήματα
καὶ ἀρρωστήματα. οἷον φιλαργυρίαν,
οἰνοφλυγίαν καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια. Οὔτε <δ᾿>365
ἕξεις οὔτε διαθέσεις τὰς κατὰ κακίας ἐνεργείας,
οἷον ἀφρόνευσιν, ἀδίκευσιν καὶ τὰ ταύταις
5g     Τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν εἶναι τελικά, τὰ
δὲ ποιητικά, τὰ δὲ ἀμφοτέρως ἔχοντα. Ὁ μὲν370
οὖν φρόνιμος | ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ φίλος ποιητικὰ
μόνον ἐστὶν ἁγαθἀχα· ρὰ δὲ καὶ εὐφροσύνη
καὶ Θάρρος καὶ φρονίμη περιπάτησις τελικὰ
μόνον ἐστὶν ἀγαθά· αἱ δ᾽ ἀρεταὶ πᾶσαι καὶ
πσιητικά ἐστιν ἀγαθὰ καὶ τελικά, καὶ γὰρ375
ἁπογεννῶσι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ
συμπληροῦσι, μέρη αὐτῆς γινόμεναι.
Ἀνάλογον δὲ καὶ τῶν κακῶν τὰ μέν ἐστι
ποιητικὰ τῆς κακοδαιμονίας, τὰ δὲ τελικά, τὰ
δὲ ἀμφοτέρως ἔχοντα. Ὁ μὲν οὖν ἄφρων380
ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ ἐχθρὸς ποιητικὰ μόνον ἐστὶ
κακά· λύπη δὲ καὶ φόβος καὶ κλοπὴ καὶ ἄφρων
ἐρώτησις καὶ τὰ ὅμοια τελικά <μόνον ἐστὶ
κακά> αἱ δὲ κακίαι καὶ ποιητικὰ καὶ τελικά ἐστι
κακἀ· ἁπογεννὥσι γὰρ τὴν κακοδαιμονίαν καὶ385
συμπληροῦσι, μέρη αὐτῆς γινόμεναι.
5h     Ἔτι δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν εἶναι δι᾽ αὐτὰ
αίρετά, τὰ δὲ ποιητικἀ. Ὁπόσα μὲν οὖν
οὐδενὸς ἄλλου ἕνεκεν εἰς εὔλογον αἵρεσιν
ἔρχεται, δι᾽ αὐτὰ αἱρετἀ· ὁπόσα δὲ τῷ ἑτέρων390
τινῶν παρασκευαστικὰ γίνεσθαι, κατὰ τὸ
ποιητικὸν λέγεσθαι.
5i     Καὶ πᾶν μὲν ἀγαθὸν αἱρετὸν εἴναι·
ἀρεστὸν γὰρ καὶ δοκιμαστὸν καὶ ἐπαινετὸν
ὑπάρχειν· πᾶν δὲ κακὸν φευκτὸν. Τὸ γὰρ395
ἀγαθὸν καθ᾽ ὃ μὲν αἵρεσιν εὔλογον κινεῖ,
αἱρετόν ἐστι· καθ᾽ ὃ δὲ ἀνυπόπτως εὶς αἵρεσιν
ἔρχεται, ἀρεστόν· καθ᾽ ὃ δὲ πάλιν εὐλόγως ἄν
τις περὶ αὐτοῦ καθυπολαμβἀνσι τῶν ἀπ᾽
ἀρετῆς εἶναι, <ἐπαινετόν>. |400
5k     ’Ἔτι δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν εἶναι ἐν
κινήσει, τὰ δὲ ἐν σχέσει. ᾿Εν κινήσει μὲν τὰ
τοιαῦτα, χαράν, εὐφροσύνην, σώφρονα
ὁμιλίαν· ἐν σχέσει δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα, εὔτακτον
ἡσυχίαν, μονὴν ἀτάραχον, προσοχὴν405
ἐπανδρον. Τῶν δὲ ἐν σχέσει τὰ μὲν καὶ ἐν ἕξει
εἶναι, οἷον τὰς ἀρετάς· τὰ δ᾽ ἐν σχέσει μόνον,
ὡς τὰ ῥηθέντα. ᾿Εν ἕξει δὲ οὐ μόνας εἶναι τὰς
ἀρετάς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας τὰς ἐν
τῷ σπουδαίῳ ἀνδρὶ ἁλλοιωθείσας ὑπὸ τῆς410
ἀρετῆς καὶ γενομένας ἀμεταπτώτους, οἱονεὶ
γὰρ ἀρετὰς γίνεσθαι. Φασὶ δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐν ἕξει
ἀγαθῶν εἶναι καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα καλούμενα,
οἷον φιλομουσίαν, φιλογραμματίαν,
φιλογεωμετρίαν καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια. Εἶναι415
γὰρ ὁδόν τινα ἐκλεκτικὴν τῶν ἐν ταύταις ταῖς
τέχναις οἰκείων πρὸς ἀρετήν, ἁναφέρουσαν
αὐτὰ ἐπὶ τὸ τοῦ βίου τέλος.
5l     Ἔτι δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν εἶναι καθ᾽
ἑαυτά, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τί πως ἔχειν. Καθ᾿ ἑαυτὰ420
μὲν ἐπιστήμην, δικαιοπραγίαν καὶ τὰ ὅμοια·
πρός τι δὲ τιμήν, εὔνοιαν, φιλίαν, <συμφωνίαν>.
Εἶναι δὲ τὴν ἐπιστήμην κατάληψιν ἀσφαλῆ καὶ
ἀμετάπτωτον ὑπὸ λόγου· ἑτέραν δὲ
ἐπιστήμην σύστημα ἐκ ἐπιστημῶν τοιούτων,425
οἷον ἡ τῶν κατὰ μέρος, λογικὴ ἐν τῷ
σπουδαίῳ ὐπἀρχουσα· ἄλλην δὲ σύστημα ἐξ
ἐπιστημῶν τεχνικῶν | ἐξ αὑτοῦ ἔχον τὸ
βέβαιον, ὡς ἔχουσιν αἱ ἀρεταί· ἄλλην δὲ ἕξιν
φαντασιῶν δεκτικὴν ἀμετάπτωτον ὑπὸ430
λόγου, ἥν τινά φασιν ἐν τόνῳ καὶ δυνάμει
κεῖσθαι. Φιλίαν δ᾽ εἶναι κοινωνίαν βίου·
συμφωνίαν δὲ ὁμοδογματίαν περὶ τῶν κατὰ
τὸν βίον. Τῆς δὲ φιλίας εἷναι γνωριμότητα μὲν
φιλίαν ἐγνωσμένων· συνήθειαν δὲ φιλίαν435
συνειθισμένων· ἑταιρίαν δὲ φιλίαν καθ᾿ αἵρεσιν,
ὡς ἂν ὁμηλίκων· ξενίαν δὲ φιλίαν ἀλλοδαπῶν.
Εἶναι δὲ καὶ συγγενικὴν τινα φιλίαν ἐκ
συγγενῶν· καὶ ἐρωτικὴν ὲξ ἔρωτος. ᾿Αλυπίαν
δὲ καὶ εὐταξίαν τὰς αὐτὰς εἶναι τῇ440
σωφροσύνῃ, νοῦν δὲ καὶ φρένας φρονήσει,
μεταδοτικὴν δὲ καὶ ὲπιδοτικὴν χρηστότητι· τῷ
μέντοι γε πρός τί πως ἔχειν ὠνομάσθησαν·
ὅπερ καθήκει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν
5m     Ἔτι δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν εἶναι ἄμικτα,
οἷον ἐπιστήμην, τὰ δὲ μεμιγμένα, οἷον
εὐτεκνίαν, εὐγηρίαν, εὐζωίαν. Ἔστι δ᾽ ἡ μὲν
εὐτεκνία χρῆσις τέκνοις κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσι
σπουδαία, ἡ δὲ εὐγηρία χρῆσις σπουδαία γήρᾳ450
κατὰ φύσιν ἔχοντι, καὶ ὁμοίως ἡ εὐζωία.
5n     Φανερὸν δὲ αἰεὶ ἐπὶ τούτων, ὅτι καὶ τῶν
κακῶν αἱ ὅμοιαι διαιρέσεις ἔσονται.|
5o     Διαφέρειν δὲ λέγουσιν αἱρετὸν καὶ ληπτὸν.
Αἱρετὸν μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὸ ὁρμῆς αὐτοτελοῦς455
κινητικόν, <ληπτὸν δὲ ὃ εὐλογίστως
ἐκλεγόμεθα>. Ὅσῳ δὲ διαφέρει τὸ αἱρετὸν τοῦ
ληπτοῦ, τοσούτῳ καὶ τὸ <καθ᾽> αὔθ᾽ αἱρετὸν
τοῦ καθ’ αὑτὸ ληπτοῦ, καὶ καθόλου τὸ ἀγαθὸν
τοῦ ἀξίαν ἔχοντος.460
6     Τοῦ δὲ ἀνθρώπου ὄντος ζῴου λογικοῦ
θνητοῦ, φύσει πολιτικοῦ, φασὶ καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν
πᾶσαν τὴν περὶ ἄνθρωπον καὶ τὴν
εὐδαιμονίαν ζωὴν ἀκόλουθον ὑπάρχειν καὶ
ὁμολογουμένην φύσει.5
6a     Τὸ δὲ τέλος ὁ μὲν Ζήνων οὕτως ἁπέδωκε·
῾τὸ ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν᾽· τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ καθ’ ἕνα
λόγον καὶ σύμφωνον ζῆν, ὡς τῶν μαχομένως
ζώντων κακοδαιμονούντων. | Οἱ δὲ μετὰ
τοῦτον προσδιαρθροῦντες οὕτως ἐξέφερον10
῾ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν᾽ ὑπολαβόντες
ἔλαττον εἶναι <ἢ> κατηγόρημα τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ
Ζήνωνος ῥηθὲν. Κλεάνθης γὰρ πρῶτος
διαδεξάμενος αὐτοῦ τὴν αἵρεσιν προσέθηκε ῾τᾖ
φύσει᾽ καὶ οὕτως ἀπέδωκε· ῾τέλος ἐστὶ τὸ15
ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν᾽. Ὅπερ ὁ
Χρύσιππος σαφέστερον βουλόμενος ποιῆσαι,
ἐξήνεγκε τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον· ζῆν κατ᾿
ἐμπειρίαν τῶν φύσει συμβαινόντων᾽. Διογένης
δέ· εὐλογιστεῖν ἐν τῇ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἐκλογῇ20
καὶ ἀπεκλογῇ᾽. Ἀρχέδημος δέ· ῾πάντα τὰ
καθήκοντα ἐπιτελοῦντας ζῆν᾽. Ἀντίπατρος δὲ·
῾ζῆν ἐκλεγομένους μὲν τὰ κατὰ φύσιν,
ἁπεκλεγομένους δὲ τὰ παρὰ φύσιν διηνεκῶς".
Πολλάκις δὲ καὶ οὕτως ὰπεδίδου· πᾶν τὸ καθ᾽25
αὑτὸν ποιεῖν διηνεκῶς καὶ ἀπαραβάτως πρὸς
τὸ τυγχάνειν τῶν προηγουμένων κατὰ φύσιν᾽.
6b     Τὸ δὲ τέλος λέγεσθαι τριχῶς ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκ
τῆς αἱρέσεως ταύτης· τό τε γὰρ τελικὸν
ἀγαθὸν λέγεσθαι τέλος ἐν τῇ φιλολόγῳ30
συνηθείᾳ, ὡς τὴν ὁμολογίαν λέγουσι τέλος
εἶναι· λέγουσι δὲ καὶ τὸν σκοπὸν τέλος, οἷον
τὸν ὁμολογούμενον βίον ἁναφορικῶς
λέγοντες ἐπὶ τὸ παρακείμενον κατηγόρημακατὰ·
κατὰ δὲ τὸ τρίτον σημαινόμενον λέγουσι τέλος35
τὸ ἔσχατον τῶν ὀρεκτῶν, ἐφ᾿ ὃ πάντα τὰ
ἄλλα ἀναφέρεσθαι. |
6c     Διαφέρειν δὲ τέλος καὶ σκοπὸν ἡγοῦνται·
σκοπὸν μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὸ ἐκκείμενον σῶμα, οὖ
τυχεῖν ἐφίεσθαι  *  *  *  τοὺς τῆς εὐδαιμονίας40
στοχαζομένους, διὰ τὸ πάντα μὲν σπουδαῖον
εὐδαιμονεῖν, πάντα δὲ φαῦλον ἐκ τῶν
ἐναντίων κακοδαιμονεῖν.
6d     Καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν ἀναγκαῖα εἶναι
πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν, τὰ δὲ μή. Καὶ ἀναγκαῖα μὲν45
τάς τε ἀρετὰς πάσας καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς
χρηστικὰς αὐτῶν· οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα δὲ χαράν τε
καὶ εὐφροσύνην καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα.
Παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ τῶν κακῶν τὰ μὲν
ἀναγκαῖα ὡς ἂν κακὰ πρὸς κακοδαιμονίαν50
εἶναι, τὰ δ᾽ οὐκ ὰναγκαῖα· ἀναγκαῖα μὲν τάς
τε κακίας πάσας καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς ἐπ᾿
αὐτῶν· οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα δὲ τά τε πάθη πάντα
καὶ τὰ ἀρρωστήματα καὶ τὰ τούτοις
6e     Τέλος δέ φασιν εἶναι τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν, οὗ
ἕνεκα πάντα πράττεται, αὐτὸ δὲ πράττεται
μὲν οὐδενὸς δὲ ἕνεκα· τοῦτο δὲ ὑπάρχειν ἐν τῷ
κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν ζῆν, ἐν τῷ ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν,
ἔτι, ταὐτοῦ ὄντος, ἐν τῷ κατὰ φύσιν ζῆν. Τὴν60
δὲ εὐδαιμονίαν ὁ Ζήνων ὡρίσατο τὸν τρόπον
τοῦτον· εὐδαιμονία δ᾽ ἐστὶν εὔροια βίου.
Κἑχρηται δὲ καὶ Κλεάνθης τῷ ὅρῳ τούτῳ ἐν
τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ συγγράμμασι καὶ ὁ Χρύσιππος καὶ
οἱ ἀπὸ τούτων πάντες, τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν εἶναι65
λέγοντες οὐχ ἑτέραν τοῦ εὐδαίμονος βίου.
καίτοι γε λέγοντες, τὴν μὲν εὐδαιμονίαν
σκοπὸν ἐκκεῖσθαι, τέλος δ’ εἶναι τὸ τυχεῖν τῆς
εὐδαιμονίας, ὅπερ ταυτὸν εἶναι τῷ
εὐδαιμονεῖν. |70
    Δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τούτων, ὅτι ἰσοδυναμεῖ ῾τὸ
κατὰ φύσιν ζῆν᾽ καὶ ῾τὸ καλῶς ζῆν. καὶ ῾τὸ εὖ
ζῆν᾽ καὶ πάλιν ῾τὸ καλὸν κἀγαθόν’ καὶ ῾ἡ ἀρετὴ
καὶ τὸ μέτοχον ἀρετῆς᾽· καὶ ὅτι πᾶν ἀγαθὸν
καλόν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πᾶν αἰσχρὸν κακόν· δι᾽ ὃ75
καὶ τὸ Στωικὸν τέλος Τσον δύνασθαι τῷ κατ᾽
ἀρετὴν βίῳ.
6f     Διαφέρειν δὲ λέγουσι τὸ αὶρετὸν καὶ τὸ
αἱρετέον. Αὶρετὸν μὲν εἶναι <ἀγαθὸν> πᾶν,
αἱρετἑον δὲ ὠφέλημα πᾶν, ὃ Θεωρεῖται παρὰ80
τὸ ἔχειν τὸ ἀγαθόν. Δι᾽ ὃ αἱρούμεθα μὲν τὸ
αἱρετέον, οἷον τὸ φρονεῖν, ὃ Θεωρεῖται παρὰ
τὸ ἔχειν φρόνησιν· τὸ δὲ αἱρετὸν οὐχ
αἱρούμεθα, ἀλλ᾽ εἰ ἄρα, ἔχειν αὐτὸ αἱρούμεθα.
    Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ πάντα ἐστὶν85
ὑπομενετὰ καὶ ὲμμενετὰ καὶ ἀνάλογον ἐπὶ τῶν
ἄλλων ἀρετῶν ἐστιν, εἰ καὶ μὴ κατωνόμασται·
τὰ δὲ ὠφελήματα πάντα ὑπομενετέα καὶ
ἑμμενετέα. Καὶ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον ἐπὶ τῶν
ἄλλων τῶν κατὰ τὰς κακίας. |90
7     Διεληλνθὀτες δ᾽ ἱκανῶς περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ
κακῶν καὶ αἱρετῶν καὶ φευκτῶν καὶ περὶ
τέλους καὶ εὐδαιμονίας, ἀναγκαῖον ἡγησάμεθα
καὶ τὰ περὶ τῶν ἀδιαφόρων λεγόμενα κατὰ
τὴν οἰκείαν τάξιν ἐπελθεῖν. Ἀδιἀφορα δ᾽ εἶναι5
λέγουσι τὰ μεταξὺ τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν
κακῶν, διχῶς τὸ ἀδιάφορον νοεῖσθαι φάμενοι,
καθ᾽ ἕνα μὲν τρόπον τὸ μήτε ἀγαθὸν μήτε
κακὸν καὶ τὸ μήτε αἱρετὸν μήτε φευκτόν' καθ᾽
ἕτερον δὲ τὸ μήτε ὁρμῆς μήτε ἀφορμῆς10
κινητικὸν, καθ᾽ ὃ καὶ λέγεσθαί τινα καθάπαξ
ἀδιάφορα εἶναι, οἷον τὸ <ἀρτίας ἔχειν ἐπὶ τῆς
κεφαλῆς τρίχας ἢ περιττὰς, ἢ τὸ> προτεῖναι
τὸν δάκτυλον ὡδὶ ἢ ὡδί, ἢ τὸ ἀνελέσθαι τι
τῶν ἐμποδών, κάρφος ἢ φύλλον. Κατὰ τὸ15
πρότερον δὴ λεκτέον τὰ μεταξὺ ἀρετῆς καὶ
κακίας ἀδιάφορα λέγεσθαι κατὰ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς
αἱρέσεως ταύτης, οὐ μὴν πρὸς ἐκλογὴν καὶ
ἁπεκλογἠν· δι᾽ ὃ καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀξίαν ἐκλεκτικὴν
ἔχειν, τὰ δ᾽ ἁπαξίαν ἁπεκλεκτικήν,20
συμβλητικὴν δ᾿ οὐδαμῶς πρὸς τὸν εὐδαίμονα
7a     Καὶ τὰ μὲν εἶναι κατὰ φύσιν, τὰ δὲ παρὰ
φύσιν, τὰ δὲ οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν οὔτε κατὰ φύσιν.
Κατὰ φύσιν μὲν οὖν τὰ τοιαῦτα· ὑγίειαν, ἰσχύν,25
αἰσθητηρίων | ἁρτιότητα, καὶ τὰ
παραπλήσια τούτοις· παρὰ φύσιν δὲ τὰ
τοιαῦτα· νόσον, ἀσθένειαν, πήρωσιν καὶ τὰ
τοιαῦτα· οὔτε δὲ παρὰ φύσιν οὔτε κατὰ φύσιν·
ψνχῆς κατάστασιν καὶ σώματος, καθ᾽ ἃς ἡ μέν30
ἐστι φαντασιῶν ψευδῶν δεκτική, τὸ δὲ
τραυμάτων καὶ πηρώσεων δεκτικόν, καὶ τὰ
τούτοις ὅμοια. Ποιεῖσθαι δὲ λέγουσι τὸν περὶ
τούτων λόγον <ἀπὸ> τῶν πρώτων κατὰ
φύσιν καὶ παρὰ φύσιν. Τὸ γὰρ διαφέρον καὶ35
τὸ ἀδιάφορον τῶν πρός τι λεγομένων εἴναι.
Διότι κἄν, φασὶ, λέγωμεν ἀδιάφορα τὰ
σωματικὰ καὶ τὰ ἐκτός, πρὸς τὸ εὐσχημόνως
ζῆν (ἐν ᾧπέρ ἐστι τὸ εὐδαιμόνως) ἀδιάφορά
φαμεν αὐτὰ εἶναι, οὐ μὰ Δία πρὸς τὸ κατὰ40
φύσιν ἔχειν οὐδὲ πρὸς ὁρμὴν καὶ ἀφορμήν.
7b     Ἔτι δὲ τῶν ἀδιαφόρων τὰ μὲν πλείω
ἀξίαν ἔχειν, τὰ δ’ ἐλάττω· καὶ τὰ μὲν καθ᾽
αὐτὰ, τὰ δὲ ποιητικά· καὶ τὰ μὲν προηγμένα,
τὰ δ᾽ ἀποπροηγμένα, τὰ δ᾽ οὐδετέρως ἔχοντα.45
Προηγμένα μέν, ὅσα ἀδιάφορα ὄντα πολλὴν
ἔχει ἀξίαν, ὡς ἐν ἁδιαφόροις· ἀποπροηγμένα
δέ, ὅσα πολλὴν ἔχει ἁπαξίαν ὁμοίως· οὔτε δὲ
προηγμένα οὔτε ἀποπροηγμένα, ὅσα μήτε
πολλὴν ἔχει <ἀξίαν μήτε> ἁπαξίαν.50
    πολλὴν ἔχει (ἀξίαν μήτε) ἁπαξίαν.
ψυχήν, τὰ δὲ περὶ σῶμα, τὰ δ᾽ ἐκτός. Περὶ
ψυχὴν μὲν εἶναι | τὰ τοιαῦτα· εὐφυΐαν,
προκοπήν, μνήμην, ὀξύτητα διανοίας, ἕξιν καθ᾽
ἣν ἐπίμονοί εἰσιν ἐπὶ τῶν καθηκόντων καὶ55
τέχνας ὅσαι δύνανται συνεργεῖν ὲπιπλεῖον
πρὸς τὸν κατὰ φύσιν βίον· περὶ σῶμα δ᾽ εἶναι
προηγμένα ὑγίειαν, εὐαισθησὶαν καὶ τὰ
παραπλήσια τούτοις· τῶν δ᾽ ἐκτὸς γονεῖς,
τέκνα, κτῆσιν σύμμετρον, ἀποδοχὴν παρὰ60
    Τῶν δ᾽ ἀποπροηγμένων περὶ ψυχὴν μὲν
εἶναι τὰ ἐναντία τοῖς εἰρημένοις· περὶ σῶμα δὲ
καὶ ἐκτὸς τὰ ὁμοίως ἀντιτιθέμενα τοῖς
εἰρημένοις περί τε σῶμα καὶ τοῖς ἐκτὸς
προηγμένοις. Οὔτε δὲ προηγμένα οὔτ᾽65
ἁποπροηγμἑνα περὶ ψυχὴν <μὲν> φαντασίαν
καὶ συγκατάθεσιν καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα· περὶ δὲ
σῶμα λευκότητα καὶ μελανὀτητα καὶ
χαροπότητα καὶ ἡδονὴν πᾶσαν καὶ πόνον καὶ
εἴ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτο. Τῶν δ᾽ ἐκτὸς οὔτε70
προηγμένα <οὔτε ἀποπροηγμἑνα> εἶναι τὰ
τοιαῦτα, ὅσα εὐτελῆ ὄντα καὶ μηδὲν χρήσιμον
προσφερόμενα μικρὰν παντελῶς ἔχει τὴν ἀφ᾽
αὑτῶν χρείαν. Τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς οὔσης
κυριωτέρας τοῦ σώματος καὶ πρὸς τὸ κατὰ75
φύσιν ζῆν φασὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν κατὰ. |
φύσιν ὄντα καὶ προηγμένα πλείονα τὴν ἀξίαν
ἔχειν τῶν περὶ σῶμα καὶ τῶν ἐκτός, οἷον
εὐφυΐαν ψυχῆς πρὸς ἀρετὴν ὐπερἀγειν τῆς τοῦ
σώματος εὐφυίας καὶ ὁμοίως ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων80
7c     Ἔτι δὲ τῶν ἀδιαφόρων φασὶ τὰ μὲν εἶναι
ὁρμῆς κινητικὰ, τὰ δὲ ἀφορμῆς, τὰ δὲ οὔτε
ὁρμῆς οὔτε ἀφορμῆς. Ὁρμῆς μὲν οὖν κινητικά,
ἅπερ ἐλέγομεν εἶναι κατὰ φύσιν, ἀφορμῆς δὲ85
ὅσα παρὰ φύσιν· οὔτε δὲ ὁρμῆς οὔτε ἀφορμῆς
τὰ μηδετέρως ἔχοντα, οἷά ἐστι τὸ περιττὰς ἢ
ἁρτίας ἔχειν τὰς τρίχας.
7d     Τῶν δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἀδιαφόρων ὄντων τὰ
μέν ἐστι πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν, τὰ δὲ κατὰ90
μετοχὴν. Πρῶτα μέν ἐστι κατὰ φύσιν κίνησις
ἢ σχέσις κατὰ τοὺς σπερματικοὺς λόγους
γινομένη, οἷον <ἀρτιότης καὶ> ὑγίεια καὶ
αἴσθησις (λέγω δὲ τὴν κατάληψιν) καὶ ἰσχύς.
Κατὰ μετοχὴν δέ, ὅσα μετέχει κινήσεως καὶ95
σχέσεως κατὰ τοὺς σπερματικοὺς λόγους, οἷον
χεὶρ ἀρτία καὶ σῶμα ὑγιεινὸν καὶ αἰσθήσεις μὴ
πεπηρωμέναι. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν παρὰ φύσιν
κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον.
7e     Πάντα δὲ <τὰ> κατὰ φύσιν ληπτὰ εἶναι100
καὶ πάντα τὰ <παρὰ> φύσιν ἄληπταζ. Τῶν δὲ
κατὰ φύσιν τὰ μὲν | καθ’ αὑτὰ ληπτὰ εἶναι,
τὰ δὲ δι᾽ ἕτερα. Καθ᾿ αὐτὰ μὲν, ὅσα ἐστὶν ὁρμῆς
κινητικὰ καταστρεπτικὤς ἐφ᾿ ἑαυτὰ ἢ ἐπὶ τὸ
ἀντέχεσθαι αὐτῶν, οἷον ὑγίειαν, εὐαισθησίαν,105
ὰπονίαν καὶ κάλλος σώματος. Ποιητικὰ <δὲ>,
ὅσα ἐστὶν ὁρμῆς κινητικὰ ὰν<εν>εκτικὥς ἐφ᾽
ἕτερα καὶ μὴ κατατρεπτικὤς <ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτὰ>, οἷον
πλοῦτον, δόξαν καὶ τὰ τούτοις ὅμοια.
Παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ τῶν παρὰ φύσιν τὰ μὲν110
εἶναι καθ᾽ αὑτὰ ἄληπτα, τὰ δὲ τῷ ποιητικὰ
εἶναι τῶν καθ᾽ αὑτὰ ἀλήπτων.
7f     Πάντα δὲ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν ἀξίαν ἔχειν καὶ
πάντα τὰ παρὰ φύσιν ἀπαξίαν. Τὴν δὲ ἀξίαν
λέγεσθαι τριχῶς, τήν τε δόσιν καὶ τιμὴν καθ᾽115
αὑτὸ καὶ τὴν ἀμοιβὴν τοῦ δοκιμαστοῦ· καὶ τὴν
τρίτην, ἢν ὁ ἈΑντίπατρος ἐκλεκτικὴν
προσαγορεύει, καθ᾽ ἢν διδόντων τῶν
πραγμάτων τάδε τινὰ μᾶλλον ἀντὶ τῶνδε
αἱρούμεθα, οἷον ὑγίειαν ἀντὶ νόσου καὶ ζωὴν120
ἀντὶ Θανάτου καὶ πλοῦτον | ἀντὶ πενίας· Κατὰ
τὸ ἀνάλογον δὲ καὶ τὴν ἀπαξίαν τριχῶς φασὶ
λέγεσθαι, ἀντιτιθεμένων τῶν σημαινομένων
τοῖς ἐπὶ τῆς τριττῆς ἀξίας εἰρημένοις.
    Τὴν δὲ δόσιν φησὶν ὁ Διογένης κρίσιν εἶναι.125
ἐφ᾽ ὅσον κατὰ φύσιν ἐστὶν ἢ ἐφ᾽ ὅσον χρείαν
τῇ φύσει παρέχεται. Τὸ δὲ δοκιμαστόν, οὐχ
ὡς λέγεται τὰ πράγματα δοκιμαστὰ
παραλαμβάνεσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς δοκιμαστήν φαμεν
εἶναι τὸν τὰ πράγματα δοκιμάζοντα· τῆς οὖν130
ἀμοιβῆς τὸν τοιοῦτόν φησι δοκιμαστὴν εἷναι.
Καὶ ταύτας μὲν τὰς δύο ἀξίας καθ᾽ ἃς λέγομέν
τινα τῇ ἀξίᾳ προῆχθαι. τρίτην δέ φησιν εἷναι,
καθ᾽ ἥν φαμεν ἀξίωμά τινα ἔχειν καὶ ἀξίαν,
ἥπερ περὶ ἀδιάφορα οὐ γίνεται, ἀλλὰ περὶ135
μόνα τὰ σπουδαῖα. Χρῆσθαι δ᾽ ἡμᾶς φησιν
ἐνίοτε τῷ ὀνόματι τῆς ἀξίας ἀντὶ τοῦ
ἐπιβἀλλοντος· ὡς ἐν τῷ τῆς δικαιοσύνης ὅρῳ
παρεὶληπται. ὄταν λέγηται εἷναι ἕξις
ἀπονεμητικὴ τοῦ κατ᾿ ἀξίαν ἑκάστῳ᾽ ἔστι γὰρ140
οἷον τοῦ ἑπιβἀλλοντος ἑκάστῳ.
7g     Τῶν δ᾽ ἀξίαν ἐχόντων τὰ μὲν ἔχειν
πολλὴν ἀξίαν, τὰ δὲ βραχεῖαν. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
τῶν ὰπαξίαν ἐχόντων ἃ μὲν ἔχειν πολλὴν
ἀπαξίαν, ἃ δὲ βραχεῖαν. Τὰ μὲν <οὖν> πολλὴν145
ἔχοντα ἀξίαν προηγμένα λέγεσθαι, τὰ δὲ
πολλὴν ἀπαξίαν ἀποπροηγμένα, Ζήνωνος
ταύτας τὰς ὀνομασίας Θεμένου πρώτου τοῖς
πράγμασι. Προηγμένον δ᾽ εἶναι λέγουσιν, ὃ
πράγμασι. Προηγμένον δ᾽ εἶναι λέγουσιν, ὃ150
προηγούμενον λόγον. Τὸν δ' ὅμοιον λόγον ἐπὶ
τῷ ἀποπροηγμένῳ εἶναι, καὶ τὰ
παραδείγματα κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ταὐτά.
Οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν εἶναι προηγμένον διὰ
τὸ τὴν μεγίστην ἀξίαν αὐτὰ ἔχειν. Τὸ δὲ155
προηγμένον, τὴν δευτέραν χώραν καὶ ἀξίαν
ἔχον, συνεγγίζειν πὼς τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φύσει·
οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐν αὐλῇ τῶν προηγμἑνων εἴναι τὸν
βασιλέα, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μετ' αὐτὸν τεταγμένους.
Προηγμένα δὲ λέγεσθαι, οὐ τῷ πρὸς160
εὐδαιμονίαν τινὰ συμβάλλεσθαι συνεργεῖν τε
πρὸς αὐτήν, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τούτων
τὴν ἐκλογὴν ποιεῖσθαι παρὰ τὰ
8     Ἀκόλουθος δ' ἐστὶ τῷ λόγῳ τῷ περὶ τῶν
προηγμἑνων ὁ περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος τόπος.
Ὁρίζεται δὲ τὸ καθῆκον· ῾τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐν ζωῇ,
ὃ πραχθὲν εὔλογον ἀπολογίαν ἔχει᾽· παρὰ τὸ
καθῆκον δὲ τὸ ἐναντίως. Τοῦτο διατείνει καὶ5
εἰς τὰ ἄλογα τῶν ζῴων, ἐνεργεῖ γάρ τι
κἀκεῖνα ἀκολούθως τῇ ἑαυτῶν φύσει· ἐπὶ <δὲ>
τῶν λογικῶν ζῴων οὕτως ἀποδίδοται· τὸ
ἀκόλουθον ἐν βίῳ᾽. Τῶν δὲ καθηκόντων τὰ μὲν
εἶναί φασι τέλεια, ἃ δὴ καὶ κατορθώματα10
λέγεσθαι. Κατορθὠματα δ᾽ εἶναι τὰ κατ᾽
ἀρετὴν ἐνεργήματα, οἷον τὸ φρονεῖν, τὸ
δικαιοπραγεῖν. | Οὐκ εἶναι δὲ κατορθώματα
τὰ μὴ οὕτως ἔχοντα, ἃ δὴ οὐδὲ τέλεια
καθήκοντα προσαγορεύουσιν, ἀλλὰ μέσα, οἷον15
τὸ γαμεῖν, τὸ πρεσβεύειν, τὸ διαλέγεσθαι, τὰ
τούτοις ὅμοια.
8a     Τῶν δὲ κατορθωμάτων τὰ μὲν εἶναι ὧν
χρή, τὰ δ᾽ οὔ. Ὦν χρὴ μὲν εἶναι <τὰ>
κατηγορούμενα ὠφελήματα, οἷον τὸ φρονεῖν,20
τὸ σωφρονεῖν· οὐκ εἷναιδὲ ὧν χρὴ τὰ μὴ
οὕτως ἔχοντα. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν παρὰ τὸ
καθῆκον τὴν αὐτὴν γίνεσθαι τεχνολογίαν.
    Πᾶν δὲ τὸ παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον ἐν λογικῷ
<ζῴῳ> γινόμενον ἁμάρτημα εἶναι· τὸ δὲ25
καθῆκον τελειωθὲν κατόρθωμα γίνεσθαι.
Παραμετρεῖσθαι δὲ τὸ μέσον καθῆκον
ἀδιαφόροις τισί, ἐκλεγομένοις δὲ παρὰ φύσιν
καὶ κατὰ φύσιν, τοιαύτην δ᾿ εὔροιαν
προσφερομένοις. ὥστ᾽ εἰ μὴ λαμβάνοιμεν αὐτὰ30
ἢ διωθοίμεθα ἀπεριστἀτως, μὴ ἂν εὐδαιμονεῖν.
9     Τὸ δὲ κινοῦν τὴν ὁρμὴν οὐδὲν ἕτερον εἶναι
λέγουσιν ἀλλ᾽ ἢ φαντασίαν ὁρμητικὴν τοῦ
καθήκοντος αὐτόθεν, τὴν δὲ ὁρμὴν εἷναι φορὰν
ψυχῆς ἐπί τι κατὰ τὸ γένος. ταύτης δ᾽ ἐν εἴδει
θεωρεῖσθαι τήν τε ἐν τοῖς λογικοῖς |5
γιγνομένην ὁρμὴν καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς ἀλόγοις
ζῴοις· οὐ κατωνομασμέναι δ᾿ εἰσίν. ἡ γὰρ
ὄρεξις οὐκ ἔστι λογικὴ ὁρμή, ἀλλὰ λογικῆς
ὁρμῆς εἶδος. Τὴν δὲ λογικὴν ὁρμὴν δεόντως
ἄν τις ἀφορίζοιτο, λέγων εἴναι φορὰν διανοίας10
ἐπί τι τῶν ἐν τῷ πράττειν· ταύτῃ δ᾽
ἁντιτίθεσθαι ἀφορμήν, φοράν τινα <διανοίας
ἀπό τινος τῶν ἐν τῷ πράττειν>. Ἰδίως δὲ καὶ
τὴν ὀρουσιν ὁρμὴν λέγουσι τῆς πρακτικῆς
ὁρμῆς οὖσαν εἶδος. εἶναι δὲ τὴν ὀρουσιν φορὰν15
διανοίας ἐπί τι μέλλον. Ὥστε μέχρι μὲν
τούτων τετραχῶς ὁρμὴν λέγεσθαι, διχῶς δ᾽
ἀφορμήν· προστεθείσης δὲ καὶ τῆς ἕξεως τῆς
ὁρμητικῆς, ἣν δὴ καὶ ἰδίως ὁρμὴν λέγουσιν, ἀφ᾽
ἧς συμβαίνει ὁρμᾶν, <ὁρμὴν> πενταχὤς.20
9a     Τῆς δὲ πρακτικῆς ὁρμῆς εἴδη πλείονα εἶναι,
ἐν οἷς καὶ ταῦτα' πρόθεσιν, ἐπιβολήν,
παρασκευήν, ἐγχείρησιν, <αἵρεσιν,> προαίρεσιν,
βούλησιν, θέλησιν. Πρόθεσιν μὲν οὖν εἶναι
λέγουσι σημείωσιν ἐπιτελέσεως· ἐπιβολὴν δὲ25
ὁρμὴν πρὸ ὁρμῆς· παρασκευὴν δὲ πρᾶξιν πρὸ
πράξεως· ἐγχείρησιν δὲ ὁρμὴν ἐπί τινος ἐν
χερσὶν ἤδη ὄντος· αἵρεσιν δὲ βούλησιν ἑξ
ἀναλογισμοῦ· προαίρεσιν δὲ αἵρεσιν πρὸ
αἱρέσεως· βούλησιν δὲ εὔλογον ὄρεξιν· Θέλησιν30
δὲ ἑκούσιον βούλησιν. |
9b     Πάσας δὲ τὰς ὁρμὰς συγκαταθέσεις εἷναι,
τὰς δὲ πρακτικὰ; καὶ τὸ κινητικὸν περιέχειν.
Ἤδη δὲ ἄλλων μὲν εἶναι συγκαταθέσεις, ἐπ᾽
ἄλλο δὲ ὁρμὰς· καὶ σνγκαταθέοεις μὲν35
ἁξιὠμασί τισιν, ὁρμὰς δὲ ἐπὶ κατηγορήματα,
τὰ περιεχόμενα πως ἐν τοῖς ἀξιώμασιν, οἷς
συγκαταθέσεις. ᾿Επεὶ δ᾽ ἐν εἴδει τὸ πάθος τῆς
ὁρμῆς ἐστι, λέγωμεν ἑξῆς περὶ παθῶν.
10     Πάθος δ᾽ εἶναί φασιν ὁρμὴν πλεονάζουσαν
καὶ ἀπειθῆ τῷ αὶροῦντι λόγῳ ἢ κίνησιν ψυχῆς
<ἄλογον> παρὰ φύσιν (εἶναι δὲ πάθη πάντα
τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς). διὸ καὶ πᾶσαν
πτοίαν πάθος εἶναι. <καὶ> πάλιν <πᾶν> πάθος5
πτοίαν. Τοῦ δὲ πάθους τοιούτου ὄντος
ὑποληπτέον. τὰ μὲν πρῶτα εἶναι καὶ ἁρχηγά,
τὰ δ᾽ εἰς ταῦτα τὴν ἀναφορὰν ἔχειν. Πρῶτα
δ᾽ εἶναι τῷ γένει ταῦτα τὰ τέσσαρα, ἐπιθυμίαν,
φόβον, λύπην, ἡδονήν. Ἐπιθυμίαν μὲν οὖν καὶ10
φόβον προηγεῖσθαι, τὴν μὲν πρὸς τὸ
φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν, τὸν δὲ πρὸς τὸ
φαινόμενον κακόν. Ἐπιγίγνεσθαι δὲ τούτοις
ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην, ἡδονὴν μὲν ὅταν
τυγχάνωμεν ὧν ἐπεθυμοῦμεν ἢ ἐκφύγωμεν ἃ15
ἐφοβούμεθα· λύπην δέ, ὅταν ἁποτυγχάνωμεν
ὧν ἐπεθυμοῦμεν ἢ περιπέσωμεν οἷς
ἐφοβούμεθα. Ἐπὶ πάντων δὲ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς
παθῶν, ἐπεὶ δόξας | αὐτὰ λέγουσιν εἶναι,
παραλαμβάνεσθαι τὴν δόξαν ἀντὶ τῆς20
ἀσθενοῦς ὑπολήψεως, τὸ δὲ πρόσφατον ἀντὶ
τοῦ κινητικοῦ συστολῆς ἀλόγου <ἢ> ἐπάρσεως.
10a     Τὸ δὲ ῾ἄλογον᾽ καὶ τὸ "παρὰ φύσιν᾽ οὐ
κοινῶς, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ῾ἄλογον᾽ ἴσον τῷ ἀπειθὲς
τῷ λόγῳ. Πᾶν γὰρ πάθος βιαστικὀν ἐστι, ὡς25
πολλάκις ὁρῶντας τοὺς ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντας
ὅτι συμφέρει τόδε οὐ ποιεῖν, ὑπὸ τῆς
σφοδρότητος ὲκφερομένους, καθάπερ ὑπό
τινος ἀπειθοῦς ἵππου, ἀνάγεσθαι πρὸς τὸ
ποιεῖν αὐτό, παρ᾽ ὃ καὶ πολλάκις τινὰς30
ἐξομολογεῖσθαι λέγοντας τὸ θρυλούμενον
    Γνὠμην δ᾽ ἔχοντά μ᾽ ἡ φύσις βιάζεται·
γνώμην γὰρ λέγει νῦν τὴν εἴδησιν καὶ γνῶσιν
τῶν ὀρθῶν πραγμάτων. Καὶ τὸ 'παρὰ φύσιν᾽35
δ᾿ εἴληπται ἐν τῇ τοῦ πάθους ὐπογραφῆ, ὡς
συμβαίνοντος παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν καὶ κατὰ φύσιν
λόγον. Πάντες δ᾽ οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες
ἀποστρέφονται τὸν λόγον, οὐ παραπλησίως
δὲ τοῖς ἑξηπατημένοις ἐν ὁτῳοῦν, ἀλλ᾽40
ἰδιαζόντως. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἠπατημένοι, λόγου
χάριν περὶ <τοῦ> τὰς ἀτόμους ἀρχὰς | εἴναι,
διδαχθέντες ὅτι οὔκ εἰσιν, ἀφίστανται τῆς
κρίσεως· οἱ δ᾽ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες, κἂν
μάθωσι, κἂν μεταδιδαχθὤσιν ὅτι οὐ δεῖ45
λυπεῖσθαι ἢ φοβεῖσθαι, ἢ ὅλως ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν
εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅμως οὐκ ἀφίστανται τούτων,
ἀλλ᾽ ἄγονται ὑπὸ τῶν παθῶν εἰς τὸ ὑπὸ τῆς
τούτων κρατεῖσθαι τυραννίδος.
10b     Τὴν μὲν οὖν ἐπιθυμίαν λέγουσιν ὄρεξιν50
εἶναι ἀπειθῆ λόγῳ· αἴτιον δ᾽ αὐτῆς τὸ δοξάζειν
ἀγαθὸν ἐπιφέρεσθαι, οὗ παρόντος εὖ
ἀπαλλάξομεν, τῆς δόξης αὐτῆς ἐχούσης τὸ
ἀτάκτως κινητικὸν <πρόσφατον τοῦ ὄντως
αὐτὸ ὀρεκτὸν εἴναι>. Φόβον δ᾽ εἶναι ἔκκλισιν55
ἀπειθῆ λόγῳ, αἴτιον δ’ αὐτοῦ τὸ δοξάζειν
κακὸν ἐπιφέρεσθαι, τῆς δόξης τὸ κινητικὸν [καὶ]
πρόσφατον ἐχούσης τοῦ ὄντως αὐτὸ φευκτὸν
εἷναι. Λύπην δ᾽ εἶναι συστολὴν ψυχῆς ἀπειθῆ
λόγῳ, αἴτιον δ᾽ αὐτῆς τὸ δοξάζειν πρόσφατον60
κακὸν παρεῖναι, ἐφ᾿ ᾧ καθήκει <συστέλλεσθαι.
Ἡδονὴν δ᾽ εἶναι ἔπαρσιν ψυχῆς ἀπειθῆ λόγῳ,
αἴτιον δ᾽ αὐτῆς τὸ δοξάζειν πρόσφατον
ἀγαθὸν παρεῖναι, ἐφ᾿ ᾧ καθήκει> ἐπαίρεσθαι.
    Ὑπὸ μὲν οὖν τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ὑπάγεται τὰ65
τοιαῦτα· Ι ὀργὴ καὶ τὰ εἴδη αὐτῆς. (Θυμὸς καὶ
χόλος καὶ μῆνις καὶ κότος καὶ πικρίαι καὶ τὰ
τοιαῦτα.) ἔρωτες σφοδροὶ καὶ πόθοι καὶ ἵμεροι
καὶ φιληδονίαι καὶ φιλοπλουτίαι καὶ φιλοδοξίαι
καὶ τὰ ὅμοια· ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν ὲπιχαιρεκακίαι70
καὶ ἀσμενισμοὶ καὶ γοητεῖαι καὶ τὰ ὅμοια· ὑπὸ
δὲ τὸν φόβον ὀκνοι καὶ ἁγωνίαι καὶ ἔκπληξις
καὶ αὶσχὐναι καὶ θόρυβοι καὶ δεισιδαιμονίαι καὶ
δέος καὶ δείματα· ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν λύπην φθόνος,
ζῆλος, ζηλοτυπία, ἔλεος, πένθος, ἄχθος, ἄχος,75
ἀνία, ὀδύνη, ἄση.
10c     Ὀργὴ μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἐπιθυμία
τιμωρήσασθαι τὸν δοκοῦντα ἠδικηκέναι παρὰ
τὸ προσῆκον· θυμὸς δὲ ὀργὴ ἐναρχομένη·
χόλος δὲ ὀργὴ διοιδοῦσα· μῆνις δὲ ὀργὴ εἱς80
παλαίωσιν ἀποτεθειμένη ἢ ἐναποκειμένη·
κότος δὲ ὀργὴ ἐπιτηροῦσα καιρὸν εἰς τιμωρίαν·
πικρία δὲ ὀργὴ παραχρῆμα ὲκρηγνυμένη· ἔρως
δὲ ἐπιβολὴ φιλοποιίας διὰ κάλλος
ἐμφαινόμενον· πόθος δὲ ἐπιθυμία κατ᾿ ἔρωτα85
ἀπόντος· ἵμερος δὲ ἐπιθυμία φίλου ἀπόντος
ὁμιλίας· φιληδονία δὲ ἐπιθυμία ἡδονῶν·
φιλοπλουτία δὲ πλούτου· φιλοδοξία δὲ δόξης.
    Ἐπιχαιρεκακία δὲ ἡδονὴ ἐπ᾽ ἀλλοτρίοις
κακοῖς· ἀσμενισμὸς δὲ ἡδονὴ ἐπὶ90
ἀπροσδοκήτοις· γοητεία δὲ ἡδονὴ δι᾽ ὄψεως
κατὰ ἀπάτην. |
    Ὄκνος δὲ φόβος μελλούσης ἐνεργείας·
ἀγωνία δὲ φόβος διαπτώσεως καὶ ἑτέρως
φόβος ἥττης· ἔκπληξις δὲ φόβος ἐξ ἀσυνήθους95
φαντασίας· αἰσχύνη δὲ φόβος ἀδοξίας·
Θόρυβος δὲ φόβος μετὰ φωνῆς κατεπείγων·
δεισιδαιμονία δὲ φόβος Θεῶν ἢ δαιμόνων· δέος
δὲ φόβος δεινοῦ· δεῖμα δὲ φόβος ἐκ λόγου.
    Φθόνος δὲ λύπη ἐπ᾽ ἀλλοτρίοις ἀγαθοῖς·100
ζῆλος δὲ λύπη ἐπὶ τῷ ἕτερον ἐπιτυγχάνειν ὧν
αὐτὸς ἐπιθυμεῖ, αὐτὸν δὲ μή· λέγεσθαι δὲ καὶ
ἑτέρως ζῆλον, μακαρισμὸν ἐνδεοῦς καὶ ἔτι
ἄλλως μίμησιν ὡς ἂν κρείττονος· ζηλοτυπίαν
δὲ λύπην ἐπὶ τῷ <καὶ> ἕτερον ἐπιτυγχάνειν ὧν105
αὐτὸς ὲπεθὐμει· ἔλεον δὲ λύπην ἐπὶ τῷ δοκοῦντι
ἀναξίως κακοπαθεῖν· πένθος δὲ λύπην ἐπὶ
Θανάτῳ ὰὠρῳ· ἄχθος δὲ λύπην βαρύνουσαν·
ἄχος δὲ λύπην ὰφωνίαν ὲμποιοῦσαν· ἀνίαν δὲ
λύπην κατὰ διαλογισμόν· ὀδύνην δὲ λύπην110
εὶσδὐνουσαν καὶ καθικνουμένην· ἄσην δὲ λύπην
μετὰ ῥιπτασμοῦ.
10d     Τούτων δὲ τῶν παθῶν τὰ μὲν ἐμφαίνειν
τὸ ἐφ᾽ ᾧ γίγνεται, οἷον ἔλεον, φθόνον,
ἐπὶΧαιρεκακίαν, αἰσχύνην· τὰ δὲ τὴν ἰδιότητα115
τῆς κινήσεως, οἷον ὀδύνην, δεῖμα. |
10e     Εὐεμπτωσίαν δ᾽ εἶναι εὐκαταφορίαν εἴς
πάθος, ὥς τι τῶν παρὰ φύσιν ἔργων, οἷον
ὲπιλυπίαν, ὀργιλότητα, φθονερίαν,
ἀκροχολίαν καὶ τὰ ὅμοια. Γίγνεσθαι δὲ120
εὐεμπτωσίας καὶ εἰς ἄλλα ἔργα τῶν παρὰ
φύσιν, οἷον εἰς κλοπὰς καὶ μοιχείας καὶ ὕβρεις,
καθ᾽ ἃς κλέπται τε καὶ μοιχοὶ καὶ ὑβρισταὶ
λέγονται. Νόσημα δ᾽ εἶναι δόξαν ἐπιθυμίας
ἑρρυηκυἷαν εἰς ἕξιν καὶ ἐνεσκιρωμένην, καθ᾿ ἣν125
ὑπολαμβάνουσι τὰ μὴ αἱρετὰ σφόδρα αἱρετὰ
εἶναι, οἷον φιλογυνίαν, φιλοινίαν, φιλαργυρίαῦ·
εἶναι δέ τινα καὶ ἐναντία <τούτοις> τοῖς
νοσήμασι κατὰ προσκοπἡν γινόμενα, οἷον
μισογυνίαν, μισοινίαν, μισανθρωπίαν. Τὰ δὲ130
νοσήματα μετ᾽ ἀσθενείας συμβαίνοντα
ἀρρωστήματα καλεῖσθαι.
11a     Κατόρθωμα δ᾽ εἶναι λέγουσι καθῆκον
πάντας ἀπέχον τοὺς ἀριθμούς, ἢ καθάπερ
προείπομεν, τέλειον καθῆκον· ἁμάρτημά τε τὸ
παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον πραττόμενον, ἢ ἐν ᾧ
παραλέλειπταί τι καθῆκον ὐπὸ λογικοῦ ζῴου.5
11b     Τά τε ἀγαθὰ πάντα τῶν σπουδαίων εἴναι
<κοινὰ> λέγουσι, καθ᾽ ὃ καὶ τὸν ὠφελοῦντα τινα
τῶν | πλησίον καὶ ἑαυτὸν ὠφελεῖν. Τήν τε
ὁμόνοιαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι κοινῶν ἀγαθῶν, δι᾿
ὃ καὶ τοὺς σπουδαίους πάντας ὁμονοεῖν10
ἀλλήλοις διὰ τὸ συμφωνεῖν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὸν
βίον· τοὺς δὲ φαύλους διαφωνοὓντας πρὸς
ἀλλήλους ἐχθροὺς εἶναι καὶ κακοποιητικοὺς
ἀλλήλων καὶ πολεμίους.
    Τό τε δίκαιόν φασι φύσει εἶναι καὶ μὴ θέσει.15
Ἑπὁμενον δὲ τούτοις ὑπάρχειν καὶ τὸ
πολιτεύεσθαι τὸν σοφὸν καὶ μάλιστ᾽ ἐν ταῖς
τοιαύταις πολιτείαις ταῖς ἐμφαινούσαις τινὰ
προκοπὴν πρὸς τὰς τελείας πολιτείας· καὶ τὸ
νομοθετεῖν δὲ καὶ τὸ παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους, ἔτι20
δὲ συγγράφειν τὰ δυνάμενα ὠφελεῖν τοὺς
ἐντυγχάνοντας τοῖς γράμμασιν οἰκεῖον εἶναι
τοῖς σπουδαίοις καὶ τὸ συγκαταβαίνειν καὶ εἰς
γάμον καὶ εἰς τεκνογονίαν καὶ αὑτοῦ χάριν καὶ
τῆς πατρίδος καὶ ὑπομένειν περὶ ταύτης, ἐὰν25
ᾖ μετρία, καὶ πόνους καὶ Θάνατον.
Παρακεῖσθαι δὲ τούτοις φαῦλα, τό τε
δημοκοπεῖν καὶ τὸ σοφιστεύειν καὶ τὸ
συγγράφειν ἐπιβλαβῆ τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσιν,
ἅπερ εἰς σπουδαίους οὐκ ἂν πέσοι.30
11c     Τριχῶς δὲ λεγομένης τῆς φιλίας, καθ᾽ ἕνα
μὲν τρόπον τῆς κοινῆς ἕνεκ᾽ ὠφελείας, καθ᾽ ἢν
φίλοι εἶναι λέγονται, ταύτην μὲν οὔ φασι τῶν
ἀγαθῶν εἶναι, διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἐκ διεστηκότων
ἀγαθὸν εἶναι κατ᾿ αὐτοὺς· τὴν δὲ κατὰ τὸ35
δεύτερον σημαινόμενον λεγομένην φιλίαν,
κατάσχεσιν οὖσαν φιλικὴν πρὸς τῶν πέλας,
τῶν ἐκτὸς λέγουσιν ἀγαθῶν· τὴν δὲ περὶ
αὐτὸν φιλίαν, καθ᾿ | ἣν φίλος ἐστὶ τῶν πέλας,
τῶν περὶ ψυχὴν ἀποφαίνουσιν ἀγαθῶν.40
11d     Εἶναι δὲ καὶ Θἀτερον τρόπον κοινὰ τὰ
ἀγαθά. Πάντα γὰρ τὸν ὁντινοῦν ὠφελοῦντα
ἴσην ὠφέλειαν ἀπολαμβάνειν νομίζουσι παρ᾽
αὐτὸ τοῦτο, μηδένα δὲ φαῦλον μήτε
ὠφελεῖσθαι μήτε ὠφελεῖν. Εἶναι γὰρ τὸ45
ὠφελεῖν ἴσχειν κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν καὶ τὸ ὠφελεῖσθαι
κινεῖσθαι κατ᾿ ἀρετήν.
    Οὶκονομικὸν δ᾽ εἶναι μόνον λέγουσι τὸν
σπουδαῖον καὶ ἀγαθὸν οἰκονόμον, ἔτι δὲ
χρηματιστικόν. Τὴν μὲν γὰρ οἰκονομικὴν εἶναι50
θεωρητικὴν ἕξιν καὶ πρακτικὴν τὤν οἴκῳ
συμφερόντων· τὴν δ᾽ οἰκονομίαν διάταξιν περὶ
ἀναλωμάτων καὶ ἔργων καὶ κτήσεως
ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ τῶν κατ᾽ ἀγρὸν ἐργαζομένων·
τὴν δὲ χρηματιστικὴν ἐμπειρίαν περιποιήσεως55
χρημάτων ἀφ᾽ ὧν δέον καὶ ἕξιν
ὁμολογουμένως ἀναστρέφεσθαι ποιοῦσαν ἐν
συναγωγῇ χρημάτων καὶ τηρήσει καὶ
ἀναλώσει πρὸς εὐπορίαν· τὸ δὲ χρηματίζεσθαί
τινες μὲν μέσον εἶπον εἷναι, τινὲς δὲ ἀστεῖον.60
Φαῦλον δὲ μηδένα προστάτην ἀγαθὸν οἴκου
γίνεσθαι, μηδὲ δύνασθαι οἰκίαν εὖ οὶκονουμένην
παρασχεῖν. Μόνον δὲ τὸν σπουδαῖον ἄνδρα
χρηματιστικὸν εἷναι, γινώσκοντα ἀφ᾽ ὧν
χρηματιστέον καὶ πότε καὶ πῶς καὶ μέχρι πότε.65
    Φασὶ <δὲ> μηδὲ συγγνώμην ἔχειν <μηδενὶ
τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα· τοῦ γὰρ αὐτοῦ συγγνώμην
τε ἔχειν> καὶ νομίζειν | τὸν ἡμαρτηκότα μὴ
παρ᾽ αὑτὸν ἡμαρτηκέναι, πάντὡν
ἁμαρτανόντων παρὰ τὴν ἰδίαν κακίαν· διὸ καὶ70
δεόντως λέγεσθαι τὸ μηδὲ συγγνώμην ἔχειν
τοῖς ἁμαρτάνουσιν. Οὐκ ἐπιεικῆ δέ φασιν εἶναι
τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα, τὸν γὰρ ἐπιεικῆ
παραιτητικὸν εἶναι τῆς κατ᾽ ἀξίαν κολάσεως
καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἶναι ἐπιεικῆ τε εἶναι καὶ75
ὑπολαμβάνειν τὰς ἐκ τοῦ νόμου τεταγμένας
κολάσεις τοῖς ἀδικοῦσι σκληροτέρας εἶναι καὶ
τὸ ἡγεῖσθαι παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν ἀπονέμειν τὰς
κολάσεις τὸν νομοθέτην.
    Τόν τε νόμον σπουδαῖον εἶναί φασι, λόγον80
ὀρθὸν ὸντα, προστακτικὸν μὲν ὧν ποιητέον,
ἀπαγορευτικὸν δὲ ὧν οὐ ποιητέον. Τοῦ δὲ
νόμον ἀστεῖον ὄντος καὶ ὁ νόμιμος ἀστεῖος ἂν
<εἴη>· νόμιμον μὲν γὰρ εἷναι ἄνδρα καὶ
ἀκολουθητικὸν τῷ νόμῳ καὶ πρακτικὸν τῶν85
ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ προσταττομένων· νομικὸν δὲ τὸν
ὲξηγητικὸν τοῦ νόμου. Μηδένα δὲ τῶν φαύλων
μήτε νόμιμον εἶναι μήτε νομικὀν.
11e     Ἔτι δὲ τῶν ἐνεργημάτων φασὶ τὸ μὲν
εἶναι κατορθώματα, τὰ δὲ ἁμαρτήματα, τὰ90
δ᾽ οὐδέτερα. Κατορθώματα μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα·
φρονεῖν, σωφρονεῖν, δικαιοπραγεῖν, χαίρειν,
εὐεργετεῖν, εὐφραίνεσθαι, φρονίμως
περιπατεῖν, πάνθ᾽ ὅσα κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον
πράττεται· ἁμαρτήματα δ᾽ εἶναι, τό τε95
ἀφραίνειν καὶ τὸ ἀκολασταίνειν | καὶ τὸ
ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι καὶ
τὸ κλέπτειν καὶ καθόλου ὅσα παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν
λόγον πράττεται· οὔτε δὲ κατορθώματα οὔτε
ἁμαρτήματα τὰ τοιαῦτα· λέγειν, ἐρωτᾶν,100
ἀποκρίνεσθαι, περιπατεῖν, ἀποδημεῖν καὶ τὰ
τούτοις παραπλήσια. Πάντα δὲ τὰ
κατορθώματα δικαιοπραγήματα εἶναι καὶ
εὐνομήματα καὶ εὐτακτήματα καὶ
εὐεπιτηδεύματα καὶ εὐτυχήματα καὶ105
εὐδαιμονήματα καὶ εὐκαιρήματα καὶ
εὐσχημονήματα· οὐκ ἔτι μέντοι γε
φρονιμεύματα, ἀλλὰ μόνα τὰ ἀπὸ φρονήσεως
καὶ ὁμοίως ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν, εὶ καὶ μὴ
ὠνόμασται, οἷον σωφρονήματα μὲν τὰ ἀπὸ110
σωφροσύνης, δικαιώματα δὲ τὰ ἀπὸ
δικαιοσύνης. Τὰ δὲ ἁμαρτήματα ἐκ τῶν
ἀντικειμένων ἀδικοπραγήματα καὶ
ἀνομήματα καὶ ἀτακτήματα.
11f     Διαφέρειν δὲ λέγουσιν, ὥσπερ αὶρετὸν καὶ115
αὶρετέον, οὕτω καὶ ὀρεκτὸν καὶ ὀρεκτέον καὶ
βουλητὸν καὶ βουλητέον καὶ ἁποδεκτὸν καὶ
ἀποδεκτέον. Αὶρετὰ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι καὶ βουλητὰ
καὶ ὀρεκτἁ <καὶ ἁποδεκτἁ τἀγαθά· τὰ δ᾽
ὡφελήματα αὶρετέα καὶ βουλητέα καὶ120
ὀρεκτέα> καὶ ἀποδεκτέα, κατηγορήματα ὄντα,
παρακείμενα δ᾽ ἀγαθοῖς. Αὶρεῖσθαι μὲν γὰρ
ἡμᾶς τὰ αὶρετἑα καὶ βούλεσθαι τἁ βουλητέα
καὶ ὀρέγεσθαι τὰ ὸρεκτέα. Κατηγορημἀτων
γὰρ αἵ τε αἱρέσεις καὶ ὀρέξεις καὶ βουλήσεις |125
γίνονται, ὥσπερ καὶ αἱ ὀρμαί· ἔχειν μέντοι
αἱρούμεθα καὶ βουλόμεθα καὶ ὁμοίως
ὸρεγόμεθα τἀγαθά, διὸ καὶ αἱρετὰ καὶ
βουλητὰ καὶ ὀρεκτὰ τἁγαθά ἐστι. Τὴν γὰρ
φρόνησιν αἱρούμεθα ἔχειν καὶ τὴν130
σωφροσύνην, οὐ μὰ Δία τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ
σωφρονεῖν, ἀσώματα ὄντα καὶ
    Λέγουσι δὲ ὁμοίως καὶ τἀγαθὰ πάντα
εἴναι ὐπομενετὰ καὶ ἐμμενετὰ καὶ ἀνάλογον135
ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν, εἰ καὶ μὴ
κατωνόμασται· τὰ δὲ ὠφελήματα πάντα
ὐπομενετέα καὶ ἐμμενετέα καὶ τὰ ὅμοια.
Ὡσαύτως δὲ διαφέρειν ὑπολαμβάνουσι καὶ τὰ
εὐλαβητὰ καὶ τὰ εὐλαβητέα καὶ ἀνυπομενετὰ140
καὶ ἀνυπομενετἑα. Τῶν δ᾽ ἄλλων τῶν κατὰ
τὰς κακίας ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος.
11g     Πάντα δὲ τὸν καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα
τέλειον εἶναι λέγουσι διὰ τὸ μηδεμιᾶς
ἀπολείπεσθαι ἀρετῆς· τὸν δὲ φαῦλον145
τοὐναντίον ἀτελῆ διὰ τὸ μηδεμιᾶς μετέχειν
ἀρετῆς. Δι᾽ ὃ καὶ πάντως εὐδαιμονεῖν ἀεὶ τῶν
ἀνθρώπων τοὺς ἀγαθούς, τοὺς δὲ φαύλους
κακοδαιμονεῖν, καὶ <ἐκείνων> τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν
μὴ διαφέρειν τῆς Θείας εὐδαιμονίας, μηδὲ τὴν150
ἀμεριαίαν ὀ Χρύσιππός φησι διαφέρειν τῆς τοῦ
Διὸς εὐδαιμονίας, <καὶ> κατὰ | μηδὲν
αἱρετωτέραν εἴναι μήτε καλλίω μήτε
σεμνοτέραν τὴν τοῦ Διὸς εὐδαιμονίαν τῆς τῶν
σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν.155
    Ἀρέσκει γὰρ τῷ τε Ζήνωνι καὶ τοῖς ἀπ᾽
αὐτοῦ Στωικοῖς φιλοσόφοις δύο γένη τῶν
ἀνθρώπων εἴναι, τὸ μὲν τῶν σπουδαίων, τὸ
δὲ τῶν φαύλωνκαὶ τὸ μὲν τῶν σπουδαίων
διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου χρῆσθαι ταῖς ἀρεταῖς, τὸ160
δὲ τῶν φαύλων ταῖς κακίαις· ὅθεν τὸ μὲν ἀεὶ
κατορθοῦν ἐν ἅπασιν οἷς προστίθεται, τὸ δὲ
ἁμαρτάνειν. Καὶ τὸν μὲν σπουδαῖον ταῖς περὶ
τὸν βίον ἐμπειρίαις χρώμενον ἐν τοῖς
πραττομένοις ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ πάντ᾽ εὖ ποιεῖν,165
καθάπερ φρονίμως καὶ σωφρόνως καὶ κατὰ
τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς· τὸν δὲ φαῦλον κατὰ
τοὐναντίον κακῶς. Καὶ τὸν μὲν σπουδαῖον
μέγαν εἶναι καὶ ἁδρὸν καὶ ὑψηλὸν καὶ ἰσχυρόν.
Μέγαν μέν᾽ ὅτι δύναται ἐφικνεῖσθαι τῶν κατὰ170
προαίρεσιν ὄντων αὐτῷ καὶ προκειμένων·
ἁδρὸν δέ, ὅτι ἐστὶν ηὐξημένος πάντοθεν·
ὑψηλὸν δ᾽, ὅτι μετείληφε τοῦ ἐπιβάλλοντος
ὕψους ἀνδρὶ γενναίῳ καὶ σοφῷ· καὶ ἰσχυρὸν
δ᾽, ὅτι τὴν ἐπιβάλλουσαν ἰσχὺν περιπεποίηται,175
ἀήττητος ὢν καὶ ἀκαταγώνιστος. Παρ᾽ ὃ καὶ
οὔτε ἀναγκάζεται ὑπό τινος οὔτε ἀναγκάζει
τινά, οὔτε κωλύεται οὔτε κωλύει, οὔτε
βιάζεται ὑπό τινος οὔτ᾽ αὐτὸς βιάζει τινά, οὔτε
δεσπόζει οὔτε δεσπόζεται, οὔτε κακοποιεῖ τινα180
οὔτ᾽ αὐτὸς κακοποιεῖται, οὔτε κακοῖς
περιπίπτει <οὔτ᾽ ἄλλον ποιεῖ κακοῖς
περιπίπτειν>, οὔτ᾽ ἐξαπατἄται οὔτε |
ἐξαπατᾷ ἄλλον, οὔτε διαψεὔδεται οὔτε ἀγνοεῖ
οὔτε λανθάνει ἑαυτὸν οὔτε καθόλου ψεῦδος185
ὔπολαμβάνει· εὐδαίμων δ᾽ ἐστὶ μάλιστα καὶ
εὐτυχὴς καὶ μακάριος καὶ ὄλβιος καὶ εὐσεβὴς
καὶ θεοφιλὴς καὶ ἀξιωματικός, βασιλικὸς τε καὶ
στρατηγικὸς καὶ πολιτικὸς καὶ οἰκονομικὸς καὶ
χρηματιστικὁς. Τοὺς δὲ φαύλους ἅπαντα190
τούτοις ὲναντὶα ἔχειν.
    Καθόλου δὲ τοῖς μὲν σπουδαίοις πάντα
τἀγαθὰ ὑπάρχειν, τοῖς δὲ φαύλοις πάντα τὰ
κακά. Οὺ νομιστέον δὲ λέγειν αὺτοὺς οὕτως,195
ὡς εἴ τινά ἐστιν ἀγαθά, ἐκεῖνα ὑπάρχει τοῖς
σπουδαίοις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν κακῶν·
ἀλλά τοι τοὺς μὲν τοσαῦτα ἔχειν ἀγαθὰ ὥστε
μηδὲν ἐλλείπειν εἰς τὸ τέλειον αὐτοῖς εἶναι τὸν
βίον <καὶ εὐδαίμονα>, τοὺς δὲ τοσαῦτα κακά,200
ὥστε τὸν βίον ἀτελῆ εἶναι καὶ κακοδαίμονα.
11h     Τὴν δ᾽ ἀρετὴν πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι
προσαγορεύουσιν. Ἀγαθόν τε γὰρ λέγουσιν
αὐτήν, ὅτι ἄγει ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ τὸν ὀρθὸν βίον· καὶ
ἀρεστόν᾽ ὅτι δοκιμαστόν ἐστιν ἀνυπόπτως·205
καὶ πολλοῦ ἄξιον, <ὅτι> ἀνυπέρβλητον ἔχει τὴν
ἀξίαν· καὶ σπουδαῖον, ἄξιον γὰρ εἶναι πολλῆς
σπουδῆς· καὶ ἐπαινετόν, εὐλόγως γὰρ ἄν τις
αὐτὴν ἐπαινοίη· καὶ καλόν, ὅτι πρὸς ἑαυτὴν
καλεῖν πέφυκε τοὺς ὀρεγομένους αὐτῆς· καὶ210
συμφέρον, φέρειν γὰρ τοιαῦτα ἃ συντείνει
πρὸς τὸ εὖ. ζῆν· καὶ χρήσιμον᾽ ὅτι ἐν τῇ χρείᾳ
ὠφέλιμόν ἐστι· καὶ αἱρετόν, συμβαίνειν γὰρ ἀπ᾽
αὐτῆς ἃ εὐλόγως ἔστιν αἱρεῖσθαι· καὶ
ἀναγκαῖον, ὅτι παροῦσα τε ὠφελεῖ καὶ μὴ215
παρούσης οὐκ ἔστιν ὠφελεῖσθαι· καὶ λυσιτελές,
τὰς γὰρ ἀπ᾽ αὐτῆς ὠφελείας κρείττους εἶναι
τῆς πραγματείας τῆς εἰς ταύτας συντεινούσης· |
καὶ αὔταρκες, ἐξαρκεῖν γὰρ τῷ ἔχοντι· καὶ
ἁνενδεές, ὅτι ἐνδείας ἀπαλλάττει πάσης· καὶ220
ἀποχρῶν διὰ τὸ ἐν τῇ χρήσει ἱκανὸν εἶναι καὶ
διατείνειν εἰς πᾶσαν τὴν κατὰ τὸν βίον χρείαν.
11i     Τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν μηδενὸς μετέχειν τοὺς
φαύλους, ἐπειδὴ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀρετή ἐστιν ἢ τὸ
μετέχον ἀρετῆς· τά τε παρακείμενα τοῖς225
ἀγαθοῖς, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὧν χρή, ὡφελήματα
ὄντα, μόνοις τοῖς σπουδαίοις συμβαίνειν·
καθάπερ καὶ τὰ παρακείμενα τοῖς κακοῖς, ἅπερ
ἐστὶν ὧν οὐ χρή, μόνοις τοῖς κακοῖς· βλάμματα
γὰρ εἶναι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τοὺς μὲν ἀγαθοὺς230
ἀβλαβεῖς πάντας εἶναι κατ᾽ ἀμφότερα, οὔτε
βλάπτειν οἵους τε ὄντας οὔτε βλάπτεσθαι,
τοὺς δὲ φαύλους κατὰ τοὐναντίον.
    Τὸν δὲ κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν πλοῦτον ἀγαθὸν
εἶναι λέγουσι, καὶ τὴν κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν πενίαν235
κακόν. Καὶ τὴν μὲν κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν ἐλευθερίαν
ἀγαθόν, τὴν δὲ κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν δουλείαν κακόν.
Δι᾿ ὃ δὴ καὶ τὸν σπουδαῖον εἶναι μόνον
πλούσιον καὶ ἐλεύθερον, τὸν δὲ φαῦλον
τοὐναντίον πένητα, τῶν εἰς τὸ πλουτεῖν240
ἀφορμῶν ὔστερημένον καὶ δοῦλον διὰ τὴν
ὔποπτωτικὴν ἐν αὐτῷ διάθεσιν.
    Τὰ δ᾽ ἀγαθὰ πάντα κοινὰ εἶναι τῶν
σπουδαίων, τῶν δὲ φαύλων τὰ κακά. Δι᾽ ὃ
καὶ τὸν ὠφελοῦντα τινα καὶ αὐτὸν ὠφελεῖσθαι,245
τὸν δὲ βλάπτοντα καὶ ἑαυτὸν βλάπτειν.
Πάντας δὲ τοὺς σπουδαίους ὠφελεῖν
ἀλλήλους, οὔτε φίλους ὄντας ἀλλήλων
πάντως οὔτε εὔνους <οὔτε> εὐδοκίμους οὔτε
ἀποδεχομένους παρὰ τὸ μήτε καταλαμβάνεσθαι250
μήτ᾽ ἐν ταὐτῷ κατοικεῖν τόπῳ, εὺνοητικὤς |
μέντοι γε πρὸς ἀλλήλους διακεῖσθαι καὶ
φιλικῶς καὶ δοκιμαστικὤς καὶ ἁποδεκτικὥς·
τοὺς δὲ ἄφρονας ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις τούτων
    Τοῦ δὲ νόμον ὄντος σπουδαίου, καθάπερ
εἴπομεν, ἐπειδὴ λόγος ὀρθός ἐστι προστακτικὸς
μὲν ὧν ποιητέον, ἁπαγορευτικὸς δὲ ὧν οὐ
ποιητέον᾿ μόνον τὸν σοφὸν εἶναι λέγουσι
νόμιμον, πρακτικὸν ὄντα τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου260
προσταττομένων καὶ μόνον ἐξηγητικὸν
τούτου, δι᾽ ὃ καὶ νομικὸν εἶναι· τοὺς δ᾽ ἠλιθίους
ἐναντίως ἔχειν.
    Ἀστείοις δ᾽ ἔτι καὶ τὴν ἀρχικὴν
κατανέμουσιν ἐπιστασίαν καὶ τὰ ταύτης εἴδη,265
βασιλείαν᾽ στρατηγίαν, ναυαρχίαν καὶ τὰς
ταύταις παραπλησίους. Κατὰ τοῦτο δὴ καὶ
μόνος ὁ σπουδαῖος ἄρχει καὶ εἰ μὴ πάντως κατ᾽
ἐνέργειαν, κατὰ διάθεσιν δὲ καὶ πάντως. Καὶ
πειθαρχικὸς μόνος ὁ σπουδαῖος ἐστιν,270
ἁκολουθητικὸς ὢν ἄρχοντι. Τῶν δ᾽ ἀφρόνων
οὐδεὶς τοιοῦτος· οὔτε γὰρ ἄρχειν οὔτ᾿
ἄρχεσθαι οἷός <τ᾽> ἐστιν ὁ ἄφρων, αὐθάδης τις
ὢν καὶ ἁνάγωγος.
    Πάντα τε εὖ ποιεῖ ὁ νοῦν ἔχων, καὶ γὰρ275
φρονίμως καὶ ἐγκρατῶς καὶ κοσμίως καὶ
εὐτάκτως ταῖς περὶ τὸν βίον ἐμπειρίαις
χρώμενος συνεχῶς, ὁ δὲ φαῦλος, ἄπειρος ὢν
τῆς ὀρθῆς χρήσεως᾿ πάντα κακῶς ποιεῖ καθ᾽
ἣν ἔχει διάθεσιν ἐνεργῶν, εὐμετάπτωτος ὢν280
καὶ παρ᾿ ἕκαστα μεταμελείᾳ συνεχόμενος. Εἶναι
δὲ τὴν μεταμέλειαν λύπηνἐπὶ πεπραγμένοις
ὡς παρ᾽ αὑτοῦ ἡμαρτημένοις, |
κακοδαιμονικόν τι πάθος ψυχῆς καὶ στασιῶδες·
ἐφ᾽ ὅσον γὰρ ἄχθεται τοῖς συμβεβηκόσιν ὁ ἐν285
ταῖς μεταμελείαις ὧν, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἀγανακτεῖ
πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ὡς αἴτιον γεγονότα τούτων· δι᾽
ὃ καὶ ἄτιμον εἶναι πάντα φαῦλον, μήτε τιμῆς
ἄξιον ὄντα μήτε τίμιον ὑπάρχοντα. Τὴν γὰρ
τιμὴν εἶναι γέρως ἀξίωσιν, τὸ δὲ γέρας ἆθλον290
ἀρετῆς εὐεργετικῆς. Τὸ οὖν ἀρετῆς ἀμέτοχον
ἄτιμον δικαίως λέγεσθαι.
    Λέγουσι δὲ καὶ φυγάδα πάντα φαῦλον
εἶναι, καθ᾽ ὅσον στέρεται νόμον καὶ πολιτείας
κατὰ φύσιν ἐπιβαλλούσης. Τὸν γὰρ νόμον295
εἶναι, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, σπουδαῖον, ὁμοίως δὲ
καὶ τὴν πόλιν. Ἱκανὥς δὲ καὶ Κλεάνθης περὶ
τὸ σπουδαῖον εἶναι τὴν πόλιν λόγον ἠρώτησε
τοιοῦτον· Πόλις μὲν <εἰ> ἔστιν οἰκητήριον
κατασκεύασμα, εἰς ὃ καταφεύγοντας ἔστι δίκην300
δοῦναι καὶ λαβεῖν, οὐκ ἀστεῖον δὴ πόλις ἐστίν;
ἀλλὰ μὴν τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ἡ πόλις οἰκητήριον·
ἀστεῖον ἄρ᾿ ἔστιν ἡ πόλις. Τριχῶς δὲ λεγομένης
τῆς πόλεως, τῆς τε κατὰ τὸ οἰκητήριον καὶ
τῆς κατὰ τὸ σύστημα τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ305
τρίτον τῆς κατ᾽ ἀμφότερα τούτων, κατὰ δύο
σημαινόμενα λέγεσθαι τὴν πόλιν ἀστείαν,
κατά τε τὸ σύστημα τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ κατὰ
τὸ συναμφότερον διὰ <τὴν εἰς> τοὺς
ἐνοικοῦντας ἀναφοράν.310
11k     Φασὶ δὲ καὶ ἄγροικον εἶναι πάντα φαῦλον·
τὴν γὰρ ἀγροικίαν ἀπειρίαν εἶναι τῶν κατὰ
πόλιν ἐθῶν καὶ | νόμῶν' ᾗ πάντα φαῦλον
ἔνοχον ὑπάρχειν, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἄγριον,
ἐναντιωτικὸν ὄντα τῇ κατὰ νόμον διεξαγωγᾗ315
καὶ θηριώδη καὶ βλαπτικὸν ἄνθρωπον. Τὸν δ᾽
αὐτὸν τοῦτον καὶ ἀνήμερον ὑπάρχειν καὶ
τυραννικόν, οὕτως διακείμενον ὥστε
δεσποτικὰ ποιεῖν, ἔτι δὲ ὠμὰ καὶ βίαια καὶ
παράνομα καιρῶν ἐπιλαβόμενον. Εἶναι δὲ καὶ320
ἀχάριστον, οὔτε πρὸς ἀνταπόδοσιν χάριτος
οἰκείως ἔχοντα οὔτε πρὸς μετάδοσιν διὰ τὸ
μήτε κοινῶς τι ποιεῖν μήτε φιλικῶς μήτ᾿
    Μηδὲ φιλόλογον εἶναι τὸν φαῦλον μηδὲ325
φιλήκοον, παρὰ τὸ μηδ᾿ ἀρχὴν παρεσκευάσθαι
πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὀρθῶν λόγων παραδοχὴν διὰ
τὴν ὐπείκουσαν ἐκ τῆς διαστροφῆς ἀφροσύνην,
παρὰ τὸ μήτε προτετράφθαι τινὰ τῶν
φαύλων μήτε προτρέπειν πρὸς ἀρετήν· τὸν330
γὰρ προτετραμμένον ἢ προτρέποντα ἑτέρους
ἕτοιμον εἶναι δεῖ πρὸς τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν, τὸν δ᾿
ἕτοιμον ἀνεμποδίστως ἔχειν, μηδένα <δὲ> τῶν
ἀφρόνων εἶναι τοιοῦτον. Οὐ γὰρ τὸν
προθύμως ἀκούοντα καὶ ὑπομνηματιζόμενον335
τὰ λεγόμενα ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσόφων ἕτοιμον
εἶναι πρὸς τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἑτοίμως
ἔχοντα πρὸς τὸ τὰ διὰ τῆς φιλοσοφίας
παραγγελλόμενα μεταφέρειν ἐπὶ τὰ ἔργα καὶ
κατ᾿ αὐτὰ βιοῦν. Οὐδένα δὲ τῶν φαύλων340
τοιοῦτον εἶναι, προκατειλημμένον τοῖς τῆς
κακίας δόγμασιν. Εἰ γὰρ προετέτραπτό τις
τῶν φαύλων καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς κακίας ἂν
ἐτέτραπτο. Οὐδεὶς δ᾽ ἔχων τὴν κακίαν πρὸς
ἀρετὴν τέτραπται, ὡς οὐδὲ νοσῶν πρὸς |345
ὑγίειαν. Μόνον δὲ προτετρἀφθαι τὸν σοφὸν
καὶ μόνον προτρέπειν δύνασθαι, τῶν δ᾽
ἀφρόνων μηδένα· κατὰ γὰρ <ἀρετῆς>
παραγγέλματα βιοῦν μηδένα τῶν ἀφρόνων.
Μηδ᾽ εἴναι φιλόλογον, λογόφιλον δὲ μᾶλλον,350
Μηδ᾽ εἴναι φιλόλογον, λογόφιλον δὲ μᾶλλον,
δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἔργοις ἐκβεβαιούμενον τὸν τῆς
ἀρετῆς λόγον.
    Μηδὲ γὰρ φιλόπονον τινα τῶν φαύλων
εἶναι· τὴν γὰρ φιλοπονίαν διάθεσιν355
ἐξεργαστικὴν εἶναι τῶν ἐπιβαλλόντων
ἀνυπόπτως διὰ πόνον, οὐδένα δὲ τῶν
φαύλων ἀνυπόπτως ἔχειν πρὸς τὸν πόνον.
    Μηδὲ γὰρ τὴν κατ᾽ ἀξίαν ποιεῖσθαι δόσιν
τῆς ἀρετῆς τῶν φαύλων τινά, σπουδαῖον μὲν360
γὰρ εἶναι τὴν δόσιν, ἐπιστήμην οὖσαν, καθ᾽ ἢν
ἀξιόλογόν τι ἡγούμεθα περιποιεῖσθαι. Τῶν δὲ
σπουδαίων μηδὲν εἰς φαύλους πίπτειν, ὥστε
μηδὲ τὴν ἀξίαν τῆς ἀρετῆς δόσιν ποιεῖσθαί τινα
τῶν φαύλων. Εἰ γὰρ τὴν κατ᾽ ἀξίαν τις365
ἐποιεῖτο δόσιν τῶν ἀφρόνων τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἐφ᾽
ὅσον ἐτίμα ταύτην, ἁπῳκονομεἷτο ἂν τὴν
κακίαν. Πᾶς δέ τις ἄφρων σύνεστιν ἡδέως τῇ
ἑαυτοῦ κακίᾳ. Σκοπεῖν γὰρ δεῖ μὴ τὸν
ἑαυτοῦ κακίᾳ. Σκοπεῖν γὰρ δεῖ μὴ τὸν370
ἀλλὰ τὸν τῶν πράξεων. Ἐκ τούτων γὰρ
ἁπελἐγχονται [καὶ] μὴ περὶ τὰ καλὰ καὶ
σπουδαῖα παρωρμημένοι, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰς
ἀνδραποδώδεις ἀμέτρους ἀπολαύσεις.
    Ἀρἑσκει δὲ καὶ πᾶν ἁμάρτημα ἀσέβημα375
εἶναι. Τὸ γὰρ παρὰ τὴν βούλησιν τι
πράττεσθαι τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἀσεβείας εἷναι τεκμήριον.
Τῶν γὰρ θεῶν οὶκειουμένων μὲν τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ
τοῖς ταύτης ἔργοις, ἀλλοτριουμένων δὲ τῇ
κακίᾳ | καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ ταύτης συντελουμένοις,380
τοῦ δ᾽ ἁμαρτήματος ὄντος ἐνεργήματος κατὰ
κακίαν, κατεφαίνετο πᾶν ἁμάρτημα
ἀπαρεστὸν θεοῖς ὑπάρχον (τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶν
ἀσέβημα)· [καὶ] καθ᾽ ἕκαστον γὰρ ἁμάρτημα
ὁ φαῦλος ἁπαρεστόν τι ποιεῖ Θεοῖς.385
    Ἔτι δὲ ἐπεὶ πᾶς φαῦλος ὅσα ποιεῖ κατὰ
κακίαν ποιεῖ, καθάπερ ὁ σπουδαῖος κατ᾽
ἀρετήν, καὶ ὁ μίαν ἔχων κακίαν πάσας ἔχει.
Ἐν δὲ ταύταις ὁρᾶσθαι καὶ τὴν ἀσέβειαν, οὐ
τὴν τεταγμένην κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, ἀλλὰ τὴν390
τῇ εὐσεβείᾳ ἐναντίαν ἕξιν. Τὸ δὲ κατὰ ἀσέβειαν
πεπραγμένον ἀσέβημα εἶναι, πᾶν <οὗν>
ἁμάρτημα ἀσέβημα εἷναι.
    Ἔτι δ᾽ ἀρέσκει αὐτοῖς καὶ πάντ᾽ εἶναι τὸν
ἄφρονα Θεοῖς ἐχθρόν· τὴν γὰρ ἔχθραν395
ἀσυμφωνῖαν εἶναι <περὶ> τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον
καὶ διχόνοιαν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὴν φιλίαν
συμφωνίαν καὶ ὁμόνοιαν. Διαφωνοῦσι δ᾽ οἱ
φαῦλοι πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς περὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸν
βίον, διόπερ πᾶς ἄφρων θεοῖς ἐχθρός ἐστιν.400
Ἔτι εἰ πάντες τοὺς ἐναντίους αὐτοῖς ἐχθροὺς
εἶναι νομίζουσι, τῷ δὲ σπουδαίῳ ὁ φαῦλός
ἐστιν ἐναντίος καὶ σπουδαῖος ἐστιν ὁ Θεός, ὁ
φαῦλος Θεοῖς ἐστιν ἐχθρός.
11l     Ἲσά τε πάντα λέγουσιν εἴναι τὰ405
ἁμαρτήματα, οὐκέτι δ᾽ ὅμοια. Καθάπερ γὰρ
ἀπὸ μιᾶς τινος πηγῆς τῆς κακίας φέρεσθαι
πέφυκε, τῆς κρίσεως οὔσης ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς
ἁμαρτήμασι τῆς αὐτῆς· παρὰ δὲ τὴν ἔξωθεν
αἰτίαν, τῶν ἐφ᾽ οἷς αἱ κρίσεις ἀποτελοῦνται410
μέσων διαλλαττὀντων, διάφορα κατὰ
ποιότητα γίνεσθαι τὰ ἁμαρτήματα. | Λάβοις
δ᾿ ἂν εἰκόνα σαφῆ τοῦ δηλουμένου τῷδ᾿
ἐπιστῆσας· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ψεῦδος ἐπ᾿ ἴσης ψεῦδος
συμβέβηκεν, οὐ γὰρ εἶναι ἕτερον ἑτέρου415
μᾶλλον διεψευσμένον· τὸ [τε] γὰρ νύκτ᾽ <ἀεὶ>
εἶναι ψεῦδός ἐστι, καθάπερ τὸ ὶπποκένταυρον
ζῆν· καὶ οὐ μᾶλλον εἰπεῖν ἐστι ψεῦδος εἴναι
θάτερον Θατέρου· ἀλλ᾽ οὐχὶ τὸ ψευδὲς ἐπίσης
ψευδές ἐστιν, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ οἱ διεψευσμένοι ἐπίσης420
εἰσὶ διεψευσμένοι. Καὶ ἁμαρτάνειν δὲ μᾶλλον
καὶ ἧττον οὐκ ἔστι, πᾶσαν γὰρ ἁμαρτίαν κατὰ
διάψενσιν πράττεσθαι. Ἔτι οὐχὶ κατόρθωμα
μὲν μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον οὐ γίγνεσθαι,
ἁμάρτημα δὲ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον γίγνεσθαι·425
πάντα γάρ ἐστι τέλεια, διόπερ οὔτ᾽ ἐλλείπειν
οὔθ᾽ ὑπερέχειν δύναιτ᾽ ἂν ἀλλήλων. Ἲσα
τοίνυν ἐστὶ πάντα τὰ ἁμαρτήματα.
11m     Περὶ δὲ εὐφυοῦς, ἔτι δὲ εὐγενοῦς οἳ μὲν τῶν
ἐκ τῆς αἱρέσεως ἐπηνἐχθησαν ἐπὶ τὸ λέγειν430
πάντα σοφὸν τοιοῦτον εἶναι, οἱ δ᾽ οὔ. Οἱ μὲν
γὰρ οἴονται οὐ μόνον εὐφυεῖς γίγνεσθαι πρὸς
ἀρετὴν ἐκ φύσεως, ἀλλὰ καί τινας ἐκ
κατασκευῆς, καὶ τὸ ἐν ταῖς παροιμίαις
λεγόμενον τοῦτο ἀπεδέξαντο435
    μελέτη χρονισθεἷσ᾽ εἰς φύσιν καθίσταται.
Τὸ δ᾽ ὅμοιον καὶ περὶ εὐγενείας ὑπέλαβον,
ὥστε εὐφυΐαν | μὲν εἶναι κοινῶς ἕξιν ἐκ φύσεως
ἢ ἐκ κατασκευῆς οἰκείαν πρὸς ἀρετήν, ἢ ἕξιν
καθ᾽ ἢν εὐανάληπτοι ἀρετῆς εἰσί τινες· τὴν δ᾽440
εὐγένειαν ἕξιν ἐκ γένους ἢ ἐκ κατασκευῆς
οἰκείαν πρὸς ἀρετήν.
    Τὸν δὲ σπουδαῖον, ὁμιλητικὸν ὄντα καὶ
ἐπιδέξιον καὶ προτρεπτικὸν καὶ Θηρευτικὸν διὰ
τῆς ὁμιλὶας εἰς εὔνοιαν καὶ φιλίαν, ὡς δυνατὸν445
εὐάρμοστον εἶναι πρὸς πλῆθος ἀνθρώπων,
παρ᾽ ὃ καὶ ὲπαφρόδιτον εἶναι καὶ ἐπίχαριν καὶ
πιθανόν, ἔτι δὲ αὶμύλον καὶ εὔστοχον καὶ
εὔκαιρον καὶ ἀγχίνουν καὶ ἀφελῆ καὶ
ἀπερίεργον καὶ ἁπλοῦν καὶ ἄπλαστον· τὸν δὲ450
φαῦλον ἔνοχον πᾶσι τοῖς ἐναντίοις. Τὸ δ᾽
εἰρωνεύεσθαι φαύλων εὶναί φασιν, οὐδένα γὰρ
ἐλεύθερον καὶ σπουδαῖον εἰρωνεύεσθαι· ὁμοίως
δὲ καὶ τὸ σαρκἀζειν, ὅ ἐστιν εἰρωνεύεσθαι μετ᾽
ἐπισυρμοῦ τινος. Ἐν μόνοις τε τοῖς σοφοῖς455
ἀπολείπουσι φιλίαν, ἐπεὶ ἐν μόνοις τούτοις
ὁμόνοια γίνεται περὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον· τὴν
δ᾽ ὁμόνοιαν εἷναι κοινῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιστήμην.
Φιλίαν γὰρ ἀληθινὴν καὶ μὴ ψευδώνυμον
ἀδύνατον χωρὶς πίστεως καὶ βεβαιότητος460
ὑπάρχειν ἐν δὲ τοῖς φαύλοις, ἀπίστοις καὶ
ἀβεβαίοις οὖσι καὶ δόγματα πολεμικὰ
κεκτημένοις, οὐκ εἶναι φιλίαν, ἑτέρας δέ τινας
ἑπιπλοκὰς καὶ συνδέσεις ἔξωθεν ἀνάγκαις καὶ
δόξαις κατεχομένας γίνεσθαι. Φασὶ δὲ καὶ τὸ465
ἀγαπᾶν καὶ τὸ ἀσπάζεσθαι καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν
μόνων εἷναι σπουδαίων.
    Καὶ μόνον εἶναι τὸν σοφὸν βασιλέα τε καὶ
βασιλικόν, τῶν δὲ φαύλων μηδένα· τὴν γὰρ
βασιλείαν ἀρχὴν ἀνυπεύθυνον εἶναι καὶ τὴν470
ἀνωτάτω καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ πάσαις. |
    Λέγουσι δὲ καὶ ἄριστον αὑτοῦ ἰατρὸν
εἶναι τὸν σπουδαῖον ἄνδρα· ἐπιμελῆ γὰρ ὄντα
τῆς ἰδίας φύσεως παρατηρητὴν ὑπάρχειν καὶ
τῶν πρὸς ὑγίειαν ἐπιστήμονα συμφερόντων.475
    Οὐχ οἷον δὲ μεθυσθήσεσθαι τὸν νοῦν
ἔχοντα· τὴν γὰρ μέθην ἁμαρτητικὸν περιέχειν,
λήρησιν εἶναι <γὰρ> παρὰ τὸν οἶνον, ἐν μηδενὶ
δὲ τὸν σπουδαῖον ἁμαρτάνειν, δι᾽ ὃ πάντα κατ᾽
ἀρετὴν ποιεῖν καὶ τὸν ἀπὸ ταύτης ὀρθὸν480
    Τρεῖς δὲ προηγουμένους εἴναι βίους, τόν
τε βασιλικὸν καὶ τὸν πολιτικὸν καὶ τρίτον τὸν
ἐπιστημονικὸν ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ χρηματισμοὺς
τρεῖς προηγουμένους, τόν τε ἀπὸ τῆς485
βασιλείας, καθ᾽ ὃν ἢ αὐτὸς βασιλεύσει ἢ
μοναρχικῶν χρημάτων εὐπορήσει· δεύτερον
δὲ τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς πολιτείας, πολιτεύσεσθαι γὰρ
κατὰ τὸν προηγούμενον λόγον· καὶ γὰρ
γαμήσειν καὶ παιδοποιήσεσθαι, ἀκολουθεῖν490
<γὰρ> ταῦτα τῇ τοῦ λογικοῦ ζῴου καὶ
κοινωνικοῦ καὶ φιλαλλήλου <φύσει>.
Χρηματιεἷσθαι οὖν καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς πολιτείας καὶ
ἀπὸ τῶν φίλων, τῶν ἐν ὑπεροχαῖς ὄντων.
Περὶ δὲ τοῦ σοφιστεύσειν καὶ ἀπὸ σοφιστείας495
εὐπορήσειν χρημάτων διέστησαν οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς
αἱρέσεως κατὰ τὸ σημαινόμενον. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ
χρηματιεῖσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν κατὰ τὴν παιδείαν καὶ
μισθούς ποτε λήψεσθαι παρὰ τῶν
φιλομαθοῦντων διωμολογήσαντσ· περὶ δὲ τὸ500
σημαινόμενον | ἐγένετό τις ἐν αὐτοῖς
ἀμφισβήτησις, τῶν μὲν αὐτὸ τοῦτο λεγόντων
σοφιστεύειν, τὸ ἐπὶ μισθῷ μεταδιδόναι τῶν τῆς
φιλοσοφίας δογμάτων᾽ τῶν δ᾽ ὑπο-
τοπησἀντων ἐν τῶ σοφιστεύειν περιέχεσθαί505
τι φαῦλον, οἱονεὶ λόγους καπηλεύειν, οὐ
φαμένων δεῖν ἀπὸ παιδείας παρὰ τῶν
ἐπιτυχόντων χρηματίζεσθαι, καταδεέστερον
γὰρ εἶναι τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον τοῦ
χρηματισμοῦ τοῦ τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἀξιώματος.510
    Φασὶ δέ ποτε καὶ τὴν ἐξαγωγὴν τὴν ἐκ
τοῦ βίον τοῖς σπουδαίοις καθηκόντως
<γίγνεσθαι> κατὰ πολλοὺς τρόπους, τοῖς <δὲ>
φαύλοις μονὴν <τὴν> ἐν τῷ ζῆν καὶ οἳ μὴ
μέλλοιεν ἔσεσθαι σοφοίοὔτε γὰρ τὴν ἀρετὴν515
κατέχειν ἐν τῷ ζῆν οὔτε τὴν κακίαν ἐκβάλλειν·
τοῖς δὲ καθήκουσι καὶ τοῖς παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον
<παρὼ>μετρεῖσθαι τήν τε ζωὴν καὶ τὸν θάνατον.
    Λέγουσι δὲ καὶ τὸν σοφὸν ἀνὐβριστον
εἴναι· οὐθ᾿ ὑβρίζεσθαι γὰρ οὐθ᾿ ὑβρίζειν διὰ τὸ520
τὴν ὕβριν ἀδικίαν εἶναι καταισχύνουσαν καὶ
βλάβην· μήτε δὲ ἀδικεῖσθαι μήτε βλάπτεσθαι
τὸν σπουδαῖον (ὰδικητικῷς μέντοι γέ τινας
αὐτῷ προσφέρεσθαι καὶ ὐβριστικῷς καὶ κατὰ
τοῦτο ἁδικοπραγεῖν). Πρὸς τούτῳ μηδὲ <τὴ>ν525
τυχοῦσαν ἀδικίαν εἶναι τὴν ὕβριν, ἀλλὰ
καταισχύνουσαν καὶ ὐβριστικὴν οὖσαν.
Ἀπερίπτωτον δ᾿ ὑπάρχειν τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα
τούτοις καὶ μηδαμῶς καταισχύνεσθαι· ἐν
ἑαυτῷ γὰρ ἔχειν τὸ | ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὴν θείαν530
ἀρετήν, δι᾽ ὃ καὶ πάσης ἀπηλλάχθαι κακίας
καὶ βλάβης.
    Καὶ βασιλεύσειν τέ ποτε τὸν νοῦν <ἔχοντα>
καὶ βασιλεῖ συμβιώσεσθαι καὶ εὐφυΐαν
ἐμφαίνοντι καὶ φιλομάθειαν. Ἔφαμεν δ᾿ ὅτι καὶ535
πολιτεύεσθαι κατὰ τὸν προηγούμενον λόγον
οἷόν ἐστι, μὴ πολιτεύεσθαι δὲ ἐάν τι <κωλὐῃ>
καὶ μάλιστ᾿ <ἂν> μηδὲν ὠφελεῖν μέλλῃ τὴν
πατρίδα, κινδύνους δὲ παρακολουθεῖν
ὐπολαμβάνῃ μεγάλους καὶ χαλεποὺς ἐκ τῆς540
    Λέγεοθαι δὲ μὴ ψεύδεσθαι τὸν σοφὸν, ἀλλ᾽
ἐν πᾶσιν ὰληθεὐειν· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ λέγειν τι
ψεῦδος τὸ ψεύδεσθαι ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλ᾿ ἐν τῷ
διαψευστικῷς τὸ ψεῦδος λέγειν καὶ ἐπὶ ἀπάτῃ545
τῶν πλησίον. Τῷ μέντοι ψεύδει ποτὲ
συγχρήσεσθαι νομίζουσιν αὐτὸν κατὰ
πολλοὺς τρόπους ἄνευ συγκαταθέσεως· καὶ
γὰρ κατὰ στρατηγίαν <κατὰ> τῶν
ἀντιπάλων καὶ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ συμφέροντος550
προὀρασιν καὶ κατ᾽ ἄλλας οἰκονομίας τοῦ βίου
πολλάς, ψεῦδος δ᾿ ὑπολαμβάνειν οὐδέποτέ
φασι τὸν σοφόν, οὐδὲ τὸ παράπαν
ἀκαταλήπτῳ τινὶ συγκατατὶθεσθαι, διὰ τὸ
μηδὲ δοξάζειν αὐτόν, μηδ᾽ ἀγνοεῖν μηδέν. Τὴν555
γὰρ ἄγνοιαν μεταπτωτικὴν εἷναι
συγκατάθεσιν καὶ ἀσθενῆ. | Μηδὲν δ᾽
ὑπολαμβάνειν ἀσθενῶς, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον
ἀσφαλῶς καὶ βεβαίως, διὸ καὶ μηδὲ δοξάζειν
τὸν σοφόν. Διττὰς γὰρ εἶναι δόξας, τὴν μὲν560
ἁκαταλήπτῳ συγκατάθεσιν, τὴν δὲ ὐπόληψιν
ἁσθενῆταύτας <δ᾽> ἀλλοτρίους εἶναι τῆς τοῦ
σοφοῦ διαθέσεως· δι᾿ ὃ καὶ τὸ προπίπτειν πρὸ
καταλήψεως <καὶ> συγκατατίθεσθαι κατὰ τὸν
προπετῆ φαῦλον εἶναι καὶ μὴ πίπτειν εἰς τὸν565
εὐφυῆ καὶ τέλειον ἄνδρα καὶ σπουδαῖον. Οὐδὲ
λανθάνειν δὲ αὐτόν τι, τὴν γὰρ λῆσιν εἶναι
ψεύδους ὑπόληψιν ἁποφαντικὴν πράγματος.
Τούτοις δ᾽ ἀκολούθως οὐκ ἀπιστεῖν, τὴν γὰρ
ἀπιστίαν εἶναι ψεύδους ὐπόληψιν· τὴν δὲ πίστιν570
ἀστεῖον ὐπάρχειν, εἶναι γὰρ κατάληψιν
ἰσχυράν, βεβαιοῦσαν τὸ ὐπολαμβανόμενον·
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἀμετάπτωτον
ὑπὸ λόγου· διὰ ταῦτά φασι μήτε ἐπίστασθαί
τι τὸν φαῦλον μήτε πιστεύειν. Ἐχομένως δὲ575
τούτων οὔτε πλεονεκτεῖσθαι τὸν σοφὸν οὔτε
βουκολεῖσθαι οὔτε διαιτᾶσθαι οὔτε
παραριθμεἷν οὔτε ὐφ᾽ ἑτέρου παραριθμεἷσθαι·
ταῦτα γὰρ πάντα τὴν ἀπάτην περιέχειν καὶ
τοῖς κατὰ τὸν τόπον ψεὐδεσι πρόσθεσιν.580
Οὐδένα δὲ τῶν ἀστείων οὔθ᾿ ὁδοῦ
διαμαρτάνειν οὔτ᾿ οἰκίας οὔτε σκοποῦ· ἀλλ᾿
οὐδὲ παρορᾶν [ἀλλ᾿] οὐδὲ παρακούειν
νομίζουσι τὸν σοφόν, | οὐδὲ τὸ σύνολον
παραπαίειν κατά τι τῶν αἰσθητηρίων, καὶ585
γὰρ τούτων ἕκαστον ἔχεσθαι νομίζουσι
τῶν[δε] ψευδῶν συγκαταθέσεων. Οὐδ᾽
ὑπονοεῖν δέ φασι τὸν σοφόν, καὶ γὰρ τὴν
ὑπόνοιαν ἀκαταλήπτῷ εἶναι τῷ γένει
συγκατάθεσιν· οὐδὲ μετανοεῖν δ᾿590
ὑπολαμβάνουσι τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα, καὶ γὰρ τὴν
μετάνοιαν ἔχεσθαι ψευδοῦς συγκαταθέσεως,
<ὡς> ἂν προδιαπεπτωκότος. Οὐδὲ
μεταβάλλεσθαι δὲ κατ᾽ οὐδένα τρόπον, οὐδὲ
μετατίθεσθαι, οὐδὲ οφάλλεσθαι· ταῦτα γὰρ595
εἶναι πάντα τῶν τοῖς δόγμασι
μεταπιπτόντων, ὅπερ ἀλλότριον εἶναι τοῦ
νοῦν ἔχοντος· οὐδὲ δοκεῖν αὐτῷ τι φασὶ
παραπλησίως τοῖς εἰρημένοις.
11n     Γίνεσθαι δὲ καὶ διαλεληθὀτα τινὰ σοφὸν600
νομίζουσι κατὰ τοὺς πρώτους χρόνους οὔτε
ὁρεγόμενόν τινος οὔθ᾿ ὅλως γινόμενον ἔν τινι
τῶν ἐν τῷ βούλεσθαι εἰδικῶν ὄντων, διὰ τὸ
μὴ κρίνοντι αὐτῷ παρεῖναι ὧν χρή. Οὐ μόνον
δ᾽ ἐπὶ τῆς φρονήσεως ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων605
τεχνῶν τὰς τοιαύτας ἔσεσθαι διαλήψεις.
11o     [Ἐκ] πάντων τε τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων ἴσων
ὄντων καὶ τῶν κατορθωμάτων, καὶ τοὺς
ἄφρονας ἐπίσης πάντας ἄφρονας εἶναι, τὴν
αὐτὴν καὶ ἴσην ἔχοντας διάθεσιν. Ἴσων δὲ610
ὄντων τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων, εἶναί τινας ἐν
αὐτοῖς διαφοράς, καθ᾿ ὅσον τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν ἀπὸ
σκληρᾶς καὶ δυσιάτου διαθέσεως γίνεται, τὰ
δ᾽ οὐ.
11p     Καὶ τῶν σπουδαίων δὲ ἄλλους ἄλλων615
προτρεπτικωτέρους | γίγνεσθαι καὶ
πειστικωτέρους, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἀγχινουστέρους
κατὰ τὰ μέσα τὰ ἐμπεριλαμβανὀμενα τῶν
ἐπιτάσεων συμβαινουσῶν.
11q     Εὐτεκνεῖν δὲ μόνον τὸν ἀστεῖον, οὔ τι μὴν620
πάντα· δεῖν γὰρ τὸν εὐτεκνοῦντα ἀστεῖα
τέκνα ἔχοντα χρήσασθαι αὐτοῖς ὡς τοιούτοις.
Εὐγηρεῖν τε μόνον καὶ εὐθανατεἶν τὸν
σπουδαῖον· εὐγηρεῖν γὰρ εἶναι τὸ μετὰ ποιοῦ
γήρως διεξάγειν κατ’ ἀρετήν, εὐθανατεῖν δὲ625
τὸ μετὰ ποιοῦ θανάτου κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν τελευτᾶν.
11r     Καὶ τά τε ὑγιεινὰ καὶ νοσερὰ πρὸς
ἄνθρωπον λέγεσθαι καὶ ὡς τρόφιμα᾿ καὶ τὰ
λυτικὰ καὶ στατικὰ καὶ τὰ τούτοις
παραπλήσια. Ὑγιεινὰ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὰ630
εὐφυῶς ἔχοντα πρὸς τὸ περιποιεῖν ὑγίειαν ἣ
συνέχειν· νοσερὰ δὲ τὰ ἐναντίως ἔχοντα
τούτοις. Παραπλήσιον δ᾽ εἶναι καὶ τὸν ἐπὶ τῶν
ἄλλων λόγον.
11s     Καὶ μαντικὸν δὲ μόνον εἶναι τὸν635
σπουδαῖον, ὡς ἂν ἐπιστήμην ἔχοντα
διαγνωστικὴν σημείων τῶν ἐκ θεῶν ἢ
δαιμόνων πρὸς ἀνθρώπινον βίον τεινόντων.
Δι᾿ ὃ καὶ τὰ εἴδη τῆς μαντικῆς εἶναι περὶ αὐτόν,
τό τε ὀνειροκριτικὸν καὶ τὸ οἰωνοσκοπικὸν καὶ640
θυτικὸν καὶ εἴ τινα ἄλλα τούτοις ἐστὶ
    Αὐστηρόν τε λέγεσθαι τὸν σπουδαῖον καθ᾽
ὅσον οὔτε προσφέρει τινὶ οὔτε προσίεται τὸν
πρὸς χάριν λόγον. Κυνιεῖν τε τὸν σοφὸν645
λέγουσιν, ἶσον <ὃν> τῶ ἐπιμένειν τῷ κυνισμῷ,
οὐ μὴν σοφὸν ὄντα ἐνάρξεσθαι τοῦ κυνισμοῦ. |
    Τὸν δὲ ἔρωτά φασιν ἐπιβολὴν εἷναι
φιλοποιίας διὰ κάλλος ἐμφαινόμενον νέων
ὡραίων· δι᾿ ὃ καὶ ἐρωτικὸν εἶναι τὸν σοφὸν650
καὶ ἐρασθήσεσθαι τῶν ἀξιεράστων, εὐγενῶν
ὄντων καὶ εὐφυῶν.
    Λέγουσι δὲ μήτε παρὰ τὴν ὄρεξιν μήτε
παρὰ τὴν ὁρμὴν μήτε παρὰ τὴν ἐπιβολὴν
γίνεσθαί τι περὶ τὸν σπουδαῖον, διὰ τὸ μεθ᾿651
ὑπεξαιρέσεως πάντα ποιεῖν τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ
μηδὲν αὐτῷ τῶν ἐναντιουμένων ἀπρόληπτον
    Εἶναι δὲ καὶ πρᾶον, τῆς πραότητος οὔσης655
ἕξεως καθ᾿ ἣν πράως ἔχουσι πρὸς τὸ ποιεῖν
τἁ ἐπιβάλλοντα ἐν πᾶσι καὶ μὴ ἐκφέρεσθαι εἰς
τἁ ἐπιβάλλοντα ἐν πᾶσι καὶ μὴ ἐκφέρεσθαι εἰς
εἶναι, τῆς κοσμιότητος οὔσης ἐπιστήμης
κινήσεων πρεπουσῶν, ἡσυχιότητος δὲ660
εὐταξίας περὶ τὰς κατὰ φύσιν κινήσεις καὶ
μονὰς ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος᾽ τῶν ἐναντίων
τούτοις ἐπὶ πάντων φαύλων γιγνομένων.
    Ἀδιάβολον δ᾿ εἶναι πάντα τὸν καλὸν
κἀγαθὸν, ἀπαρἀδεκτον ὅντα διαβολῆς, ὅθεν665
καὶ ἀδιἀβολον εἶναι κατά τε τοῦτον τὸν
τρόπον καὶ τῷ μὴ διαβάλλειν ἕτερον. Εἶναι δὲ
τὴν διαβολὴν διάστασιν φαινομένων φίλων
ψευδεῖ λόγῳ· τοῦτο δὲ μὴ γίνεσθαι περὶ τοὺς
ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας, μόνους δὲ τοὺς φαύλους καὶ670
διαβάλλεσθαι καὶ διαβάλλειν, δι᾿ ὃ καὶ τοὺς μὲν
κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν φίλους μήτε διαβάλλειν μήτε
διαβάλλεσθαι, τοὺς δὲ δοκοῦντας καὶ
φαινομένους. |
    Οὐδ᾽ ἀναβάλλεσθαι δέ ποτε τὸν675
σπουδαῖον οὐδὲν, εἶναι γὰρ τὴν ἀναβολὴν
ὑπέρθεσιν ἐνεργείας δι᾽ ὄκνον, ὑπερτίθεσθαι δέ
τινα μόνον ἀνεγκλήτου τῆς ὐπερθέσεως οὔσης.
Ἐπὶ γὰρ τοῦ ἀναβάλλεσθαι τὸν Ἡσίοδον
ταῦτ᾿ εἰρηκέναι·680
    Μήδ᾿ ἀναβάλλεσθαι ἔς τ᾿ αὔριον ἔς τ᾿
    Αἰεὶ δ᾿ ἀμβολιεργὸς ἀνὴρ ἄτῃσι παλαίει·
τῆς [δ᾽] ἀναβολῆς ἔκπτωσίν τινα τῶν685
προσηκόντων ἔργων ἐμποιούσης.
12     Ταῦτα μὲν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον. Περὶ γὰρ
πάντων τῶν παραδόξων δογμάτων ἐν
πολλοῖς μὲν καὶ ἄλλοις ὀ Χρύσιππος διελέχθη·
καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ Περὶ δογμάτων καὶ ἐν τῇ
Ὑπογραφῇ τοῦ λόγου καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις πολλοῖς5
τῶν κατὰ μέρος σνγγραμμάτων. Ἐγὼ δ᾽
ὁπόσα προὐθἐμην ἐπελθεῖν ἑν κεφαλαὶοὶς τῶν
ἠθικῶν δογμάτων <τῶν> κατὰ τὴν τῶν
Στωικῶν φιλοσόφων αἵρεσιν διεληλυθὼς
ὶκανὤς ἤδη τοῦτον τὸν ὐπομνηματισμὸν10
αὐτόθι καταπαύσω.


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